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The topic ofsubliminalperception (perception without awareness) is investigated in this thesis.
A technique of masking by visual noise was developed for use with an IBM-type
microcomputer and VGA screen. This technique was used to investigate whether subliminal
mood priming influences subjects' resolution oflexical ambiguity in a homophone task designed
by Halberstadt et al. (1995). Limited evidence was found for mood-congruent priming, but only
for negative emotional priming, and with the most strongly negative items. Some non-specific
effects were also found to be associated with negative mood priming. The mood-priming effect
was correlated with the negative emotional ratings of these items obtained from a separate
group ofsubjects. In a Follow-up study, a self-report mood scale was used to assess subjects'
reaction to both negative and positive subliminal stimuli. A pattern oftrends was found which
suggested that subjects experienced a paradoxical improvement in mood after exposure to the
negative stimulus. No changes were observed in the group exposed to the positive stimuli. A
theoretical explanation was entertained which suggested that subjects adaptively attributed their
change in affective arousal in terms of experimental demands. of A number ofrelationships to
recent research were suggested by these experiments, in particular the finding of a preattentive
bias for negative information in subjects with anxiety and non-clinical depression by Bradley
et al., (1994, 1995) and Mogg et al.,(1993). It is suggested that measures ofphysiological and
cortical arousal should receive attention in future research in order to clarify the response to
subliminal stimulation in terms of affective arousal.
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The research for this thesis began when I read an article by Patton (1992) on a Subliminal
Psychodynamic Activation (SPA) investigation of the theory that binge eating episodes may
be triggered, in those suffereringfrom bulimia, by an unconscious fear of abandonment. In the
article, Patton described a fascinating experiment in which an analogue eating-disordered
samplewas induced to eat more crackers in an experimental task, after subliminal exposure to
an abandonment threat phrase. Patton's article introduced me to the huge body ofresearch on
SPA, and led me to ask the question, along with many other researchers, 'Is this a genuine
phenomenon, and if so, how does it work?'
I started my investigation with little knowledge about subliminal stimulation, and with a odd-
looking device from the department workshop which was thought to be a tachistoscope, but
did not seem able to do any of the things that the sophisticated (and expensive) devices
describedin the literature could. I did not know at the time whether a personal computer, and
VGA screen had ever been used for subliminal stimulation, and set out to see if this was
feasible. I must give credit to Professor Lachenicht at this point, since he was adamant that it
should be possible to achieve subliminal exposure levels with the VGA screen.
This research project began therefore, with the development of a method of subliminal
stimulation, virtuallyfrom scratch. It has been a process ofexploration for me, both with regard
to the method and theories of subliminal perception, and this will probably be evident to the
reader. The use ofvarious methods and statistical techniques has necessarily been tentative
exploratory, and in the process, many different hypotheses and explanations have been
entertained. Entering this area of research from a position ofignorance, as I have done, has
also given me the luxury ofbeing uninvested in any particular theoretical position, but has left
me with the need for a coherent framework withinwhich to view my results. I have to concede,
that much of the theorising done in this thesis has been post hoc in nature. A fairly consistent
pattern of statisticaland theoretical findings has emergedfrom the research however, and gives
me the hope that this research will provide a basis on which more specific research questions
and hypotheses may be posed.
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We learn by taking chances. Every modern learning theorist
expects learning to be by trial with some errors. This is as
true for science as for the individual.
(John, W. Tukey, 1969)
Seriousness is stupidity sent to college.
(P. J. O'Rourke, 1992).
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This thesis seeks to investigatethe area, often referred to as 'subliminal perception', specifically
with regard to the question ofhow words presented below the threshold ofperception may
affectmood and cognition. This subjecthas been the subject ofcontroversy for some time, and
a range of effects have been claimed. It seems that there is some agreement in the literature,
especially in the last decade, that subliminalperception, or 'perception without awareness' is
a genuine phenomenon, and worthy of serious research.
This thesis describes the literature on subliminal perception, and attempts to integrate the
findings ofvarious research paradigms (psychoanalytically vs. non-psychoanalytically orientated
research). A major contention ofthis author, is that while these paradigms stem from different
theoretical orientations, and frame their experimental findings in seemingly incommensurable
ways, some integration is possible at a basic level of description. In the Survey ofLiterature,
these paradigms are compared, and critiqued.
Some time needed to be spent examining the evidence for subliminal perception, and
establishing the conclusions which have been reached by experimenters in recent years. A
discussionofperception without awarenessneeds to address the question ofconsciousness, and
the difference between conscious and unconscious processes. The discussion has mainly
revolved around empirical research, and the operational definitions of conscious vs.
unconscious processes.
The basic question explored in this thesis concerns subliminal priming and mood. The
experiments were designed to answer the question ofwhether subliminallypresented phrases
(negative or positively valenced) can affect the manner in which subjects access the various
meanings ofambiguous words. A secondary question, arising from this one, concerns subjects'
experience of subliminal stimulation. Follow-up research asks the question, 'Does any
measurable change in mood occur when subjectsare presented subliminally with different mood
suggestions.
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I would like to point out that the entire thesis is, in effect, an exploratory study of subliminal
priming and mood. Historically, the most usual way ofpresenting stimuli below the perceptual
threshold was by means ofa tachistoscope. This is an expensive instrument however, and none
was available for this research. Because of the ease with which a microcomputer may be
programmed, it seemed that this was probably a better alternative in many ways. However, little
information was available on the use of the microcomputer and VGA screen with subliminal
stimulation, and so far as I was aware at the time, a technique had to be pioneered. Everything
that was done for this thesis has an exploratory flavour to it, since this area was quite new to
me.
The various Pascal computer programs used for the experiments, and for scoring and analyzing
the data are given in the Appendices.
The stages ofexperimentation are as follows:
1. A method ofvisual masking was developed to run on an IBM-type 80486 computer whereby
visual stimuli could be presented below the perceptual threshold. The development of this
procedure is described in the chapter entitled Pilot Study (Chapter 3) .
2. The Main Study (Chapter 4) describes the use ofthemasking technique with various mood-
type phrases ('sad' and 'happy') where the research question concerned the resolution oflexical
ambiguity by emotional state (based on the research of Halberstadt et al. 1995). The
experiment was run with a sample of 108 subjects with computers linked to a file server, and
the question was posed, 'Can subliminally presented mood stimuli affect subjects ' spelling of
ambiguous words (homophones)?
3. With some encouragement from the Main Study that the technique worked, the Follow-up
Study (Chapter 5) was designed to answer the question 'Do subjects experience a change in
mood after subliminal stimulation, which could be reflected in their responses to a self-report
mood scale?'
Because of the complexity of the effect associated with priming, extensive data analysis was
done. The analysis was thought to be justified, since little was known about subliminal mood
priming, and the experiment was deliberately exploratory in nature. Justification for this
approach to statistical analysis is found in the method termed Exploratory Data Analysis
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(EDA) and attributed to John Tukey. This is set out and discussed briefly in Chapter 6.
I would like to apologise in advance for the complexity ofthe analysis presented in Chapter 4.
In order to 'unlock' the secrets contained in the data, an intensive item analysis was necessary.
This appeared to thrown some light on the effects obtained, and attributed to the subliminal
priming. In order to study the data, several statistical models were used:
1. A principle components analysis was done to summarise the determinants ofvariance.
2. An factorial analysis ofvariance model was used to test for group differences.
3. A non-parametric Chi-square analysis of the items was done to assess the effects of the
independent variable subliminal condition on subjects' responses to the homophone task.
An independent rating ofthe homophones was done, and an interesting set of correlations was
observed which suggests that items were sensitive to negative, but not positive priming.
1.2 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
It seems necessary at this point to discuss the ethical considerations of exposing subjects
subliminally to aversive stimuli. Lasser (1977) raised a concern in a letter addressed to
Silverman, that his experiments were unethical for the reason that they were designed to 'stir
up unconscious conflict, and thus increase psychopathology...' Lasser pointed out that even
though the negative effectswere transient, the mere fact that pathology-enhancing experiments
were conducted was difficult to justify ethically.
Silverman's reply sets out 4 considerations:
1) In his experiments, informed consent was regularly obtained.
2) Intensification of pathology by means of Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation (SPA) is
'with rare exceptions' slight, and fleeting (see Section 2.5 for a definition). Moreover,
pathology-intensifying stimuli are used in one session only, as opposed to pathology-reducing
stimuli given for therapeutic purposes, which are given repeatedly.
3) Extensive debriefings were given to participants after the experiment and in particular, care
was taken to reveal the content ofthe stimuli. Silverman remarks that in their experience, this
'lessens the possibility ofany lingering negative effects' ( in Lasser, 1977, p. 578).
4) In the rare instances where negative effects arose from the experimental manipulation,
clinical interviews were conducted, and further action was taken.
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The subjects who participated in the Main Study, admittedly, were naive to the nature ofthe
study, and were not informed until after the experiment. However, the aversive subliminal
stimulus phrase was mild ('Sad and grey'), and on the basis ofthe literature consulted, it did
not seem likelythat any negative effects would be experienced. A relaxation exercise was built
into the procedure in order to counter experimentally induced anxiety that may have occurred.
In the Follow-up Study however, where a more noxious phrase was used, informed consent
was obtainedverballyfrom all subjectswhen they were invited to participate. All subjects were
informed that the experiment would involve subliminal exposures of a similar nature to those
used in the Main Study.
The claimby Silverman, that intensification ofpathology by means of subliminal stimulation is
slight appears to be consistent with the literature consulted in the review of SPA literature in
that effect sizes are generally small (see Weinberger & Hardaway, 1990). On the basis ofthis,
it was felt that the risk of complications arising from this research was slight.
Particular care was taken to debrief the subjects in the Follow-up study, and to make an
assessment of their post-test mental status, based on both a subjective assessment and
examinationofthe subjects' post-test mood scores. If subjects expressed any concerns, more
time was spent debriefing, and discussing their response . All subjects were invited to contact
the experimenterifany ill effectshad occurred, or ifthey experienced anything (such as dreams
or feelings) which they thought were unusual and might be related to the experiment. Each
subject was later sent written feedback on her participation in the experiment. This was done
because of the nature of the psychometric tests, and for ethical reasons. Since the General
Health Questionnaire is an instrument designed to screen for psychopathology, and the Profile
Of Mood States is a potential indicator of disturbance, the experimenter felt obliged to reflect
the results of this test to the subjects in an appropriate manner if there was any cause for
concern. Instead of singling out subjects whose results seemed problematic, I decided to
incorporate a briefperformance report with a letter of thanks to each subject, highlighting if
necessary, any concerns and inviting the subjects to contact the experimenter if she needed
assistanceor had queriesarising from the experiment. In general, the mood ofparticipants was
either unchanged, or improved (according to scores on the POMS) after the subliminal
intervention, so it does not generally seem likely that any significant distress resulted.
5
Fourthly, no instances of complications were reported by any of the participants. Since the
hypotheses explained to the subjects as part ofthe debriefing procedure were not supported,
and others were formulated, the subjects were all sent copies of a letter asking ifthey would
like to be informed about the results ofthe research, and inviting them to participate in further
research, shouldthis occur. Subjectswere also invited to contact the researcher ifthey had any
queries related to the research. Although 10 ofthe subjects replied, none had queries related
to the research.
On the basis of these considerations, it is claimed that the research conducted did not cause
the participants any significant degree of distress, and that it was done in an ethical manner.
1.3 CONVENTIONS
In this thesis, words such as condition, sad, happy, neutral, sad/neutral happy/neutral. are
italicisedbecause they are used as variablenames, and refer to actual independent ofdependent
variables used in the analysis. Quotes are used with words such as 'sad' and 'happy' or
'neutral' when they refer to words characterised as such, although this characterisation is not
absolutely self-evident.
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2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Subliminalstinrulation is a large, fascinating, and extremely controversial subject which touches
on many different areas ofresearch. For this reason, a number oftheoretically distinct fields are
referred to in this review ofliterature. In each field, there exists a substantial body ofliterature
which spans many years ofresearch. In the area ofvisual masking, I have drawn heavily from
the work ofBreitmeyer (1984). Breitmeyer's book usefully summarises the vast and complex
literature on visual masking. Another book found to be useful was that ofDixon (1981) which
provides a helpful summary ofthe earlier literature on subliminalstimulation. These works have
proved to be valuable entry points into the more recent literature ofwhat could be referred to
generically, as subliminal research.
This review aims to give the reader a general overview of the subliminal research, and to
highlight conclusions which may be drawn from it. In selecting literature, I have tried to focus
on the most central and important findings. Because the topic of subliminal stimulation is an
extremely controversial one, it seemed necessary to spend some time establishing the empirical
basis from which research into perception without awareness has come to be regarded as a
worthwhile area ofinquiry. The content and extent ofthe survey was somewhat constrained
by the availability ofjournals, and the literature presented here is only a sample ofthe published
research. This literature is highly detailed and complex and the single greatest challenge for this
author has been to interpret and synthesize this fascinating but conflicted body ofresearch.
In this chapter, two research paradigms, or traditions are discussed and compared (Subliminal
Psychodynamic Activation vs. non-psychoanalytically orientated research), and a suggestion
is made that while these research paradigms stem from vastly different theoretical orientations,
they need not be regarded as incommensurable. In reviewing evidence for subliminal effects,
various findings willbe presented and discussed. The conclusion is reached in this chapter that
a substantial amount ofresearch clearly establishes the existence ofperception and cognition
without awareness. This conclusion is based on evidence from both research paradigms alluded
to, and while significant common ground exists between them, some gaps in the
psychoanalytically orientated research exist and need to be addressed by means ofmore discrete
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and narrowly defined research.
2.2 THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF MASKING PROCEDURES
In this section, a briefintroduction is given to the theory ofvisual masking, and it is suggested
that this technique offers a way in which conscious and unconscious processes may be
explored. The focus ofthe discussion is the disruptive effect of masking on visual perception.
Visual masking refers to the technique used to modify perception ofvisual targets by preceding
or following the target with a flash oflight, or the exposure of a pattern in the target area. The
technique has been extensivelyused to research processes and stages ofvisual perception, and
it is often used as a method of stimulus degradation to prevent conscious perception,
registration and identification ofstimuli. Masking by light and masking by pattern (also referred
to as masking by visual noise) are two types ofmasking commonly used.
In early research, visual masking was used to investigate the effects of sudden changes ofvisual
sensitivity in terms of light and dark adaptation, but later researchers focussed on temporal
aspects of the perception and processing of visual stimuli. In the first type of research
mentioned, it was found that as masking flash intensity increases, overall visual sensitivity
decreases. Conversely, as masking flash intensity increases, visual sensitivity thresholds
increase. By using a masking flash, registration of a prior stimulus may be affected for up to
100 ms. In other words, any stimulus displayed for up to 100 ms before the masking flash may
be affected by it in terms of a reduced sensitivity. The brighter the masking flash, the less
sensitive subjects were to preceding stimuli. It is not clear ifthis effect is due to changes in the
sensitivity of the photoreceptors alone, or if there are accompanying neural adaptations. In
research carried out by Boynton and Kandel (1957, cited by Breitmeyer, 1984, p. 39-42) there
appears to be evidence for both. These authors showed separate effects of photochemical
depletion in the photoreceptors, and reduced sensitivity in neural systems as a function oflight
adaptation.
According to Breitmeyer, Exner (1868, in Breitmeyer, 1984) was the pioneer ofthe method
of backward masking by light, and this method has been employed extensively in subsequent
research. The backward masking by light technique consists of presenting a stimulus flash
(target) followed at some measured time interval, by another non-stimulus (mask) flash.
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Breitmeyer summarises the general findings of subsequent research as follows:
(1) 'the more intense the after-coming mask flash, the less the visibility ofthe prior target...'
(2) 'the greater the temporal interval between prior target and succeeding mask, the weaker
the masking magnitude' (p. 17).
A theoretical explanation offered for the masking by light effect is the sensory persistence
hypothesis (Eriksen, 1966, cited by Breitmeyer, 1984, p. 17). In this view, the target stimulus
persists in the visual system as a decaying visual after-image and the mask that follows, causes
interference by combining,or becoming integrated with it. Thus, the decaying after-image from
the target merges with the subsequent blank, and usually brighter, masking field and becomes
indistinguishable from it. Marcel (1983) asserts that energy masking does not operate merely
at a physiological level, such as that where changes in photoreceptors occur, but also at a
psychological level. This is supported by Boynton and Kandel's research (1957, op cif.) where
separate neural and photochemical changes were observed.
Backward masking by visual noise is similar to the masking by light technique except that a
mask consisting ofrandom characters or markings is used instead ofthe bright masking field.
Masking by light is sometimes thought of as a type of energy masking which may be explained
by the sensory persistence hypothesis. Turvey (1973, in Marcel, 1983) suggests that masking
by light operates at a more peripheral stage of perception. Marcel (1983) qualifies this by
speculating that with masking by light, the contour information of the stimulus is degraded
before it can be graphicallyanalysed. This is consistent with the sensory persistence hypothesis,
that the target stimulusmerges with the mask. It is suggested that visual noise masking, on the
other hand, affects a later, or more central stage ofvisual processing.
The sensory gating hypothesis describedby Mayzner, Tresselt and Helfer (1967, in Kahneman,
1968) is somewhat differentto the sensory persistence explanation. According to these authors,
the effects of discrete stimuli are particularly susceptible to interference by subsequent and
temporally close stimuli (within approximately 100 ms). They suggest that visual input is
slightly delayed at a 'gate' prior to entry into awareness, and is particularly vulnerable to
interference at this point of entry. Conscious recognition ofthe target stimulus is disrupted by
the temporally close mask stimulus at the point ofthe sensory gate, and the target stimulus is
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thereby prevented from entering awareness.
The first hypothesis (sensory persistence) emphasises the merging ofthe temporally close mask
flash with the stimulus, and thereby implies that features, or contours of the stimulus are
degraded by the mask flash. This would preclude any further pattern recognition, and the
implication is that degradation occurs at a more peripheral level. The second hypothesis
(sensory gating) stresses the disruptive effect ofthe mask on conscious recognition ofvisual
data. It is thought to be a more central method ofmasking since the contours ofthe stimulus
are not degraded by the mask. The notion of a 'gate' may be a helpful way of expressing the
slight delay between preconscious and conscious processing of stimuli. Perhaps conscious
recognition of stimuli is determined by means of various templates (corresponding with
perceptual defences - see Dixon and Henly, 1991 for a discussion of differential stimulus
thresholds), in which case the notion of a 'gate' would be appropriate.
Both hypotheses agree that there is a delay between registration of a visual stimulus and
awareness. The first suggests that the mask merges with the stimulus, and the second suggests
that the mask interrupts, or prevents further processing of the stimulus. It may be that these
theories explain the two different types of masking: the first explains the masking by light
effect, while the second explains the masking by visual noise effect.
Masking effects are ofcentral importance to the present thesis because they have implications
for the process ofvisual perception - namely those of(1) registration of a stimulus and (2)
recognition, or what may be termed 'cognitive categorisation' (Breitmeyer, 1984 p. 24).
Breitmeyer concludes that while the exact process ofvisual processing which masking disrupts
is not clear from the research, it may be thought of in approximate terms as intervening
between registration and recognition of the stimulus. The processes of registration and
recognitionmay be conceptualised respectively as perception ( 'entry ofthe visual impression
into consciousness') and apperception ('the entry of the conscious impression into the focal
point ofawareness') (Wundt, in Breitmeyer 1984, p. 24). Using Wundt's terminology, visual
masking could then be considered as intervening between processes of perception and
apperception. The more precise notion of iconic memory is suggested by Neisser (1967, in
Breitmeyer, 1984) as a stage ofregistration at which a 'literal' representation ofthe stimulus
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occurs, although it has not been further processed or categorised (Breitmeyer, 1984, p. 24).
Making a clear distinctionbetween registration ofa stimulus, and the entry ofthis data into 'the
focal point of awareness', Breitmeyer implies that processing beyond the stage of iconic
representation is effortful. That is, the transfer of information from the stage of iconic
registration to that of cognitive representation requires conscious effort. Visual masking thus
prevents the transfer ofstimulusdata from a 'precategorical, literalvisual representation or icon
ofthe stimulus' to a higher level of 'cognitive categorical representation' because it causes a
diversion of attention (ibid.). Marcel (1983) suggests that this interpretation of masking is
widely accepted, and ascribesit to Sperling (1967) and Turvey (1973) (both in Marcel, 1983).
Proponents ofthis interpretation suggest therefore, that visual masking disrupts the availability
of raw representation ofvisual input (iconic memory), without which it cannot be processed
to achieve semantic or phonological encoding. This means that the masking by light effect is
not merely due to changes in sensitivity ofthe photoreceptors and visual neurons, but concerns
a disruption of the process by which raw data is further encoded. It also suggests that visual
information stored briefly in sensory registers is unavailable to consciousnessif'it cannot be
transferred to the processing stage described as that ofapperception or conscious cognitive
categorisation. In remarking on the subjective effects ofvisual masking, Breitmeyer cites an
interesting observation made by Cattell (1885):
In making these experiments I notice that the impressions [ofbriefly exposed
letters, words or sentences] crowd simultaneously into my consciousness, but
beyond a certain number, leave traces too faint for me to grasp. Though unable
to give the impression, I can often tell, if asked, whether a certain one was
present or not. This is especially marked in the case oflong sentences; I often
have a curious feeling ofhaving known the sentence and having forgotten it.
The traces ofimpressionsbeyond the limits ofconsciousness seem very similar
to those left by my dreams (cited by Breitmeyer, 1984, p. 24).
Cattell gives an interesting account of his own familiarity with targets which could not be
recalled, but that could later be recognised. This remark is an interesting antecedent to the
research into perception without awareness which will be discussed later in this chapter. On the
basis of Cattell' s account and subsequent research, one may readily speculate that memory
traces ofvisual stimuli persist in some form, even ifpartially unavailable to consciousness.
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Theories ofvisual masking are diverse, but have in common the idea that 'the visual response
to a brief stimulus lasts much longer than did the stimulus that caused it; consequently the
response to two successive stimuli may overlap in time' (Kahneman, 1967, p. 419). The
technique offers, potentially, a way ofinterfering with the process ofperception by interrupting
the normal signal processing path so that masked stimuli may be registered in the visual cortex,
but not enter consciousness. Dixon (1981) refers, for example, to 'preconscious processing'
as the facility in which perceptual information is processed before its entry into awareness'.
2.3 THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF THE TERM 'UNCONSCIOUS'
A logical starting point in a review of literature on unconscious perception would be a
discussion ofwhat is termed 'the unconscious'. Discussion ofthis issue however, leads into the
midst of a thorny debate. At the theoretical level, it is difficult to define the nature of
consciousness, quite apart from making viable distinctions between what is conscious and
unconscious. At the empirical level, it is certainly difficult to operationalise such a concept in
a valid, or at least defensible manner.
Definitions of the 'unconscious' tend to be circular, and one faces the considerable difficulty
in the first place, of establishing the nature of consciousness. This leads into the fimdamental
philosophical problem ofmind which needs to be acknowledged, but which cannot be explored
in a work ofthis length. The Cartesian intuition of an ontological difference between mind and
brain is certainly currently regarded as passe, yet interestingly, is still treated as an important
reference point - even ifit has become an Aunt Sally. Identity theories of mind appear to be
current, and without professing any commitments to them, or espousing philosophically strong
views regarding ontology, this author has found them to be a useful focus for the problem of
mind'.
1 In particular, Strawson (1959) suggests a useful synthesis in his book Individuals: An
Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics.
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The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1992) defines the word
'unconscious' in its adjective form in 4 ways:
1. Lacking awareness and the capacity for sensory perception; not
conscious.
2. Temporarily lacking consciousness.
3. Occurring in the absence of conscious awareness or thought:
unconscious resentment; unconscious fears.
4. Without conscious control; involuntary or unintended: an
unconscious mannerism.
In its noun form, the word is taken to signify:
The division of the mind in psychoanalytic theory containing elements of
psychicmakeup, such as memories or repressed desires, that are not subject to
conscious perception or control but that often affect conscious thoughts and
behaviour.
It is interesting to see the distinction made in a generalist publication of this kind, between
informal and formal notions ofunconscious processes. Informal (adjectival) descriptives of
unconscious processes appear, amongst other things, to refer to events which occur in the
absence ofconscious awareness, thought or control, and they are referred to here as informal
because they are not associated with a specific theoretical superstructure. The more formal
(noun) description of the unconscious is often associated with a more systematic theory of
mind, namely psychoanalysis.
The non-psychoanalytic notion of 'unconscious' phenomena appears to be less specific, and
does not entail psychoanalytic constructs. Use ofthe term 'unconscious' often seems to be
avoidedby these theorists because ofits association with psychoanalysis. Instead of employing
the term 'unconscious' for example, Bradley et al. (1994) use the notion of 'implicit memory'
to refer to biases in 'early' attentional and perceptual processes. The word 'early' here refers
to a stage of information processing in terms ofits order of occurrence. Clearly though, the
term 'unconscious' may be used to refer to processes and entitiesapart from the theory-specific
constructs ofpsychoanalysis.
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The psychoanalytic paradigm' is explicitly linked to 'Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation'
(SPA) research - an approach pioneered by L. H. Silverman in 1964 (according to Schulman,
1990) who published the bulk ofhis experimental findings from 1974 to1985. In this approach,
subliminal stimulation is understood to bypass 'certain ego defences that require conscious
awareness ofstimulus content in order to be effective' (Bomstein, 1992, p. 70). It may be said
that proponents of this position are indebted to psychoanalysis for their understanding of
psychic structure, the nature ofthe unconscious and explanations of experimental findings.
Non-psychoanalytic conceptions of unconscious psychological processes are largely
independent oftraditional psychodynamic constructs, and an impressive body ofresearch data
has been created over the years. Kihlstrom et al. (1992) claim that 'After 100 years ofneglect,
suspicion, and frustration, unconscious processes have now taken a firm hold on the collective
mind ofpsychologists' (p. 788). These authors suggest that the study of so-called 'subliminal
perception' is no longer seen as entailing a commitment to psychoanalysis. Authors who are
more antagonistic to psychoanalysis imply that by the same token, investigation ofunconscious
processes has gained a degree of scientific credibility.
There is a large and self-critical body of recent research in this area which has surfaced
independently of psychoanalysis. Reading in this area heightens awareness of the inherent
difficulties of research, and Erdelyi (1992) captures this sense by his injunction that the
unconscious should be 'reclaimed gingerly'. The reason for the apparently renewed interest,
and the emerging consensus that unconscious processes can be the subject of serious scientific
study, appears to be partly due to the influence of cognitive neuropsychologists and various
other branches ofexperimental and social psychology. Kihlstrom et al. refer to research into
the 'Non-Freudian Unconscious' as a species of scientific psychology, by implication, unlike
that ofFreud. According to these writers,
...the psychological unconscious documented by latter-day scientific psychology
is quite different from what Sigmund Freud and his psychoanalytic colleagues
2 The term 'paradigm' is not used here in its strictest Khunian sense which refers to
scientificmodels which include' ...law, theory, application, and instrumentation...' (Kuhn,
1970) from which emerge coherent traditions of scientific practice, but rather in the more
casual sense ofa distinctive theoretical and practical modus operandi.
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had in mind... Their unconscious was hot and wet; it seethed with lust and
anger; it was hallucinatory, primitive and irrational. The unconscious of
contemporary psychology is kinder and gentler than that, and more reality
bound and rational... (p. 788).
While the ' scientific' basis for contemporary research into unconscious processes may be
queried, much of it shows evidence of careful efforts by researchers to find links with other
established fields of research. An interesting area in which unconscious phenomena are
mentioned is that ofneuropsychology where the 'blindsight' syndrome' (Weiskrantz, 1977,
cited in Dixon, 1981) has been investigated. Findings in this area seem, in particular, to have
alerted researchers to brain processes which appear to be mediated without representation in
consciousness. Researchers in different fields such as cognitive psychology (eg. Greenwald et
al., 1995), advertising(eg. Kellyand Kessler, 1978 in Theus, 1994) and neuropsychology (eg.
Ladavas et aI., 1993) have investigated specific aspects of unconscious processing using
subliminal methods of stimulation.
2.4 SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION
The term ' subliminal' is made up from the prefix sub , and the Latin term limen, meaning
threshold, and refers in its psychological sense, to stimuli which are below the threshold of
conscious perception. These stimuli, according to The American Heritage Dictionary ofthe
English Language (1992), are 'Inadequate to produce conscious awareness but able to evoke
a response'. In the public mind, subliminal phenomena are commonly associated with
propaganda, advertising, and ' self-help ' tapes. Attitudes do not seem to vary much, and
subliminal stimulationis often regarded as sinister (subliminal propaganda), as a rather magical
but coercive advertising technique, or as a type of self-help method (eg. giving up smoking,
boosting confidence etc.). Some applications ofsubliminal stimulation will be briefly mentioned
in this chapter.
Advertisingresearch into effects ofsubliminal messaging on choice behaviours generally shows
inconclusive or negative results (Theus, 1994), and certainly does not suggest that the
technique can be applied indiscriminately with any degree of success. Although the author of
3 In this condition, patients with damage to the striate cortex ofthe occipital lobes are able
to make discriminative responses to stimuli that they cannot report having seen.
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the apparently original experiment (Vicary, cited by Theus, 1994) in which the phrases 'Eat
Popcorn' and 'Drink Coca Cola' were presented tachistoscopically at 0.5 ms to an audience
in a movie theatre, claimed increases in sales ofthese items, these findings have certainly not
been replicated with any degree of reliability. With regard to advertising, Theus asserts that
visually presented stimulihave a higher chance ofbeing cognitively processed than do auditory
stimuli. Theus concludes that stimuli relating to relevant need states are most likely to produce
related behavioural changes. The psychological characteristics ofthe audience are plausibly an
important factor, and effects depend therefore on susceptibility to psychodynamically relevant
subliminal themes.
The research consulted on subliminal messaging in 'self-help' type audio tapes suggests that
the claimed effect is either non-existent, or due to placebo (Mitchell, 1995; Pratkanis et aI.
1994; Merikle and Skanes, 1992; Greenwald et aI., 1991; Russell et al., 1991). Claims that
backward messaging in music affects behaviour are apparently also not well-founded according
to Vokey and Read, (1985). These authors conclude that 'the apparent presence ofbackward
messages in popular music is more a function ofactive construction on the part ofthe perceiver
than ofthe existence ofthe messages themselves'.
In reviewing evidence for the use of subliminal techniques as propaganda tools, Bornstein
(1989) concluded that the research suggests that 'exposure to simple drive or affect-related
subliminal stimuli can produce ecologically significant, temporally stable changes in attitudes
and behaviour, and therefore may have potential for use as propaganda tools'. This conclusion
agrees with that of Theus since both stipulate that messages need to be relevant to need or
drive states in the target audience.
The three areas mentioned thus far with regard to subliminal perception, illustrate the variety
of ways in which it has been applied or researched. It is not surprising, given the number of
spurious claims about the efficacy ofthe method, that research in this area tends to be regarded
with scepticism. A sceptical attitude about subliminal effects is certainly justified, and should
in fact be cultivated. An appropriate response would therefore be to view any methodology
critically, and to employ appropriate controls in experimental design.
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2.5 SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION: RESEARCH PARADIGMS
The expression 'perception without awareness' is a way many authors refer to 'subliminal
perception' without invoking the connotations ofthe latter phrase. Some authors find it useful
to characterise such phenomena in this way since this phrase carries fewer assumptions, and
is more precise. In this thesis, no particular theoretical framework is implied by the use ofthe
term 'subliminal perception', and these terms are used interchangeably unless otherwise stated.
Attention was drawn earlier, to the uses ofthe word 'unconscious', and it was pointed out that
a distinction can often be drawn between schools of thought on the two ways in which the
word is used. The noun reference to 'the unconscious' was seen as referring to a specific
theoretical position, namely psychoanalysis. The word is also used more informally and
atheoretically to refer to specific processes which occur without conscious awareness. This is
a term used to refer to a greater diversity of empirical phenomena.
Two different traditions have emerged from research into the unconscious. The first ofthese
has strong links to psychoanalysis, and is partly a reaction to criticism that psychoanalysis lacks
a basis of empirical support for its assertions (Shulman, 1990). The rivalry between
psychoanalysis and other schools ofthought can hardly be overstated. For example, Eysenck's
suspicion ofpsychoanalysts' reliance on clinical data led him to remark that 'We can no more
test Freudian hypotheses on the couch, than we can adjudicate between the rival hypotheses
of Newton and Einstein by going to sleep under an apple tree' (Eysenck, 1963, in Shulman,
1990).
Subliminal perception was seen by psychoanalytically inclined researchers as a tool by which
the unconscious could be investigated, and this issued in the Subliminal Psychodynamic
Activation (SPA) research paradigm. SPA seeks to investigate specific psychodynamic
formulations and propositions experimentally.
Other approaches to investigating the unconscious are also based on experimental
methodology, and whilst they do not collectively constitute a distinctive approach, they use
traditional experimental methods, and tend to be associated with a wide range of more
empirically based theories.
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The term 'paradigm' which is used to characterise these research traditions, is used in its more
casualphilosophical sense for conveniencesake because it is has some currency in terms ofthis
meaning. It would certainly be inaccurate to characterise these two orientations as being
separate paradigms in the stronger Kuhnian sense however, and this brings to light a tension
in the literature. There appears to be little in the way of discussion which synthesises the
findingsofthe two research paradigms referred to here. It is important to make this point since
the strictuse ofthe term implies that research data generated in different paradigms cannot be
compared. This is because ofthe assumed dependencyofthe data on the method of observation
used, and the incommensurability ofthe associatedtheoretical constructs. Kuhn made this point
with an illustration of the separate accounts of a helium atom that a physicist and a chemist
would give. For the chemist, 'the atom ofhelium was a molecule because it behaved like one
with respect to the kinetic theory ofgases'. For the physicist on the other hand, 'the helium
atom was not a moleculebecause it displayed no molecular spectrum'. Kuhn's understanding
ofthis theoretical difficulty is that whileboth scientists were talking about the same entity, they
were 'each viewing it through their own research training and practice' (Kuhn, 1970, p. 50-51).
Now in practice, one gains the impression that data generated within the two research
paradigms are viewed and treated as incommensurable because of the way that the data is
perceived to be dependent on (or even determined by) a theoretical superstructure. There is
apparentlylittle communication across this theoretical divide, and researchers in one tradition
tend either to ignore, or to be unaware ofthe findings emerging from the other.
The idea that these research orientations are incommensurable may be rejected on the basis,
suggested by Popper, that science is distinguished from non-science by the notion ofpotential
falsifiability". This provides a basis for agreement on findings, provided that hypotheses are
narrow and separated from generalisations suggested by high-level ideological or quasi-
scientific dogmas. Provided that hypotheses are specific and potentially falsifiable, they do not
need to be seen as inextricably linked to a particular (perhaps highly disputed) theoretical
4 An elegant exposition ofthis position is given by Popper in his book Quantum Theory
and the Schism in Physics (1982) in which he argues for a realistic or non-idealistic
interpretation of quantum theory. He argues that science may progress on the basis of
rational argument, and need not terminate in subjectivism where data is regarded as
indistinguishable from theory.
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framework. Naturally, conclusions drawn from experimental data need to be described with
caution lest they be paraded as evidence for a priori assumptions.
The point was argued in this section that understandably, researchers ofthe unconscious have
been sceptical of psychoanalytic conceptions of unconscious cognition. The fact that many
researchers have shifted to more 'respectable' (or perhaps more researchable) areas such as
neuropsychology and cognitive-orientated theories ofmemory and perception (Jacoby et aI.,
1992) suggest that there has been acceptance ofthe notion ofthe 'unconscious', and that this
notion is not synonymous with psychoanalysis. The result is the acceptance of a 'cognitive
unconscious that differs in important ways from the psychoanalytic unconscious' (ibid.).
Erdelyi rightly draws attention to the apparent fact that 'Although the unconscious need not
be logically tied to the psychodynamic approach, in practice it usually is' (1992), hence his
warning that it should be reclaimed 'gingerly'. This does not necessarily mean that data
generated by SPA researchers is 'tainted', or incommensurable, with that generated by
experimentersworking in other theoretical fields, and Popper's criterion ofthe demarcation of
sciencefrom non-sciencewas pointed to as a way of establishing appropriate common ground.
2.5.1 THE SUBLIMINAL PSYCHODYNAMIC ACTIVATION PARADIGM
In this section, a survey of literature which falls into the realm of Subliminal Psychodynamic
Activation (SPA) will be presented. Criticisms of the approach will be noted, and discussed.
2.5.1.1 SYMPTOM ENHANCEMENT STUDIES
According to Shulman, Silvennanis credited with the development of SPA methodology (1964
in Shulman 1990, p. 489). Silverman's experiments involved tachistoscopically exposing
(typically 4 exposures at 4 ms.) various groups of clinical subjects (such as 'stutterers',
'schizophrenics', 'depressives' etc.) to psychodynamically relevant stimuli (relevant that is, to
their diagnosedpsychopathology). These stimuli were designed to evoke unconscious conflicts
in the subjects, or as Weinberger and Hardaway (1990) put it, they were designed to 'stir up
libidinal and aggressive conflicts' presumed to underlie psychopathology. The dependent
measures were contrived to measure associated changes. The stimuli were either verbal, or
drawings depictingvarious relevant themes. Generally, the results of such studies were positive,
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and appeared to support the various psychoanalytical formulations.
Numerous examples, which are discussed below, are available of both mixed and positive
findings with the use ofpsychodynamically relevant subliminal stimulation phrases with clinical
samples. Talbot et al. (1991) found that both subjects suffering from anaclitic' depression and
controls who were exposed (4 ms.) to the experimental phrase 'Mommy is leaving me', ate
significantly less crackers in an experimental task, than those exposed to the control phrase
'Mona is loaning it'. It is important to note that the depressed group did not react differently
to the control group when exposed to the abandonment stimulus in this experiment and this is
inconsistent, as the authors point out, with previous studies (Dauber, 1984; Schmidt, 1981.
cited by Talbot et al. 1991). Those exposed to the supraliminal experimental phrase tended to
eat more crackers in the bogus rating task. Interestingly, this was a relatively large all male
group (N=148). These authors suggest that the lowered consumption offood in the anaclitic
group exposed to the abandonment stimulus is related to the tendency of the anaclitic
personality to engage in denial and avoidance as a defence against conflict. This does not
explain the lowered consumption offood in the control group however. It may be, as they point
out, that the response ofmale subjects is different to that offemales, but the fact remains that
the stimulus phrase did not differentiate clinical from non-clinical groups on the basis ofthe
central behavioural index, and this casts doubt on the validity oftheir hypothesis. They concede
that the abandonment phrase may not have been specifically relevant to the 'needs, wishes, and
fears central to the anaclitic personality', and may be salient to all human beings.
These authors also used a measure of 'Confidence in judgement' and 2 measures of
'Confidence in Interpersonal Attractiveness'. They found that in the first measure of
'Confidence in Interpersonal Attractiveness', both the anaclitic and control group exposed
subliminally to the abandonment message showed significantly lower levels of confidence than
those exposed to the neutral stimulus.
5Anaclitic depression is contrasted with introjective depression whereby the former is
thought to be related to an early loss ofmaternal support, manifesting in pathology and
interpersonal difficulties related to 'primitive' conflicts, and the latter is thought to be
related to more mature types of conflicts such as guilt and personal unworthiness etc.
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Despite the lack ofspecificity found in their subjects' response pattern (in terms ofthe subject
groups), and hence a lack of support for their psychodynamic hypothesis, these authors'
conclusion, that semantic analysis was performed without consciousness appears valid, since
there was a qualitatively different response to supraliminal and subliminal exposure of the
stimuli. They speculate that the subliminal message bypassed ego defences to activate
symptoms (avoidance, denial), while the supraliminal presentations of the stimuli activated
defences. They suggest that the increasedfood consumptionnoted in the supraliminal condition
reflected an 'action-oriented defence against anxiety and an act ofself-nurturance' (p. 821).
Dauber (1984) found in a group of depressed women (N=18) that subliminal (4 ms) exposure
to the phrase 'Leaving momis wrong' increased depression, but the stimulus phrase 'Mommy
and I are one' did not reduce depression. In a second experiment, the stimulus 'Leaving mom
is wrong' also increased depression, especially for high scorers on a measure ofintrojective
depression, and the stimulus 'Mommy and I are two' reduced depression on one ofthe two
dependent measures (TAT) at a level close to significance (p=O.054). The dependent measure
used in both experimentswas a modifiedversion ofthe Depression Adjective Check List (Lubin
1965, in Dauber, 1984), and the additional dependent measure used in the second experiment
was the TAT. Dauber concluded that psychodynamically relevant effects could be shown with
subliminal stimuli whose content was relevant to the psychodynamics ofthe subjects.
In a study ofabandonment fear and binge eating, Patton (1992) found support for the theory
that binge eating episodes are associated with fear of abandonment in an analogue sample of
eating disordered, and non-eating disordered subjects (as measured by the Eating Disorder
Inventory: Gamer and Olmstead, 1984, in Patton, 1992). Using a double-blind method, Patton
found that eating disordered subjects ate significantly more than non-eating disordered subjects
in a bogus cracker rating task after subliminal exposure to the stimulus 'Mama is leaving me'.
No such effect was found with subjectsfrom either group when the exposure was supraliminal,
nor was there any increase when subjects were exposed subliminally to the control phrase
'Mama is loaning it'. Patton interpreted these findings as giving preliminary support for the
psychoanalytic hypothesis that binge eating is a defence against an unconscious fear of
abandonment.
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2.5.1.2 SYMPTOM REDUCTION STUDIES
After initial research with stimuli calculated to stir up unconscious conflicts, Silverman went
on to explore the use ofsubliminal stimuli which were designed to activate symbiotic fantasies
(eg. 'Mommy and I are one') and achieve a decrease in pathology. These symbiotic fantasies
were found to ameliorate symptoms in a broad range ofboth clinical and non-clinical groups.
Findingsby other researchers were thought to corroborate certain psychoanalytic propositions.
In their article, Gustavson and Kallmen(1990) cite Silverman's (1982) review ofthese studies,
and mention important positive findings. In an experiment, high school students' classroom
behaviour and academic performance improved after exposure to a subliminal symbiotic
message (Bryant- Tuckett and Silverman, 1984, cited by Gustavson and Kallmen, 1990).
Following exposure to a symbiotic message, patients were more easily able to give up smoking
(Palmatier and Bomstein, 1980, cited by ibid), and alcoholics were able to reduce their
drinking (Schurtman, Palmatier and Martin, 1982, cited by ibid). In their own research,
Gustavson and Kallmen showed that when subjects were exposed to a subliminal symbiotic
phrase ('Mommy and I are one'), cognitive and motor performance was improved compared
to subjects exposed to a neutral phrase ('People are walking'). The improvements resulting
from exposure to the symbiotic stimulus are typically explained by the theory that a child's
separation from a mother figure is accompanied by unconscious anxiety and insecurity.
Associated with this separation is an unconscious wish to return to the security ofthe symbiotic
state with the mother figure. This wish however, is in direct conflict with the socialised
superego which forbids such a shift. Exposing subjects to a subliminal suggestion of symbiosis
is thought to bypass the superego, and the unconsciouswish is :fulfilled by means of a symbiotic
fantasy - thereby reducing anxiety and improving performance.
2.5.1.3 EVALUATION OF SPA RESEARCH
In this section, SPA research will be discussed in terms ofvarious criticisms and the answers
to these criticisms. The emphasis will be on a broader view ofthe validity of SPA research.
2.5.1.3.1 FUDIN AND BENJAMIN (1992)
Although the literature surveyed thus far all showed positive findings, there are a substantial
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number offailures to replicate them In summarising their list of experimental results, Fudin and
Benjamin (1992) concluded that the majority of experiments do not clearly support SPA
hypotheses. These authors categorised the results ofpublished research using the guideline that
a judgement ofwhether the findings ofthe experiments were supportive of SPA or not should
be based simply on the result of hypothesis testing. They established their criteria in the
following manner:
1. ]fat least halfofthe hypotheses advanced in an experiment were supported, the investigation
would be judged 'clearly supportive' .
2. If any hypothesis was supported on any measure, the results were classified in a 'middle
group' - these studies could be thought of as 'weakly supportive' .
3. Results in which no hypotheses were supported, or ifthe results were significant but in the
opposite direction to that expected, were categorised as 'non-supportive' (Fudin and Benjamin
1992, p. 962).
The results of their review are illustrated in
Figure 2.1. The largest proportion (51.30%) of
their findings were weakly supportive (79
studies), followed by the non-supportive findings
(24.70%, 37studies), which was closely followed
by those which were supportive (24%, 37
studies). ]fone takes the supportive and weakly
supp ortive findings, it could be said with some Figure2.1 Surveyof findings (Fudinand Benjamin, 1992).
legitimacy that the majority of the studies lent
some support to SPA, even if such support is weak. Included in the group of studies which
Fudin and Benjamin judged non-supportive are some where results were opposite to those
predicted but were statistically significant. While these results clearly do not confirm the
hypotheses, they stilldo not constitute a null finding. ]fone sees this less conservatively, these
results may be valid experimental findings. Results which are opposite to predictions are still
meaningful, and constitute a comment of some kind on the hypothesis in question.
Giventhe data presented above, these authors' judgement that the majority offindings do not
clearly support SPA hypotheses may be overly conservative. A general dismissal of SPA
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methodology on the strength of the above findings is unwarranted, since the majority ofthem
could be seen to lend it some support, even ifit is modest. The contention that SPA effects are
highly specific with regard to the nature ofthe stimuli employed, the dependent measure, and
the psychodynamic characteristics ofthe subject sample needs to be highlighted. Dauber (1984)
makes this same point in his comment that investigators should take more care to finely
delineate their subject populations than they have done in the past. Otherwise, Dauber argues,
justice is not done to either the research method, or psychoanalytic theory. This comment
seems appropriate given the guideline suggested earlier, that hypotheses should be precise,
narrow and specific.
Despite some successes in finding support for psychoanalytic hypotheses, this approach has
been heavily criticised. Criticisms are levelled at SPA research on methodological, statistical
and theoretical grounds.
2.5.1.3.2 BALAY AND SHEVRIN (1988)
In particular, Silverman's research has been subjected to extensive criticism ego Silverman and
Candell (1970: On the relationship between aggressive activation, symbiotic merging,
intactness of body boundaries, and manifest pathology in Schizophrenics); Silverman et
al.(1972: The effects ofsubliminal drive stimulation on the speech ofstutterers); Silverman
et al. (1973: An experimental study of aspects of the psychoanalytic theory of male
homosexuality) ; Silverman (1978: Simple research paradigm for demonstrating subliminal
psychodynamic activation: Effects ofoedipal stimuli on dart throwing accuracy in college
males) - these studies cited in Balay and Shevrin, (1988).
Balayand Shevrin (1988) offer the following general criticisms of Silverman's work:
1. Problems with experimental design and control.
2. The lack of consistency and robustness of Silverman' s claimed effects.
3. The inconsistencies of Silverman' s results in relation to SPA methodology and the
psychoanalytic propositions which Silverman researched.
These criticisms will be described briefly.
Firstly, a number of methodological difficulties are given. In many of his experiments,
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Silverman had difficulty in establishing the neutrality of both neutral and control stimuli, a
difficultywhich was largely ignored. This is problematic since the neutrality of control stimuli
cannot simply be assumed, as Balay and Shevrin point out. They cite a study by Litwack,
Wiederman and Yager (1979) in which it was found that Silverman's supposedly neutral
stimulus, 'people are talking', was not seen to be neutral by a group of schizophrenic subjects.
The phrase elicited the association in these subjects that 'people are talking about me'. There
also been general difficulty in establishing the validity ofthe stimuli which Silverman used in
terms ofthe construct being tested. Balay and Shevrin ask the following germane question:
For instance, ifa subliminalpicture of a charging lion increases a pathological-
thinking change score as compared to the critical control picture of a bird, is
that because of the aggressive qualities ofthe experimental stimulus, because
of some unknown meaning the bird has for the subjects, or because of some
unknown interaction between the baseline control pictures and the experimental
stimuli? (p. 162).
Another difficulty involves Silverman's use of two types of controls, i.e. both a baseline and
critical control paired with the experimental stimulus. The difficulty involves the lack of
counterbalancing in the order of baseline and critical conditions with regard to the baseline
controls. Because ofthis, Balay and Shevrin argue that results 'cannot be generalised beyond
the interaction ofbaseline and critical conditions' (p. 162).
Silverman is also criticised for the excessive use ofpost hoc and ad hoc explanations, and
auxiliary hypotheses which are not validated by any further research. An example Balay and
Shevrin give ofan auxiliaryhypothesis involves Silverman's 'index ofhomosexual orientation'
derived from ratings of sexual attractiveness ofmale and female photographs. This index was
used without any attempt at validation. While these authors acknowledge the difficulty involved
in operationalising and researching these constructs, they criticise Silverman for continuing to
expand the applications ofhis theory while ignoring difficulties ofthis kind. Silverman tended
to proceed regardless of experimental inconsistencies, and without testing the post hoc
hypotheses which were formulated to explain them. Balay and Shevrin suggest that by doing
so, Silverman tended to ignore difficulties in his basic theory.
Secondly, the results which Silverman reported were by no means robust, and a number of
attempted replications have failed. Silverman himself also had difficulty in replicating some of
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the experimental successes. This happened in the case of Silverman's study of stuttering where
an exact replication of the earlier results was not achieved. Silverman also failed to replicate
a study of competitive behaviour and oedipal conflict involving dart throwing as a dependent
measure. A notable failure to replicate cited by these authors is Heilbrun (1980) in which care
was taken to replicate the exact conditions of Silverman's original study (Silverman et a!.,
1978, in Balay and Shevrin, 1988). Although the experiment was repeated twice, each time
with refinements to bring it closer to the original experiment, no effect was found. According
to Balay and Shevrin, Heilbrun was at a loss to explain these findings from a methodological
point ofview, and was forced to conclude that SPA effects were not at all robust.
Thirdly, Silvennan's theoretical assumptions have been questioned with regard to the use of
the supposedly ubiquitously therapeutic (symbiotic) phrase 'Mommy and I are one' . Balay and
Shevrin dispute Silverman's claim that this is universally relevant by suggesting that fantasies
ofoneness are experienced, expressed and understood idiosyncratically. For some individuals,
they argue, a fantasy ofsymbiotic oneness might have been experienced on 'Mommy's lap', in
which case the experimental phrase 'Mommy's lap' would be more potent. One can certainly
see the logic of this argument, and it seems possible that cultural differences could be an
important factor. For example, the authors point out that in the South, usage of the term
'Mama' is more prevalent than in the northern parts ofthe United States. Given that this is a
likelyfactor, one could then reason that idiosyncratic factors and differences in life experience
are also determinants ofresponse to any given symbiotic stimulusphrase. llitimately, this ought
to become a research question which is operationalised and tested.
2.5.1.3.3 WEINBERGER AND HARDAWAY'S (1990) REBUTTAL
A larger list of criticisms is given by Weinberger and Hardaway (1990) who also attempt to
answer them. Some ofthese objections will be presented and discussed.
1.Primary analyses ofdata. A) Gain scores have been used instead of:final status and covariate
adjusted scores. B) Silverman and other authors have often been accused ofusing one-tailed
tests of significance.
Weinberger and Hardaway answer these objections by pointing out firstly, that the use of
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change, or gain scores is probably appropriate in the case ofwithin-subjects designs in SPA
methodology since the ANCOVA has a tendency to under adjust for the pre-treatment score,
whereas the difference score has a tendency to over adjust for the pre-treatment score. This,
Weinberger and Hardaway suggest, is desirable since the danger ofunder-adjusting for pre-
treatment scores is worse than the danger of over-adjusting in SPA research. In cases where
there is a high correlationbetween pre- and post-treatment scores, the use of difference scores
is justified. In addition, these authors point to the fact that meta-analyses of SPA research
which report genuine effects for much of the research, have used measures which are not
vulnerable to the gain-score criticism.
Secondly, These authors point to the general controversy about the use of one-tailed versus
two-tailed tests ofsignificance. IIIpractical terms, conversion from a one-tailed to a two-tailed
test ofsignificance is easily done by doubling the probability level, although the probability of
making a Type I error is increased (i.e. retaining Hainstead ofHo). On the other hand, these
authors argue that levels of significance are a question of convention, and do not have any
necessary logical or scientific basis. As Weinberger and Hardaway remark, on occasion
statisticians have intimated that psychologists worry too much about Type I errors and not
enough about Type IT errors (Cohen, 1977;Hunter et al. , 1982; Rosenthal and Rosnow, 1984,
cited by Weinberger and Hardaway, 1990), and giventhe somewhat arbitrary nature ofp<0.05,
this concern has substance especially in areas ofresearch where effect sizes are generally small.
2. File-drawer argument. This argument states that there may be a large body ofunreported
negative results that 'languish in filing drawers' and which lead to the impression that SPA
findings are more consistent than is the case in reality.
Weinberger and Hardaway respond to this argument by pointing out that many ofthe studies
on SPA were doctoral dissertations, and state that these are published whether they report
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negative or positive outcomes. Their analysis ofthe fail-safe N statistic" suggests that further
validation ofthe aggressive and libidinal drive studies is needed, while the oedipal sanctioning
and symbiotic studies appear robust with respect to the probability ofthe number of existing
null filing drawer studies.
3. Failures to replicate. Weinberger and Hardaway acknowledge that there have been some
replication failures, but suggest that some of them were not valid replication attempts. They
offer detailed criticisms of some of these failed replications. In the case cited by Balay and
Shevrin (Heilbrun, 1980: failed replication of symbiotic oneness studies), Weinberger and
Hardaway point out deficiencies of Heilbrun's procedure, one of which was the viewing
distance of the tachistoscope which was 30 cm less than that of Silverman et al. (1974) and
which altered viewing anglesby 10 to 30%. Weinberger and Hardaway suggest that this factor
may have been responsible for the failure to replicate, since subjects may not have been able
to see the stimulus. One oftheir conclusions, based partly on invalid failures to replicate, is that
Silverman and his colleagues were not more likely to obtain effects than independent
investigators. They base their conclusion on a sample of the results of research gathered in
1985. In this sample, they show that of the 59 supportive studies, 33 were connected to
Silverman in some way, and 26 were conducted independently ofhim.
Weinberger and Hardaway suggest that inconsistent outcomes may sometimes be due to a lack
of statistical power. For instance, if one takes the average power (0.31, one-tailed) of the
symbioticoneness studies (where a=0.05)using the average sample size ofthe studies (N=36)
then the probability ofmaking a Type IT error is 0.69. With a two-tailed test, power is reduced
to 0.21, and statistically non-significant results can be expected 79% of the time (p. 741).
Periodic failures in replication can therefore be expected due to a lack of statistical power.
Weinberger and Hardaway conclude that 'blanket indictments cannot be legitimately levelled
because of isolated failures to replicate' (p. 741). They also conclude that meta-analysis is
6 This method entails an estimation ofthe number ofstudies averaging null results, and the
determination ofthe number of studies it would take to annul a given number ofpositive
findings. The fail-safe N statistic reflects the number of studies showing null results that
would bring the probability ofa body of research to p=0.05. I£thefail-safe N is large
enough, the filing drawer criticism is regarded as invalid.
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required for the whole corpus ofresults to be analysed systematically. The results oftheir meta-
analysis suggest that while there appears to be a significant laboratory bias in SPA effects for
'libidinal-drive derivative studies' and 'oedipal-prohibiting studies', no such bias exists in the
Oedipal and adaption-enhancing studies. Moreover, they demonstrate from the meta-analysis
that there are substantive effects in SPA research for oedipal and adaption-enhancing stimuli.
4. Subliminality. As Weinberger and Hardaway comment, the question of subliminality is a
thorny one. The main problem in this area it seems, is a lack of consensus on what constitutes
subliminality. Cheesman and Merikle (1984) suggest that subliminal effects are observed at the
higher subjective awareness threshold (see section 2.6.1). Weinberger and Hardaway do not
resolve the definitional difficulties, but assert that an acceptable set of criteria regarding
subliminality are generally agreed upon and met in SPA research.
It is indeed difficult to establish whether authors have adequately ensured the subliminality of
their stimuli. It seems that most authors have used an exposure time of4 ms using unmasked
stimuli on a tachistoscope (see Bomstein, 1990, Bomstein, 1992; Dauber, 1984; Masling et al.
1991; Patton, 1992). This appears to have become a rule ofthumb. Some authors go to great
lengths to establish that the stimuli were not consciously detected by their subjects. For
example Masling et al. 1991, used 3 separate tests of awareness: 1. An open-ended recall test.
2. A multiple choice recognition test. 3. Tests in which subjects were asked to discriminate
between control and experimental stimuli exposed at 4 ms. These authors had positive results
in their experiment. Dauber (1984) also asked subjects to choose between control and
experimental stimuli exposed at 4 ms. As a test ofawareness, Patton (1992) required subjects
to choose between control and experimental stimuli in a list of phrases, and found that their
selection of targets did not exceed the level of chance. While absolute assurance cannot be
given, generally, the impression was gained from the literature which was consulted, that the
authors went to great lengths to ensure subliminality oftheir stimuli.
Bomstein (1992) regards stimulus unawareness as a crucial factor for the production of SPA
effects. Although he remarks that some authors have 'not assessed subjects' awareness of4-ms
stimuli as rigorously as possible' he implies that subliminality was generally achieved, from the
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fact that differential effects were found between subliminal and supraliminal exposure
conditions. He points to 43 studies in which there was a comparison between these two
conditions, and shows that statistically stronger effects were likely to occur in the subliminal .
condition (in the theoretically predicted direction) at a rate significantly higher than chance
(X~7.54, df=l, N = 43, p=0.006). Bornstein also found evidence for this in his meta-analysis
of SPA studies (1990, cited in Bornstein, 1992). This indicated that significantly stronger
effects on behaviour occurred when stimuli were presented subliminally. This argument may
seem to be somewhat circular because when Bornstein attempts to infer that subliminality was
achieved from the finding that differential effects occurred between conditions, he seems to be
assuming what he is trying to prove. Although he has not established in the first place that the
exposure conditions were different, it seems reasonable to make this inference (backwards)
from the fact that different effects were obtained between conditions. His argument is perhaps
not viciously circular.
5. Expectancy and demand characteristics. Weinberger and Hardaway reply to the criticism that
SPA effects are due to experimenter effects, and the demand characteristics ofthe experimental
situation by pointing out that SPA studies are carried out in a double-blind fashion. True
double-blind studies are rare in psychology, as these authors remark, and are a strong guarantee
both that the experimenter cannot systematically influence a subject's response, and that the
subject cannot guess the direction ofthe expected effect. This seems to be an adequate answer
to the criticism.
6. The problem ofinference. These authors acknowledge that the (unconscious mental) events
which mediate between the stimulus and behavioural response have only been inferred, and
concede that it constitutes a serious problem for SPA. Indeed, this is a thorny question which
can scarcely be answered since the events are by definition unconscious. It seems likely that
events such as these can only be inferred from behavioural, or perhaps electrophysiological
changes. It would be exceedingly naive therefore, to suppose that unconscious events could
ever be directly observed, or for that matter, to think that any psychological process can be
directly observed without making inferences of some kind. However, the various measures
from which inferences are made need to be validated as far as it is practically possible, in order
that the inferences made are defensible.
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7. There is some agreement that non-psychoanalytic interpretations of SPA findings are poor,
and Weinberger and Hardaway concede that rejection of these interpretations does not
constitute support for psychoanalytic theory. This draws attention to the argument made
previously that findings should, in principle, be able to stand on their own and not be
completely dependent on an elaborate and unverifiable theoretical superstructure, although it
is obviously necessary for experiments to have theoretical underpinnings and implications. It
seems important, if an impasse due to theoretical incommensurability is to be avoided, that
findings should lead to theoretical refinement and new syntheses. This would necessitate the
use of well established criteria and definitions. Consensus therefore needs to be reached on
operationally precise definitions ofwhat constitutes an unconscious process. On the other hand,
it is easy to formulate theoretical criteria so rigidly that empirical demonstrations of such
phenomena are rendered impossible a priori. This makes dialogue and co-operation across
tradition theoretical lines all the more necessary, and necessitates the use ofwell validated and
defensible measures.
2.5.2 DISCUSSION
In this section, discussion of the SPA paradigm is summed up briefly. The concepts of
'subliminal perception' and 'unconscious' processes are both extremely controversial, as are
psychoanalytic constructs. Any discussion of SPA is therefore bound to be encumbered by
controversy. SPA research faces a major problem in establishing the nature ofthe unconscious
processes which mediate between a subliminal stimulus and behavioural output, and this is a
problem which leads, at present, to a major impasse. It is not known how in principle, this
could ever be established, but one can nevertheless remain open to the possibility that more
direct and defensible dependent measures can be developed in order to demonstrate the nature
ofmediating processes? and make inferences more acceptable. Critics of SPA however, tend
to fix criteria so rigidly that detection of unconscious processes seems to be rendered
impossible a priori, and this poses a major problem with regard to operationalising variables.
t Masling et al. (1991) for instance, found significant changes in skin conductance and
respiration rate, in subjects who were exposed to the experimental phrase 'No one loves
me' and concluded that emotionally relevant stimuli perceived without awareness have
predictable, measurable effects on autonomic arousal.
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Debate concerning the replicability of SPA effects is vigorous, although some of these
criticisms may be answered satisfactorily (eg. the filing drawer argument). However there
appear to have been some genuine failures to replicate Silverman and others' work. This is a
point which Weinberger and Hardaway (1990) concede. It seems that SPA effects are highly
specificthough, and there may be specificnuances which replication studies did not reproduce.
Some replication studies appear to have involved rather arbitrary judgements of significance
and have been considered failures when in fact their findings were very close to p <0.05. For
example Hayden and Silverstein (1983) judged their replication attempt a failure on the basis
ofp<0.06, 1=2.031, two-tailed (in Weinberger and Hardaway, 1990, p. 737). Weinberger and
Hardaway cite a number of similar examples which they consider to be overly conservative
judgements.
The criticismthat supposed SPA effects are actuallydue to experimental expectancy effects and
demand characteristics, is adequately answered by the fact that SPA research employs double-
blind methodology.
The following points can be made in summary of the SPA literature.
1. While there are theoretical and methodological difficulties with the findings of SPA research,
enough evidence exists to support the conclusion that SPA effects exist, and are modest in size,
and probably highly specific with respect to the properties of the stimuli in relation to the
psychodynamic issues relevant to the subjects. TIle nature ofthe claims made for these effects
is problematic however, and the claimed connections between the subliminal stimulus message
and behavioural response are often disputed.
2. Bomstein's seemingly robust finding of different effects between the subliminal and
supraliminalexposure conditions is important. In an analysis of43 studies Bornstein found that
there are likely to be no experimental effects when stimuli are viewed in the above threshold
exposure condition, but when stimuli were exposed below the perceptual threshold, effects
were observed. This was confirmed in a meta-analysis which found significantly stronger
behavioural effects when stimuli were presented subliminally. These findings led Bornstein to
claim that unawareness was crucial for the production of SPA effects.
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3. The conclusion ofFudin and Benjamin(1992) that the majority of experiments do not clearly
support SPA hypotheses, while technically correct, appears to err on the conservative side since
it ignores a considerablenumber ofpositivefindings for experimentalhypotheses in their middle
and non-supportive groups.
4. The criticisms of Balay and Shevrin regarding problems with experimental design and
controls, lack of consistency and robustness of Silverman's claimed effects, and theoretical
inconsistencies, appear less damning in the light of Weinberger and Hardaway's
counterarguments. In particular, these authors' meta-analysis, along with those ofother authors
(Eg. Bomstein, 1990) appears to support the conclusion that reasonably robust and reliable
SPA effects exist without needing to resort to problematic statistical tests and levels of
significance.
Another quantitative review and meta-analysis by Weinberger and Hardaway (1990) of
symbiotically activated fantasies found that after correction for statistical artifacts, small but
significant effectswere present. Hardaway suggested that further research designed to replicate
the experimental design and effects was superfluous.
5. The question ofthresholds cannot be settled beyond all doubt, but it is likely that many SPA
researchers were able to establish that stimuli presented in the subliminal condition were
undetectable.
In short, SPA research has made an important contribution to research on perception without
awareness, and evidence exists that specific behavioural changes may be evoked by certain
subliminal stimuli. Explanations given for these behavioural changes lack specificity and
empirical support however, and links between subliminal stimuli and the experimental effects
need to be further elucidated (eg. the general therapeutic usefulness ofthe symbiotic oneness
stimulus 'Mother and I are one'). This author suggests that these links need to be carefully
investigated with a view to producing a greater degree oftheoretical integration.
2.6 THE NON-PSYCHOANALYTIC RESEARCH PARADIGM
It was pointed out earlier that there is no necessary connectionbetween research into subliminal
perception and psychoanalysis. This point is important since the explicit aim of SPA is to test
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specificpsychoanalyticalpropositions, whereas research in this area is concerned with a wider
range ofnon-clinicalphenomena. In this section, important research will be surveyed, and the
conclusions and implications discussed.
2.6.1 SEMANTIC PRIMING
Many studies ofunconscious perception have been done in which primes (usually words) are
presented tachistoscopically to subjects below the perceptual threshold. This is done as a way
ofresearching the aspects ofvisual perception which occur without awareness. The discussion
will begin with the question ofthresholds, since this is crucial in understanding the research.
It must be pointed out from the outset that one ofthe most problematic issues in this area is
the question ofthresholds. There is sharp debate on the question of stimulus thresholds and
measures ofawareness in the 'perception and cognitionwithout awareness' literature, although
in recent years, some consensus has been reached on the basis of Cheesman and Merikle's
(1984) definition oftwo threshold levels:
1) A subjective threshold is the detection level at which 'subjects claim not to be able to
discriminate perceptual information at a better than chance level' (p. 391).
2) An objective threshold is 'the detection level at which perceptual information is actually
discriminated at a chance level' (ibid bold type added for emphasis).
Greenwald et al. (1995) clarifythis in a helpful manner by suggesting an operational definition
of each:
1) A subjective threshold is associated with 'greater stimulus energy', and is also likely to be
associated with above-chance performance on direct measures. Essentially it is the highest level
of stimulus presentation at which subjects report phenomenal lack of awareness.
2) An objective threshold is the highest level of stimulus energy at which 'forced-choice
responding indicates that the stimulus is undetectable' (ibid). This signifies that performance
is at the level of chance in a direct test of detection.
Questions are often raised concerning the subliminality of stimuli in the early studies of
semantic priming without awareness. In their criticism of a previous experiment (McCauley,
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et al.,1980, cited by Purcell et al., 1983) which used backward masked semantic primes,
Purcell et al. dispute the claim that the primes were presented below the threshold for
identification, and hence the claim that semantic priming without awareness occurred. They
suggest in the case of McCauley et al., who in their view produced some of the most
convincing evidence ofsemantic priming without awareness, that the priming information was
actually available to subjects because oflight adaptation. They concluded therefore, that this
claim of sematic processing without awareness was premature.
Cheesman and Merikle (1984) also failed to obtain priming effects when their exposure
threshold was based on an objective test of awareness (subjects are not able to distinguish
between targets and non-targets in a forced-choice test at a greater than chance level).These
authors however, were able to show priming effects when a subjective threshold was used.
They argue that the effect of masking is to reduce subjective confidence that a stimulus has
been presented, and in this situation, subjects may show discriminative responding although
they are not able to report having seen the stimulus. In terms of Cheesman and Merikle's
findings, this is likely to be an explanation ofwhy Purcell et al. failed to obtain priming effects
in their experiment, since they set their threshold at the objective level. It is thus possible that
the findings ofMcCauley et al. are quite valid, assuming that the subjective exposure threshold
was used.
A later study of unconscious semantic processing was conducted by Groeger (1984) which
investigated the effect of priming on word recognition. Subjects were required to choose a
response (in a forced-choice manner) from a matrix of24 words which were either structurally
or semanticallyrelated to the subliminal target. The matrix ofwords was made up as follows:
6 were semantically related to the target, and the remaining 18 had some structural similarity
to the target. Groeger established awareness and recognition thresholds for each subject and
each target in a preliminary experiment. The average awareness threshold was in the region of
10 ms, and recognition thresholds fell between 37 ms and 59 ms. Subjects were exposed to
stimuli at these two levels, and were then asked to select the word they thought they had seen
from a matrix ofwords. The words in the matrix were either structurally or semantically related
to the stimulus word.
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Groeger concluded that the data supported the views ofsubliminal perception theorists, i.e. that
unconscious semantic processing occurred. Subjects exposed to primes that were below
recognition threshold chose words that were structurally related to the target, i.e. structural
or graphical analysis occurred and predominated in word choice. Subjects exposed to primes
that were below the awareness threshold chose words that were semantically related, i.e.
semantic analysis predominated in word choice.
Marcel (1980, cited by Marcel, 1983. N.B. in all cases, Marcel1980 is cited by Marcel, 1983)
conducted an experiment in which subjects were exposed to polysemous" words which were
shown to subjects in either a masked or unmasked manner. Preceding presentation of the
polysemous word was a context word, and after presentation ofthe polysemous word was a
third (target) word. For example, one ofthe sequences used was:
1. HAND (context or biasing word)
2. PALM (polysemous word: either a type oftree, or a part ofthe hand)
3. WRIST. (target word)
Marcel found that the masked presentation of the word 'PALM' facilitated processing ofthe
word 'WRIST' irrespective ofthe preceding context word, whereas the unmasked presentation
of the word 'PALM' only facilitated processing of the word 'WRIST' when the preceding
context word was 'HAND' . Presentation ofthe priming word 'TREE' delayed processing of
the target word 'WRI ST' . Marcel used decision time to target as a dependent measure.
The conclusion ofthis experiment was that conscious awareness is necessary for the selection
of a context-relevant interpretation of a stimulus. While the context word activated one
meaning only ofthe polysemous word in the unmasked condition, both were activated when
exposure to the polysemous word was masked. Thus, as Merikle (1992) expresses it, 'context
exerts relatively few constraints when words are perceived without awareness, but conscious
awareness is necessary for the selection of context-relevant interpretation' (p. 794). The
significance ofthis result is that a qualitatively different effect was shown between conscious
8 A polysemous word has more than one meaning, which are all spelled the same (distinct
from a homophone whose various meanings sound the same, but are spelled differently).
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and unconscious conditions, hence Marcel considered that a difference between conscious and
unconscious cognition had been demonstrated.
2.6.2 WORD DETECTION, GRAPHIC AND SEMANTIC ANALVSIS
In a further series of studies, Marcel (1983) showed that as word-mask stimulus onset
asynchrony"(SOA) was reduced, subjects reached chance-level performance on the detection,
graphic, and semantic decisions in that order. A dioptic" method ofpattern masking was used
in this experiment. A corollary ofthis finding is stated by Doy1e and Leach (1988), that 'there
is semantic activation at short SOA's which is more useful to subjects than graphic information
in making similarityjudgements (p. 289). In other words, semantic judgements could be made
about stimuli, even when presence/absence judgements about stimuli were at chance level, thus
providing evidence of semantic processing at short SOA's.
In a review of visual masking studies, Doyle and Leach (1988) re-examined and re-analysed
the results ofvarious replications attempted in the following experiments:
1) Marcel (1983), experiment 2
2) Fowler et al. (1981)
3) Nolan and Caramazza (1982)
Marcel (1983) tried to replicate his original demon stration (1980, in Doyle and Leach, 1988)
that a semantic judgment could be performed when the presence/absence judgements about
stimuli were at chance level, but appeared to be unsuccessful. However, Doyle and Leach's
reanalysis ofthe experiment show that subjects were still able to discriminate better on the basis
of semantic similarity than graphical similarity under these conditions. The results of at-test
are significant (p<0.05, one-tailed) when subjects' choice of semantically similar words is
compared with their choice ofgraphically similar words (35.6% vs. 29.4%). As a replication,
9 SOA refers to the duration between the onset of the target exposure, and that of the
mask in backward masked experiments. It could be thought of as the effective exposure
time.
10 In dioptic exposures, stimuli are presented separately to both left and light visual fields,
usually with specific modifications. This method is distinct from the binocular method
where stimuli are presented to both visual fields simultaneously. '
37
Doyle and Leach suggest that a one-tailed test of significance is appropriate.
In the case ofsimilarwork by Fowler et al. (1981, in Doyle and Leach, 1988), Doyle and Leach
suggest that evidence for semantic activation was overlooked. In their second experiment which
implemented a control condition (in which subjects were not exposed to any masked stimulus),
the size ofthe bias (in favour ofsubjects choosing correct targets) when there was no stimulus
present, was not compared with the size ofthe effect when the stimulus was present since the
authors only tested against the 50% level of chance. In re-analysing the data, Doyle and Leach
conclude that evidence existed which was overlooked, of semantic processing at SOA's for
which subjects cannot make visual judgements of similarity above the level of chance .
Thirdly, in their study, Nolan and Caramazza (1982, in Doyle and Leach, 1988) did not
compare the results of semanticjudgements between the groups of subjects who were exposed
to a stimulus to those who were not. Semantic judgements were superior to visual judgements
at the low presence/absence detection level, but the difference was not statistically significant
(58% vs 55 %). However, differences which approach statistical significance (p=0.12, two-
tailed) can be seen between the two groups in terms of semantic judgements (58% correct
when the stimulus was present vs . 50% correct when it was absent). These conclusions seem
somewhat tenuous, but Doyle and Leach suggest that since 2 subjects (who were excluded
from the analysis because oftheir detection scores of>60%) performed significantly better in
the semanticjudgements than the visual similarity task, additional corroborating evidence exists
for semantic activation at short SOAs. Again, this conclusion seems precarious.
Doyle and Leach conclude (perhaps a little optimistically) that the studies reviewed provide
ample evidence ofsemantic activation at short SOAs where detection is at the level ofchance.
The claim made by Marcel that semantic similarity judgements would be superior to those of
presence/absence was not clearly supported though.
In their own research, Doyle and Leach found that at short SOA's, words were more detectable
than non-words. They term this a 'word superiority effect', and concluded the following:
1. High level processing (lexical access, as opposed to graphical analysis) occurs for short
target-mask SOA's when subjects have considerable difficulty detecting the target.
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2. Because words are more detectable than non-words, lexical activity affects levels of
detectability.
In two further experiments, Doyle and Leach replicated this effect, and refined a number of
hypotheses related to the detectability ofwords in terms oftheir orthographic structure.
Another experiment which replicated and confirmed the experimental findings of Doyle and
Leach was done by Hirshman and Durante (1992). In their first experiment, they showed that
while masked prime-presentation durations of33 ms produced near-zero identification rates,
the semantic priming effect was approximately as large in the masked prime condition as in the
control (above threshold) condition. Hirshman and Durante replicated this finding in an
identical experiment, and reported similar findings, i.e. that targets preceded by related primes
were responded to faster than targets preceded by unrelated primes.
Hirshman and Durante draw the following conclusions from their work:
1) The finding that semantic priming can occur without prime identification 'raises important
questions about the sufficiency oftheories which assume that conscious retrospective semantic
matching occurs' (p. 263).
2) The finding that semantic priming can occur in the absence ofidentification suggests, that
'semantic activation can occur before word identification' (p. 264). This finding agrees with
that of Groeger (1984), Doyle and Leach (1988) and numerous others (see Hirshman and
Durante, 1992, p. 264).
Amongst other things, this findinghas important implications for theories ofword recognition,
and especially for theories of subliminal perception. Hirshman and Durante suggest 'that an
item's semantic characteristics may affect the latency or accuracy ofits identification' (ibid),
a suggestion made too by Balota (1990, in Hirshman and Durante, 1992). Although this could
simplyreflect issues ofword complexity and recognisability, it is also suggestive ofthe notion
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of perceptual defences", although this notion as operationalised by the Defence Mechanism
Test (DMT) designed by Kragh (1985, cited by Bengtsson, 1991) and used for example, by
Sundbom et al. (1989), appears on first impressions, to be rather remote from Hirshman and
Durante's observation.
Sundbom et al. showed a relationship between the borderline personality disorder and specific
perceptual distortions measured by the subliminal DMT. Bengtsson (1991), another researcher
in this area, suggests that 'stimuli which do not achieve conscious representation may still
influenceconscious psychologicalprocesses' (p. 38). Despite the fact that this observation has
become something of a cliche in the literature, when seen in the light of Hirshman and
Durante's suggestion, it appears more plausible. Bengtsson remarks that 'the findings from
several lines of research strongly suggest that pre-conscious processing involves complex
cognitive activity, including, among other things, semantic analysis and an emotional appraisal
of sensory inflow... ' (ibid). This remark naturally suggests a number ofinteresting avenues
for exploring psychodynamically orientated hypotheses.
Bengtsson suggests that the emotional classification of sensory inflow that takes place outside
of awareness influences its chance of achieving phenomenal representation. Specifically,
r
Bengtsson submits that when the 'perceptual threshold for an emotionally loaded stimulus is
raised compared to a more neutral stimulus, the effect may be interpreted as a manifestation
ofthe defence mechanism ofrepression' (ibid). This is similar to Dixon's view (see footnote
11). The Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation (SPA) literature is certainly replete with
examplesofbehavioural changeswhich occur in response to specific stimuli, and these may be
related to the phenomenon of differential semantic processing. Whether these phenomena can
be equated with defensive operations though, is a subject which requires careful consideration.
Unfortunately, drawing parallels between semantic analysis and defensive operations raises
further problems and goes beyond the scope ofthe research discussed in this review.
11 The existence ofperceptual defences is inferred from the finding that different stimuli
(verbal and pictures) have different sensitivity thresholds. Dixon (1991) states that
'subjects show abnormally high or low thresholds for words related to underlying
complexes' (p. 245).
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2.6.3 THE MERE EXPOSURE EFFECT
This refers to the finding by Zajonc (1968, in Bornstein and D'Agostino, 1992; Murphy and
Zajonc, 1993) that 'repeated, unreinforced exposure is sufficient to enhance attitude towards
a stimulus' (ibid. , p. 545). This finding has been shown to be robust, and reliable.
2.6.3.1 CONDITIONING BY MEANS OF UNDETECTED STIMULI.
Another effect consistent with the findings cited and discussed previously in relation to
unconscious semantic processing (Groeger, 1984; Marcel, 1980, in Marcel, 1983; Doyle and
Leach, 1988; Hirshman and Durante, 1992, p. 264) is that termed the mere exposure effect,
observed in below threshold exposures. Research into the mere exposure effect has thus been
extended by presenting conditioning stimuli subliminally, with the result that stronger
conditioning effects have been found for subliminal presentation than for above threshold
presentation. Indeed, Bornstein's (1989) meta-analysis of subliminal mere exposure
experiments concluded that 'across all mere exposure experiments, there is an inverse
relationshipbetween stimulus recognition accuracy and the magnitude ofthe exposure effect'
(in Bornstein, 1992, p. 545) .
In their 1992 study, Bornstein and D'Agostino replicated this finding in two experiments with
subliminal (5 ms) and above threshold (500 ms) exposures to various stimuli (Welsh figure, and
a photograph). Both experiments showed evidence that the mere exposure effect was stronger
in the subliminal condition than when stimuli were clearly recognised.
Another study which deserves mention, is that by De Houwer et al. (1994) who used a method
of backward pattern masking on a 70 Hz VGA computer screen linked to a 486 computer.
These authors presented neutral words (CS), followed by a below threshold exposure of either
a positive or negative word (US) and found that subjects exposed to positive stimuli liked the
neutral words more than those exposed to a negative stimulus. They concluded that evaluative
conditioning can occur in the absence of contingency awareness.
2.6.4. PREATTENTIVE BIAS STUDIES
A number of investigations were conducted by Mogg et al. and Bradley et aI., into the
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subliminalprocessing ofinformation with subjects suffering from anxiety and depression, and
also with non-clinical subjects. These authors set out to investigate Beck's theory that mood-
congruent biases 'operate throughout all aspects ofprocessing, such as attention, reasoning and
memory' (Mogg, et al. 1993, p. 304). Their studies also sought to research the effects of
anxiety and depressive conditions on pre-conscious processing ofinformation. This involved
testing for perception without awareness in relation to hypothesized bias thought to exist in
early stages ofinformation processing (which occur without awareness). According to Beck,
anxiety and depression vary with the type ofprocessing bias encountered (Beck, 1976, Beck
et al.1986). Anxious individuals, according to this theory, process anxiety-relevant information,
whereas depressed individuals selectively process depression-relevant information (Mogg et
al. 1993). Some studies have found evidence that anxiety is associated with a bias in early
aspects ofprocessing (attention) (Matthews, 1990, provides a review of these studies), whereas
depression is associated primarily, with a bias in later stages ofprocessing (Mogg et al. suggest
Dalgleish and Watts, 1990; Macleod, 1990; Williams et al., 1988 for reviews ofthese studies).
Williams et al. (1988, in Mogg et al., po 304) proposed that with anxiety, the bias operates at
an 'automatic, preattentive stage' (ibid) and anxious individuals direct processing resources
towards negative or threatening information before that information has entered awareness
(ibid) . This corresponds with the tendency of anxious individuals to be highly vigilant, and to
scan the environment for threatening stimuli. With depression however, Williams suggested that
the bias occurs at a later stage ofprocessing which occurs once the information has entered
consciousness (ibid). Using a Stroop-type colour naming interference task, Mogg et al. found
that anxious subjects, in comparison with depressed and normal subjects, showed more colour
naming interference when anxiety-relevant and depression relevant words were displayed in
both subliminal and supraliminal exposure conditions. This study supported the theory that
anxiety is associated with a preattentive bias for negative information. Anxious subjects were
therefore sensitive to negative emotional words in the absence of conscious awareness. The
study is also consistent with the other evidence showing that semantic processing may occur
without awareness.
A later study (Bradley et al. 1994) investigated implicit and explicit memory for emotional
words in a group ofnon-clinical subjects. These authors separated their subjects into 2 groups
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based on measures of state and trait anxiety and a measure ofnon-clinical depression. They
found that the high negative affect group showed greater sensitivity to subliminal priming than
the low affect group. No priming effect was obtained with the group exposed to supraliminal
stimuli. These authors thus demonstrated that a mood-congruent bias was associated with non-
clinical depression.
In a Stroop colour naming task, Bradley et al. (1995) found differential interference effects
from the subliminal presentation of anxiety- and depression-related words with 3 subject
groups: 1. Subjects diagnosed as suffering from Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) without
concurrent depression. 2. Subjects diagnosed with GAD with concurrent depression. 3. Normal
control group. The following conclusions were reached:
1. Those diagnosed with GAD without concurrent depression showed greater interference
effects due to negative words in both subliminal and supraliminal exposure conditions
compared with control subjects.
2. In those subjects where anxiety and depression co-existed, the interference bias was no
longer present. The authors speculate that depression may inhibit sensitivity to negative
information.
Bradley et al. concluded that patients sufferingfrom GAD showed a pre-attentive bias, not just
for anxiety-related information, but for negative words in general.
2.6.5 UNCONSCIOUS COGNITION: THEORETICAL ASPECTS
A number of theoretical issues come to bear on the question of unconscious cognition.
Greenwald et al. (1995) provide what is to date, probably the most comprehensive theoretical
reflection on unconscious cognition in relation to subliminalresearch. In this section, a number
of important theoretical issues are addressed, and will be discussed in turn. These are as
follows:
1) The relationship ofconscious to unconscious processes.
2) The nature of direct and indirect experimental effects.
3) The nature ofthresholds, (objective vs. subjective).
2.6.5.1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS
PROCESSES
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Three views are cited by Greenwald et al. (1995). They are as follows:
a) Nonexistence : unconscious cognition does not exist.
b) Association: unconscious cognition exists, but only in association with, or as an adjunct to
conscious cognition.
c) Dissociation: unconscious cognition exists dissociatedfrom, and independently of conscious
cognition (Greenwald et al. 1995, p. 22-23).
Proponents of the association view include Cheesman and Merikle (1984) who propose that
unconscious effects can be detected when stimuli fall between subjective and objective
thresholds (see Cheesman and Merikle, 1984, p. 391). This will be discussed further in section
2.6.4.3. In this situation, as Greenwald et al. put it, 'when stimuli produce unconscious effects,
they also produce associated but perceptually indistinct conscious effects' (p. 23).
As the term implies, an implication of the dissociation view, as Greenwald et al. point out, is
that 'there is no potential path for discovery, via conscious perception, that a potential
unconscious influence is occurring ' . This raises formidable theoretical difficulties regarding
detection ofunconscious processes.
2.6.5.2. DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS
As a way of operationalising the difference between conscious and unconscious processes,
these are conceptualisedrespectively as direct and indirect experimental effects. Greenwald et
al. (1995) consider a direct effect of an experimental stimulus to be that which is the result of
a response to an instructed task. This could take the form for example, of a measure of
accuracy in the instructed task. An indirect effect is an uninstructed effect ofthe task stimulus
on behaviour. The example these authors give of a direct effect is the Stroop task ofnaming
the colour of the ink with which a word is printed, where a distracting feature would be the
spelling of that word with the name of another colour. The indirect effect in this case is that
caused by the distracting feature of the word spelling. The practical significance of the
difference between direct and indirect effects is that direct effects are thought to reflect the
contents ofawareness, whereas indirect effects are thought to reflect an unconscious process.
Greenwald et al. were concerned to investigate the relationship between conscious and
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unconscious cognition, hence they took pains to separate direct from indirect effects. They
suggest that theoretical conclusions need to come from experiments that obtain both direct and
indirect measures of responses to tasks. A basic premise, which seems self-evident, is that
unconscious cognition refers to cognition that occurs without awareness (p . 23). This is a fairly
informal notion, and receives further clarification by these authors who cite Holender (1986),
Reingold and Merikle (1988) and Cheesman and Merikle (1984). Greenwald et al. provide a
useful summary ofthese authors' theoretical positions. These willbe presented and discussed
briefly since they provide valuable points of reference.
Holender takes a sceptical stance concerning the existence ofunconscious cognition, and makes
strict assumptions about the demonstration of such effects. In order to draw conclusions,
Holender assumes that direct measures must be sensitive to all conscious effects ofthe stimuli
and must only reflect conscious effects (conditions which they term exhaustiveness and
exclusiveness respectively). In order for unconscious effects of stimuli to be demonstrated, an
indirect effect must occur in the absence of a direct effect. In this manner, dissociation of
conscious and unconscious processes willhave been demonstrated. Holender therefore rules
out a priori, the possibility of conscious and unconscious processes being associated.
Holender's strict theoretical position leads predictably to a sceptical stance regarding the
empirical literature. Since the studies cited do not, in the view of Holender, give adequate
information regarding performance on direct measures, they fail to show indirect effects in the
absence ofdirect effects. Holender's scepticism extends even to those studies which did report
the 'indirect-without-direct-effect', and Greenwald et al. remark that 'their collective weight
appears to have remained insufficient to counterbalance the sceptical position stated in
Holender's (1986) review' (Greenwald et al., 1995, p. 23).
Holender's position makes the demonstration of unconscious cognition difficult, given the
problem which Reingold and Merikle point out (in Greenwald et al. p. 24), ofaccepting a null
hypothesis for the direct effect. Accepting a null hypothesis is one thing, but actually proving
it is another. This isproblematic from a statistical point ofview because ofthe inherent degree
of uncertainty that is involved in making such a judgement. Also, one wonders why direct
measures should reflect only conscious contributions to behaviour. Perhaps this is a logical
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necessity imposed by the distinction made between direct and indirect measures. In reality,
these definitions may be too strict.
Reingold and Merikle (1988) suggest a relaxation of Holender's requirement about direct
measures. They allow that both direct and indirect measures might show effects of both
conscious and unconscious contributions. This relaxation however, makes the inference of
unconscious effects difficult, since these may be confounded with conscious effects. Reingold
and Merikle suggest therefore that the difference in the effects should be defined statistically.
That is, when the effects are defined on a comparable measurement scale, a statistically stronger
effect on the indirect measure would suggest the existence of unconscious cognition. This
seems to be a useful way of differentiating conscious from unconscious effects since it allows
for the possibility oftheir association, and does not rule it out a priori. Differential effect sizes
certainly appear to have been established in the subliminal mere exposure studies cited earlier,
where there were effects ofboth conscious and unconscious conditioning. Importantly, one
wonders how they are related to each other.
2.6.6 AWARENESS THRESHOLDS, PRIMING EFFECTS AND
CONSCIOUSNESS: INTEGRATION OF EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
This section seeks to integrate the research reviewed in this chapter in order to present a more
coherent picture of perception, awareness and consciousness. Perceptual thresholds are
examined in relation to priming effects, and this relationship is linked in turn to the distinction
made between conscious and unconscious processes. Firstly, important work by Cheesman and
Merikle (1984) regarding prime detectability and priming effects will be reviewed and the
implications for the other research reviewed in this chapter will be discussed. The focus ofthis
discussion is the difference in the priming effect size obtained at objective and subjective
thresholds. Subjective awareness is suggested as the proper basis for distinguishing conscious
and unconscious processes. Secondly, the type ofprocessing seen is discussed in relation to
consciousness.
2.6.6.1 VALIDATION OF AWARENESS THRESHOLDS
Cheesman and Merikle's (1984) experiment in which they tested for the effects ofpriming at
various levels ofprime detectability, showed a positive relationship between prime detectability
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and the magnitude ofpriming effects in a Stroop-type task measuring response latencies with
congruent and incongruent priming. At this point, these authors challenged Marcel, (1983) and
others' findings that 'complete lexical access occurs independently of conscious awareness' by
suggesting that the validity of the conclusion depended on the adequacy with which the
thresholds for discriminated verbal reports were measured.
In Cheesman and Merikle's (1984) experiment, a number of forced choice trials for prime
detection were then run in order to set various detect ability thresholds (objectively) in terms
of performance. The thresholds were defined at 25% (chance threshold), 55% and 90%
detection rates. An additional unmasked exposure condition was used. As prime detectability,
(as measured by the objective forced choice trials) increased, so did priming effects.
In a second experiment, Cheesman and Merikle (1984) determined objective and subjective
thresholds for each subject before the priming trials. They predicted that the subjective
threshold would be at a longer prime-mask SOA than the objective threshold, and consequently
that subjects objective detection performance would be at above chance when exposures were
made at the subjective threshold. At this stage, these authors set out to show that a subjective
rather than an objective threshold was inadvertently used in other masked-prime studies, and
they criticised this as an insufficiently rigorous test of unawareness (p. 392). These authors
definedthe objective threshold in their experiment as 25% correct performance in the forced-
choice test (there were 4 choices, hence a chance threshold of 25%), and the subjective
threshold was defined as the 'actual observed performance' when subjects estimated their
initialdetection performance as less than 30% correct during a block of48 threshold detection
trials in the forced choice test. The interesting feature of this experiment is that subjects
consistently underestimated the accuracy with which they were able to discriminate amongst
primes in the forced choice test.
The objective and subjective condition threshold means were determined as 30 ms (range: 16.7 -
50 ms) and 56 ms (range: 33.3 - 83.3 ms) respectively. The results of the detection tests
showed correct detection means of 27% and 66% for objective and subjective thresholds
respectively. Significant priming effects were found with subjects in the subjective threshold
condition, and no significant priming effects were found with subjects in the objective threshold
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condition.
In a later study using the same experimental task, Cheesman and Merikle (1986) replicated the
finding that priming effects are seen when a subjective threshold is used (but are not seen when
exposures are made at the objective threshold). In addition, they showed that a qualitatively
different type ofpriming occurred between subjective threshold and suprathreshold conditions.
In the suprathreshold condition, as the congruent trial probability increased, latency decreased
for congruent priming, and increased for incongruent priming. No such effect was evident in
the subjective threshold condition where subjects claimed no awareness for the primes.
Cheesman and Merikle understood this to mean that in the suprathreshold condition subjects
were able to strategise, and hence that response latency changed as a function of subjects'
expectancy ofcongruent primes. As they point out, while a predictive strategy led to improved
performance on the congruent trials, it led to a decrement in performance on incongruent trials.
They concluded that this finding supported their hypothesis that 'observers can initiate a
strategy based on the predictive relationship between primes and targets only when they are
consciously aware ofthe primes'. Thisfinding was replicated in the same series of experiments.
Cheesman and Merikle argued on the basis oftheir (1984) research, that priming effects could
be demonstrated when the threshold for discriminative responding was set at the subjective
level where subjects were unable, on the basis of self-report, to discriminate masked primes at
a greater than chance level.
Cheesman and Merikle began their (1986) research by asserting that the boundary between
conscious and unconscious perceptual processing could be defined operationally in terms of
subjectively based discriminative responding. Their contention was that no priming effects
occurred when thresholds were set at the objective level where subjects were unable to
discriminate masked primes at greater than chance levels (on the basis of actual performance).
They infer from this, that subjective awareness is the proper empirical basis for demarcating
conscious and unconscious processing. Stimuli perceived with awareness are therefore subject
to conscious processes, whereas stimuli perceived without claimed awareness are processed
unconsciously. Their research indeed indicates that subjects are only able to strategise when
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stimuli are perceived in the suprathreshold exposure condition.
2.6.6.2 CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSING OF INFORMATION
Following this research Cheesman and Merikle reflected that the distinction between conscious
and unconscious processes would be further validated if it could be shown that qualitatively
different types of processing occur between conditions where primes are shown with and
without subjective awareness.
There are a number of similarities between the work of Cheesman and Merikle, and that of
others. In particular, that of Groeger (1984) and Marcel (1980, in Marcel, 1983) stands out.
Groeger's work showed evidence of qualitatively different types ofprocessing between aware
and non-aware states: where subjects were unable to consciously perceive primes, semantic
analysis occurred, whereas when subjects were able to identify priming stimuli, structural
analysis occurred. Marcel showed a difference in subjects' responses between masked and
unmasked exposures of a polysemous word. This difference was seen in the qualitatively
different type ofbias introduced by context words. More context-specific semantic activation
was observed in the above threshold condition, whereas a more general, and noncontext-
specific semantic activation was seen in the below threshold condition.
In summarising this section, it seems that there are a substantial number ofindependent and
robust findings which imply the following two conclusions:
1) Semantic analysis may occur without awareness: Marcel (1980, in Marcel, 1983); Groeger
(1984); Doyle and Leach (1988) (word superiority effect); Bomstein and D 'Agostino (1992)
(mere exposure effect); Hirschman and Durante (1992); De Houwer et al. (1994); (evaluative
conditioning in the absence of contingency awareness).
2) Qualitatively different types of processing occur between conscious and unconscious
conditions: Groeger (1984), Marcel (1980, in Marcel, 1983) (semantic coding predominating
without awareness, structural analysis predominating with awareness); Marcel (1980, in
Marce1, 1983) (context specific cues processed only above the threshold of awareness,
whereas nonaware processing led to more general semantic activation); Cheesman and Merikle
(1986) (awareness needed for activation of an adaptive strategy).
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2.6.6.3 SEMANTIC PRIMING REVISITED
The work of Greenwald et al.(1995) is impressive because of its extent, the theoretical
integration achieved, and the sample sizeinvolvedin their study (N=2026). These authors used
a dioptic method ofstimulation with pattern masking on a 80286-type computer with an EGA
display. The object of their research was to investigate separate effects of conscious and
unconscious cognitive processing. They did this by measuring the effects ofboth direct and
indirect effects of stimulation with a comparable scale, and with a rational zero point for each
measure. A linear regression model was used to analyse the relationship between direct and
indirect effects based on Reingold and Merikle's (1988) suggestions.
Greenwald et al. conducted a series of experiments which determined eye dominance, set
detection thresholds, and provided a number of practice trials. After this, a position
discrimination task was run in which subjects were scored on a direct measure (based on the
hit rate, with a rational zero point corresponding with chance performance), and an indirect
measure (the effect ofa masked prime stimuli suggesting word position). Another task was also
given in which subjects were asked to rate neutral words on a continuum from unpleasant to
pleasant. Neutral word presentation was accompanied, on critical trials, with the presentation
of a prime word with either a negative or positive meaning (eg. 'killer ' , 'poison'; 'happy',
'mother'). The direct measure was the judgement ofthe word, and the indirect measure was
the latency time to a correct decision. Either congruent or incongruent semantic priming was
possible, and it was expected that incongruent priming would be associated with greater
latencies, and congruent priming with shorter latencies. Interestingly, these authors also
anticipated that priming effects could take the form of higher error rates with incongruent
pnmmg,
The results of the regression analysis showed that above chance performance on the indirect
measure was associated with chance performance on the direct measure. This was a highly
significant effect (p=O.OOI6, two-tailed). This corresponded with the 'indirect-without-direct-
effect' pattern. However, no significant effects of unconscious influences on evaluative
decisions were found in the study. The authors suggest that this data pattern was compatible
either with the association of conscious and unconscious cognition model, or with the
dissociation of conscious from unconscious cognition model.
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Greenwald et al. concludedthat the 'indirect without direct effect' had been shown statistically,
in accordance with the suggestion made by Reingold and Merikle (1988) that dissociation of
conscious from unconscious processes could be shown by statistical means, and not simply
judged on presence vs. non-presence.
2.6.7 DISCUSSION
In this section, a sample ofnon-psychoanalytically orientated literature on perception without
awareness was presented and discussed. For some time, the subject of priming without
awareness has dominated research, and this seems to have been demonstrated quite
consistently. The single most important issue emerging from this research is the question of
threshold setting. The subjective threshold ofawarenessis suggested by Cheesman and Merikle
as an appropriate practical manner in which conscious and unconscious processes may be
separated, and it appears possible that many authors who report findings have used this
threshold without making it explicit, or referring to it exactly as such, egoGroeger, (1984),
Marcel (1980 , in Marcel, 1983), Hirshman and Durante (1992) , Doyle and Leach (1988).
Findings may be summarised thus:
1. Semanticprimingwithout subjective awareness has been demonstrated in a fairly consistent
manner.
2. Different types of perceptual processing seem to occur between the conscious and
unconscious condition: semantic processing predominates in the unconscious condition
(Groeger 1984: recognition based on semantic analysis; Doyle and Leach, 1988: word
superiorityeffect (replicated); Hirshman and Durante, 1992: replication ofDoyle and Leach's
experiment).
3. Preattentive bias may exist for negative, or threatening information whereby subjects
experiencing anxiety, or non-clinical depression show a bias in attending to negative stimuli.
4. Bomstein and D'Agostino ' s finding that attitudes towards stimuli may be enhanced by
repeated below threshold exposure implies semantic priming without awareness.
5. Conscious and unconscious processes may be dissociated (Greenwald et al. 1995:
dissociation demonstrated statistically).
6. Conscious awareness is required for strategising (Marcel, 1980 in Marcel, 1983; Cheesman
& Merikle, 1986).
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The general theoretical contributions ofthe non-psychoanalytic research are:
1. The notion that subjective awareness separates conscious from unconscious processes.
2. The contents ofawareness may be measured by direct task effects although plausibly, direct
measures might also reflect unconscious contents to some extent.
3. Unconscious processes may be inferred from indirect, or uninstructed effects. An indirect
effect must be distinguishable from a direct one.
2.7 GENERAL DISCUSSION
In section 2.4, two paradigms or experimental traditions were highlighted: SPA and non-
psychoanalytically orientated research. A major difference between these traditions is that the
former is associated with clinical aspects of psychology, and the latter is not clinically
orientated.
It is difficult to compare the findings ofthe SPA paradigm with those ofthe non-psychoanalytic
paradigm, since the experiments are often quite different in nature. However, some general
points are offered:
1. It is difficult to compare the thresholds used in SPA research with those used in non-
psychoanalytically orientated research. It seems that claims were made in the former paradigm
for activation effects when subjects were exposed at stimulus levels corresponding with the
objective threshold. That is, tests ofunawareness were done in which subjects were not able
to distinguish between target and control stimuli. This is not uncommon in the literature (see
section 2.5.1.3 .3, point 4 on subliminality). In general, this author was impressed with the
rigour with which unawareness was established in SPA research.
2. The SPA research simply assumes that semantic activation and analysis occurs without
awareness, indeed this would be a necessary condition for any specific, predictable behavioural
effect. One ofthe problems with SPA research is that this aspect has been overlooked, while
researchers have pressed ahead with the testing of ambitious, and to some, exotic
psychodynamichypotheses. The failure of SPA researchers to pay attention to the more basic
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issues impliedby perception without awareness gives SPA research the appearance and perhaps
the reputation ofbeing more like magic than science. This might account for the reluctance of
non-psychoanalytically inclined researchers to mention SPA experiments.
3. Having made the above criticisms, it must be acknowledged, however that some SPA effects
appear to be robust, and replicable, ego the oedipal and adaption-enhancing studies 'Mother and
I are one'. SPA effects seem to be quite specific in terms ofthe stimulus shown to subjects, and
stimuli concerning the maternal figure appear particularly potent in evoking changes.
4. In general, it seems implausible that the entire body of SPA findings is due to experimental
artifacts of one kind or another. The sheer weight of experimental evidence, especially the
meta-analyses make it difficult to reject SPA as fraudulent. There are indeed failures to
replicate, and enormous difficulties in establishing the validity ofpsychoanalytic interpretations
ofSPA effects, but on close examinationthese do not seem to be as damning as at first glance.
5. Some common ground between the two paradigms may exist with regard to the qualitatively
different effects seen between above and below threshold conditions. The fact that subjects are
only able to strategise on the basis ofconscious awareness seems clear from Marcel's (1983)
research, and that ofCheesman and Merikle (1986). A finding which is of central importance
to SPA research, is that significant behavioural effects only occur when the stimuli are
perceived without awareness (see Bornstein, 1990, 1992). Awareness therefore appears to
inhibit effects in SPA.
It seems likely that the type of processing which occurs in the suprathreshold condition (in
other words, with subjective awareness) is more sophisticated than that which occurs without
awareness (subliminal). Processing without awareness could be characterised as more
automatic and certainly cannot be described as intentional in the way that intentionality is
usually defined. So, even though semantic activation occurs, no higher, or more integrative
types ofcognitive processing occurs.
The findingthat subjects were able to strategise in the suprathreshold condition, but not in the
below-threshold condition may be related to the claim by SPA theorists that subliminal (below
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threshold) exposures bypass conSCIOUS defences, while supraliminal (above threshold)
exposures activate these defences. Talbot et al. suggest that increased food consumption noted
in the subliminal condition reflected an 'action-oriented defence against anxiety and an act of
self-nurturance' (1991, p. 821). Increased eating is an indirect effect, and according to this
explanation, is therefore the result ofa defence which operates without awareness, as opposed
to a conscious defence.
It seems that when subjects are shown stimuli supraliminally, conscious defences are activated
which counter the effect ofthe stimuli. Conscious awareness ofthe threat is therefore needed
in order for an appropriate defensive action to be taken. What is termed a 'defence' in the SPA
literature, may be comparable to a strategy in the non-psychoanalytic literature. In other
words, in the terminology of the latter paradigm, conscious awareness of a threat may result
in subjects actively strategising in order to counter it. Feasibly, in some situations subjects may
suppress certain behaviours in response to a perceived threat, whereas in other situations,
various behavioural responses may be activated. Both these situations would reflect active,
goal-directed and presumably adaptive strategising in the face of a threatening situation. The
type ofstrategy adopted would depend on the options availablein the situation, and the various
constraints on behaviour. This might be an explanation ofthe difficulties found in replicating
SPA experiments, since some ofthe nuances of the original experiments may not have been
reproduced in the attempted replication.
6. Both SPA and non-psychoanalytically orientated research suggests that conscious and
unconscious processes may be somewhat different in nature, and dissociated in function. In
psychoanalysis, independence of conscious and unconscious cognition is central and SPA
research appears to confirm this . An important finding by Greenwald et al. (1995) also offers
some support for this hypothesis.
2.8 CONCLUSION
Findings cited in the non-psychoanalytical literature surveyed are not necessarily at odds with
those ofSPA, but comparison is difficult. Both paradigms offer support for the conclusion that
perception and cognition without awareness exists. Different types ofprocessing are thought
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to occur between aware and non-aware conditions, and subjective awareness is established as
the crucial aspect in this regard. Perhaps the question asked by Greenwald et al. 'whether
unconscious processes are "smart" or dumb'" (in Merikle 1992, p. 794) is the right one.
Merikle implies that the question ofwhether unconscious processes exist has virtually become
redundant in the light of the collective weight of recent evidence, and suggests that further
research into qualitative differences may reveal 'the ultimate value of the long-standing




This chapter describes the development and testing of a subliminal stimulation procedure using
a personal computer and VGA colour monitor. Two types of subliminal exposure procedures
were developed and tested and are described in this chapter:
1) masking by light
2) masking by random noise (Breitmeyer, 1984).
The masking by random noise procedure was found to be the most efficient method ofmasking.
Computers have been used more commonly for subliminal presentation of stimuli in recent
years (eg. Greenwald, et al. 1995, De Houwer, et at. 1994), apparently with positive results.
Before the advent ofthe microcomputer, the instrument most commonly used for this purpose
was the tachistoscope. In some ways, this is the ideal instrument since there is a wealth of
research done using the exposure time of 4 ms (see Bomstein, 1992, p. 69). The
microcomputer offers certain advantages however, since administration is easier and more
flexible. Complex routines can easily be programmed to run on a fairly standard modem IBM-
type computer with a VGA screen, and the data may be captured and scored with relative ease.
However, authors who have used personal computers in this way have not published much
detail, and for this author, the technique had to be developed from first principles. No
information was available on the characteristics of the VGA screen for example, and authors
do not make their masking algorithms available. A good deal of experimental work had to be
done before the technique was reliable enough to be used with a large group of subjects.
3.2 PROPERTIES OF THE VGA SCREEN
The algorithm for the subliminal stimulation procedure was developed on an IBM type
computer with an 80486 processor running at 65 MHz using the DOS 6.1 operating system.
The monitor was a Tatung Ultra VGA type with a Phoenix VGA adapter card. The monitor
was operated in a non-interlaced video mode (i.e. mode 3: 80 columns by 25 rows). The total
frame time in thismode is specified by the manufacturer as 16.68 milliseconds with a scanning















Test were performed on the screen in order
to estimate the actual exposure times
obtainable, and to determine what was
actually being displayed on the screen
when a stimulus was presented.
Measurement oflight at the screen surface
was done with a light meter coupled
through an amplifier to an analogue to
digital converter, sampling at 10 kHz. The
typical rise time (the time taken for the
screen to reach its brightest level) of the
Figure 3.1 Screen scanning characterist ics .
screen was in the region of 1.5 ms, and the
amount of decay between one scan and the next was in the order of 55% (i.e. there was a
reduction in brightness.of 55% to 45% ofits highest level). This took place over a period of
13.2 ms. Measurement. was done on the surface of the screen with the exposure of a 3-line
block ofmaximum brightness. The amount of time taken for the brightness to decay to 25%
of its highest peak was approximately 65 ms. This information is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
In the preliminary stage, light levels at the









phrase that was to be used in the pilot
study. It may be seen from Figure 3.2 that
the total time from the beginning of the
steep rise in brightness until the light value
returns to its baselinelevel is approximately
9.5 ms (unfortunately, considerable 70 Hz
noise in the background made more
accurate measurement impossible). It was
thus estimated that the shortest exposure
Figure 3.2 Light measurement at the screen surface using a test
duration possible using the equipment in phrase.
this configuration is equal to , or less than
9.5 ms. It is important to note that the initial decay rate of the screen was high, and since the
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response ofthe retina to light is logarithmic, the brightness level may drop below the minimum
sensitivity threshold before its return to the baseline level. Therefore, although the minimum
exposure duration is estimated at 9.5 ms, the effective exposure time may be somewhat less.
Unfortunately, a more detailed analysis was not possible because of time constraints and
equipment limitations.
An element ofrandomness was observed in the number of exposures actually displayed on the
screen when the programmed exposure time approached its absolute minimum. It appeared that
the screen was unable to respond to allprogram instructions because of the limit imposed either
by its scanning speed, or the speed ofthe video display card . Either way, it appeared that the
VDU display could not keep up with the instructions from the CPU, when the exposure time
reached its lower limit. An average of eight exposures were actually seen on the screen when
10 such exposures were programmed although no fewer than seven were displayed.
3.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE VGA MONITOR
It quickly became apparent, given the relatively slow scanning speed and brightness decay time
ofthe VGA monitor, that be1owthreshold exposure times could not be achieved at the shortest
exposure duration possible. It was not difficult to read a phrase exposed on the screen at the
shortest possible duration. It appears iu the literature that unmasked tachistoscopic exposure
times are typically in the region of4 ms, and this is less than 50% ofthe exposure time possible
on this equipment. (Bomstein 1990). Since verbal stimuli could still be perceived at the shortest
possible exposure time on the VGA screen, other methods were investigated to by to achieve
subliminality. One such technique, 'masking by light ' (Breitmeyer, 1984) was designed and
tested.
3.4 DESIGN AND TESTING OF A MASKING BY LIGHT TECHNIQUE
After some initial experimentation, the masking by light technique seemed promising. A
computer program was written in Pascal that would brieflyexpose a phrase in the centre ofthe
VGA screen, clear it, then display a blight, uniform mask over the area where the stimulus
phrase had appeared (see Appendix A) . Success with this method led to the design of an
experiment in which 10 phrases were displayed to subjects at decreasiug exposure times. The
purpose ofthis experiment was to establish the point at which subjects were no longer able to
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perceive a stimulus phrase , or Table 3.1 Phrases and exposure durations.
.....-....:.;.;.:.:.:•....... . .
recognise it at a level above chance.
This corresponds with the objective
threshold defined by Cheesman and
Merikle (1984). The sequence,
phrases and relevant exposure times
used are shown in Table 3.1. The
exposure of stimulus phrase 10 was
programmed to be shorter than the
theoreticallyminimumpossible time of
approximately 9.5 ms, and was timed
in the program to be displayed for a theoretical 4.3 ms. While this did reduce the potential
number ofexposures ofthe target phrase on the screen, it nevertheless guaranteed the shortest
exposure time possible on a VGA screen.
The conversion factor between the delay units used in Pascal and the actual time was
calculatedby a series oftrials in which the screen exposure time was measured by a light meter
at the screen surface and recorded by an analogue to digital converter. The digitised data could
then be plotted on a screen (with time on the x-axis and amplitude on the y-axis) and precise
measurements made. An average factor of0.216 (SD=0.002) was calculated from the average
conversion factors of eight trials ranging from 108 ms to 9.5 ms.
3.5.1 METHOD
Five subjects participated in this study. They were each seated individually in front of the
computer and told that they would be exposed to 10phrases 10 times each, i.e. Phrase 1 would
be exposed 10 times at a set exposure time, then phrase 2 at a shorter exposure time until 10
phrases had been exposed at progressively shorter duration times. Subjects were told that the
experiment was designed to test visual detection thresholds, and they were instructed to pay
close attention to the stimulus phrase in each trial, and try as best as they could to see it. The
program displayed these and other relevant instructions at appropriate points. The
experimental procedure appears below.
59
3.5.1.1 DEMONSTRATION
Each subject was given a demonstration ofthe exposure sequence. In this phase the following
were displayed:
a) A focussing dot '©' was displayed in the middle ofthe exposure field ( 3 seconds).
b) A target phrase was flashed in the exposure field at a predetermined exposure time.
c) the mask was displayed (2 seconds) (see Section 2.2 for an explanation ofmasking).
The timing ofthis demonstration was exactly the same as that ofthe experiment proper except
that the test phrase was flashed for a relatively long period (0.5 second) to make it more visible.
The focussing dot, target phrase and mask were exposed in grey against a dark (unilluminated)
background for both the demonstration and experiment proper.
3.5.1.2. TRIALS 1 TO 10
Ten trials were conducted, each consisting of 10 exposures of a) b) c).
For each trial, a target phrase was exposed 10 times to the subject. After 10 exposures ofthe
target, a free recall and recognition trial was performed:
a) FREE RECALL. After each phase, the subject was instructed 'Ifyou were able to see the
phrase, type ''y'''. Ifthe response was ''y'' the subject was asked to type out the phrase. Ifthe
response was not "y", the subject was asked to guess what the phrase was and to type it out.
Subjects were encouraged to type anything that came to mind, even if it didn't make sense.
b) RECOGNITION TRIAL. In this trial, the stimulus phrase was presented in random order
with four other phrases, and the subject was asked to identify it. Phrases in this list usually had
the same number ofwords, or were of a similar length, and were designed to resemble each
other configurally as closely as possible. The phrases were constructed in such a way that they
were all more or less grammatical, but not particularly meaningful. One phrase in each group
was matched as closely to the target phrase as possible so that subjects would have to
discriminate carefully between them. For example, the word list in trial I0 was as follows:
1. all through the night
2. also throw the knife
3. alter calls help me
4. addle the eggs over
5. under the tall ships
Note the similarity of phrases 1 and 2. The target phrase in this case was 1. All subjects'
60
responses were recorded and written to a file on the hard drive for later analysis.
3.5.1.3 DEBRIEF
All subjects were debriefed and given feedback about their performance. Results were
discussed, and comments about the experiment were invited.
3.5.2 RESULTS
43 38.734.4 30.1 25.8 21.5 17.2 12.9 9.5 <9.5
exposure time (ms)
Figure 3.3 Backward masking by light: mean correct word
free recall (n=5).
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Results ofthe experimentare shown in Figure 3.3
and 3.4. Figure 3.3 displays the average
percentage ofwords correctly recalled in the free
recall trial, whether the subjectguessed the words
or not. Thiswas calculatedby scoring the number
ofcorrectlyrecalledwords as a percentage ofthe
possible number of words. Credit was given
irrespective ofword order. Note the following:
a) An apparent learning effect between trials 1
(43 ms) and 2 (38.7 ms) where a rapid
improvement was generally observed from 20%
to 50% correctly recalled words despite the
decreased exposure time.
b) The plateau between trials 2 and 3 (34.4 ms).
c) The gradual decline in correctly recalled words
until trial 6 (21.5 ms).
d) The improvement in trial 7 (17.2 ms).
e) Decline until in trial lO «9.5 ms) no words
were recalled correctly by any ofthe subjects.
Figure 3.4 shows the average percentage of stimulus phrases correctly identified by subjects
across trials. The data shows a similar pattern of trends to that of the free recall trials. The
following aspects were observed again in the recognition trial:
a) The learning effect which occurred from triall (43 ms) to 2 (38.7 ms).
b) The plateau of 100% correct recognition; (c) subsequent decline across trials 4 (30.1 ms)
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to 6 (17.2 ms).
d) The peak of 100% on trial 7 (17.2 ms).
e) The decline to 40% on trials 9 (9.5 ms) and 10 «9.5 ms),
3.5.3 DISCUSSION
The trends seen in the data were in the expected direction, and it seemed clear that the
reduction in the number of words recalled and phrases recognised was a function of the
decrease in exposure time. In trial 9, an average of 10% of the words recalled were correct
(Figure 3.3) and 40% ofsubjectsmanaged to correctly identify target phrases. No words were
recalled correctly in trial 10 by any ofthe subjects. None were able to suggest any words at all,
and responded with comments such as 'haven't a clue' or 'no idea' although one subject
reported seeing the phrase. Thissubject reported seeingthe phrase but was unable to recognise
it correctly. The reduced recognition and recall scores may have been due to either a slightly
reduced exposure time, or simply the fact that fewer exposures were made on the screen due
to the synchronisation problem mentioned previously, or a combination ofboth effects. It is
ofinterest however, that although none were able to correctly recall any ofthe words from the
phrase, two subjects correctly identified the phrase. There may have been a priming effect of
some kind which increased the recognition level ofthe phrases to above that ofchance alone.
One subject remarked spontaneouslythat she thought the target phrases had a pattern ofbeing
more plausibleor acceptable in their meaningthan non-targets, so another possible explanation
is that the target words were unintentionally cued, and one subject at least may have responded
to nuances in this regard.
A possibilitywas entertained that cues had alerted subjects to the difference between target and
non-target phrases. This may have been due to the way in which non-target phrases were
constructed, since it was the experimenter's intention that they be configurally similar.
Although this could not be decided conclusively, the phrase list was modified for the next
experiment. The changes will be described in section 3.6.
In general, it was concluded that this method of masking by light might have inherent
limitations. Firstly, factors such as ambient light levels in the room might impact on the
subjects ' dark adjustment , and this in turn could impact on the perceived contrast between
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target and mask. Secondly, since the masking effect was highly dependent on the contrast
between target and mask, initialscreen brightness settings would be another factor to take into
account. During this pilot study, the screen was set to a standard value at the beginning ofeach
session but there was a likelihood that it could constitute a nuisance variable - especially with,
a large group of subjects using multiple screens.
Apart from the limitations mentioned, it was felt that even at the exposure times ofless than
or equal to 9.5 ms, subjects' word recall level was still too high. It was pointed out earlier that
this may have been due to a subtle pattern in the word list, and an astute subject was able to
detect it (this subject also correctly identified all 10 stimulus phrases). However, this subject
was not able to identify any ofthe words correctly in recall trial 9, while another subject was
able to guess 50% ofthe words correctly in trial 9. This leads to the conclusion that it was not
the pattern alone which could explain the high level of recall at the exposure time of9.5 ms.
This method ofmasking by light was therefore not considered reliable enough for the purposes
of subliminal presentation of verbal stimuli since exposures were close to the perceptual
threshold.
3.6 DESIGN AND TESTING OF A MASKING BY VISUAL NOISE PROCEDURE
Since(admittedlylimited)testing had shown the masking by light procedure to be problematic
as a method of presenting stimuli below the threshold of perception, another method of
masking by random visual noise was developed and tested.
Breitmeyer lists the procedure of 'masking by noise' as a type ofmasking by pattern. Where
theories ofthe masking by light effect explain it in terms ofan integration ofthe stimulus with
the mask, masking by pattern theories refer to an interruption ofthe processing ofthe stimulus.
Two types ofmasking by pattern procedures exist: ones in which the mask precedes the target
are known as paracontrast or forward masking types, whereas those in which the target
precedes the mask are known as metacontrast or backward masking types. Breitmeyer
attnbutes the masking by noise procedure to Kinsbourne & Warrington (1962) who appear to
have coined the term (in Breitmeyer, 1984, p. 101). In this experiment, the metacontrast or
backward masking technique was used (See Appendix B for Pascal source code)..
...........::::::::::::::::;:::: :;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;=::::;=;::::::;:;
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In the masking by noise procedure the contrast elementsand contours ofthe mask are designed
to have no relationship to those of the target. Breitmeyer describes such a mask as a 'random
dot mask (1984, p. 101). In research by Marcel (1976, cited by Dixon, 1981, p. 75) the mask
is described as ' a jumble ofletters or cut-up letters ofthe same typeface ' .
The design of such a mask was constrained by the variety
of ASCII characters available. The graphics characters
from 176 to 245 (using the IBM character set) were
. , • Figure 3.5 Visual noise mask.
selected because of their neutrality (non-alphabetical). An
algorithmwas designed to select a random sequence ofthese characters for each exposure, and
the mask was unique every time it was displayed. It consisted of a one-line display ofan array
ofrandom characters covering the area where the stimulus field had been displayed (centre of
the screen). In the program, the mask array was computed before exposure of the stimulus,
then displayedafter the stimulusfieldwas cleared. Figure 3.5 shows an example of the masking
field at approximately the size at which it appears on the screen.
As indicated previously in section 3.5.3, both the target and phrase list were redesigned to
avoid the possibility that the meaning of targets phrases were more plausible or presentable.
The amended list of target phrases
appears ill Table 3.2. The Table 3.2 Phrases and exposure durations .
recognition phrase list for trial 10
was as follows:
1. all through the night
2. also throw the knife (target)
3. altar calls help me
4. turn the eggs over
5. under the tall ships
Note also that the exposure times
were amended so that a wider range
of times was tested. Again, the
exposure listed as <9.5 ms was timed in the program to be displayed for 4.3 ms in the program.
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3.6.1 METHOD
The procedure was identical in all respects to that of the masking by light experiment, and 6
subjects participated in the experiment. The information from sections 3.5.1 to 3.5.1.3 is
applicable and will not be repeated.
3.6.2 RESULTS
Results willbe given in quantitative terms, and then observations of a qualitative nature will be
made .
3.6.2.1 QUANTITATIVE ANALVSIS
Results are displayed in Figure 3.6 and 3.7. As in
the previous experiment, free recall and phrase
recognition were tested. As Figure 3.6 shows, the
maximum percentage of correctly recalled words
was 66.7%. Once more, there appeared to be a
learning effect between trials I (81. 7 ms) and 2
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exposure time, there was a plateau at the much
Figure3.6Backward masking by visual noise: mean correct
higher level of66.7% for trials 2 (73. I ms) and 3 word free recall (n=6).
(64.5 ms) - higher than the plateau of 50% observed in the masking by light experiment for
trials2 (38.7 ms) and 3 (34.4 ms). In trial 4 (55.9 ms) there was a sharp drop in the number of
phrases recognised, followed by a sharp increase in trial 5 (47.3 ms). After this there was a
decrease to the level of4.2% (SD=9.3) in both trials 9 (12.9 ms) and 10 «9.5 ms) which were
the lowest rates ofrecall. In trial 9 one subject recalled the word 'she' from the target phrase,
but did not recognise it when presented. In trial 10 one subject recalled the word 'the', but also
did not recognise the phrase. For comparable exposure times, the average recall rate was much
lower using this method ofmasking. For example in trial 2 (38.7 ms) in the previous experiment
an average recall rate of 50% (SD=35.6) was scored, whereas in this experiment, the average
recall rate was 12.5% (SD=19.1). For trial 8 (12.9 ms) in the previous experiment, the average
recall rate was 25% (SD=27.4) compared with 4.2% (SD=9.3) for the same exposure time in
this experiment. It was ofinterest that the variability in word recall decreased steadily after the
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learning effect from trial 1 to 2. In trial 2 the standard deviation was 40, and this declined in a
predictable manner (apart from trial 4: SD=12.5) until its lowest level of9.3 in trials 9 and 10.
This signifies that with a progression to the minimum threshold, word recall ability and hence
perceptual ability between subjects became more uniform.
exposure time (ms)
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Figure 3.7Backward masking by visual noise: meancorrect
phrase recognition (n=6).
pattern of the data suggests a variable, but
generally high rate ofrecall for trials 1 to 7 3
(83%), and then a sudden drop to 17% in trial 8.
No subjects were able to recognise any of the
phrases in trials 9 (12.9 ms) and 10 «9.5 ms). In
the previous experimentthere was a recognition rate of 60% for an exposure time of 12.9 ms,
In Figure 3.7 it may be seen that a 100%
recognition rate was scored only on trial 3 (64.5
ms), whereas in the previous experiment there
were 3 trials in which 100% was scored. The
and the lowest rate ofrecognition was 40%. In this experiment, subjects scored 17% for a trial
ofthe same duration, and 0% for both subsequenttrials. Measures ofvariability were generally
also lower in the latter experiment.
In Figure 3.8 a comparison is made between
masking by light and masking by noise
procedures for trials of equivalent times. The
maskingby light graph is in the background, and
the masking by visual noise graph is in the
foreground. Note that the recognition rates in the
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Figure 3.8Comparison of masking by light and maskingby
noise: mean recognition rates for equivalenttimes.
3.6.2.2 QUALITATIVE OBSERVATIONS
Subjects were encouraged to free-associate during the free recall trial, and in trials where
phrases were not correctly recognised, interesting qualitative observations were made which
suggested a relationship between the target phrase and the subject's free association responses.
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Table 3.3 Qualitative observations suggesting a link between target
phrases and responses .
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Table 3.3 show some responses that were
of interest. It may be seen from the table
that none of the subjects recalled any of
the words from the target phrases in the
free recall trial. It was speculated that the
responses were a commentary on the
target phrases - made without any
apparent conscious awareness of their
content. For example, the response 'dry'
seemed to be a comment on the
humorous aspects ofthe phrase 'get the dog to pray'. The response 'a peaceful time' is quite
congruent with the phrase, whereas the response 'it is written' suggests that this subject's sense
of spiritual propriety was aroused. The response is reminiscent of a biblical injunction. The
second target phrase evoked both a negative and positive response: the negative response
' don't play' had the qualities of a warning, and the positive response alluded to shelter -
perhaps a response to acorns (referring to an oak tree?) , and rain (a response to the word
'wilt ' ?). The target ' also throw the knife' evoked emotionally valanced responses of
enthusiasticparticipation ('follow the happy'), fear ('help'), value judgement ('a fair deal') and
a sense of adversity ('it is hard'). While the responses were necessarily fragmentary and the
suggested connections between the stimulus phrases and responses entail speculation, it was
thought that they were potentiallya source ofprojective hypotheses. Generally, it was thought
that further investigation ofpossible connections between the stimulus phrases and responses
was warranted.
3.6.3 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
It seemed clear once more, that the trends seen in the data were in the expected direction, and
that they reflected subjects' increasing difficulty in recalling and discriminating target phrases
from non-targets as the exposure time decreased in duration. Only one subject recalled the
word 'she' in trial 9 (12.5 ms), but was unable to correctly identify the phrase. The phrase this
subject recalled ('prefer she did') may be said to have had a slight resemblance to the target
phrase ('acorns can she wilt ') but clearly, recognition ofthe important elements ofthe phrase
did not occur. Similarly, one subject recalled the word 'the' in trial 10 «9.5 ms), and was also
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unable to correctly identify the phrase.
Despite reservations about words occasionallybeing recalled correctly, the data suggested that
the masking by visual noise effect was more predictable, and more effective than that obtained
using the masking by light technique. This is seen from the fact that no subjects were able to
recognise the phrases in trials 9 and 10 and appeared to be a considerable improvement on the
40% recognition rate obtained using the masking by light technique. A possible confounding
variable seen in the previous experiment whereby subtle cues may have existed in the target
phrases, was no longer present. This is seen in the fact that no subjects were able to recognise
the target phrases in trials 9 and 10.
It was speculated that a subliminal priming effect was beginning to emerge. And the apparent
relationship between target and free recall phrases was taken to be evidence for this . This is
admittedly tentative and requires further investigation, but it was thought to have some bearing
on the remark made by Cattell (section 2.2) regarding the dreamlike quality ofthe impressions
left by subliminal stimulus material. The link between the meanings of stimulus and free recall
phrases while oblique and idiosyncratic, may be evidence of a primary thought process, or set
ofunconscious associations for subjects.
The general conclusion reached by this experiment was that the masking by visual noise
technique designed on a personal computer using a VGA screen held promise as a method of
subliminalstimulation and warranted further investigation with a larger group ofsubjects. While
the samples used were admittedly small, a large number of trials were used for each subject.
In other perceptual experiments however, reliability ofresults was established in that numbers




In the previous chapter, two masking techniques were described: masking by light and masking
by visual noise. These techniques were tested in 2 experiments with a program run on a
microcomputer and VGA screen. The most promising results were obtained using the masking
by visual noise technique, and it was found that subjects were unable to recognise stimulus
phrases at exposure times ofless than or equal to 9.5 ms. In this section, an experiment will be
described where this technique was used on computers connected to a local area network
(LAN) with a group of 107 subjects in order to test whether a priming effect could be obtained
by subliminal exposure to test phrases (see Appendix C for source code) . In this experiment,
subjects were exposed subliminally to either a sad or happy stimulus, and their responses to a
homophone task were recorded to test for the presence of such a priming effect. The aim of
the experiment was to see whether subliminal exposure to differently mood-valenced phrases
could influence subjects' interpretation of ambiguous words.
4.2 MOOD AND COGNITION
Halberstadt et al. (1995) remark that it is 'almost a tautology that people who are feeling
"down" tend to see events in a negative light, whereas people who are feeling happy seem
more generally optimistic '. Findings in the study of mood and cognition suggest that mood
facilitatescognition in that it has a biasing effect on cognitive judgements. Mayer (in Sharkey,
1986) suggests that this mood biasing effect occurs in judgements according to whether the
prevailingmood is positive or negative. When mood is positive, judgements tend to be skewed
in a positive direction , and vice versa. According to Mayer, mood facilitates cognition: as a
determinant ofplan construction: 1. by altering judgements ofthe likelihood of success; 2. in
the selection of 'the optimal plan' (by assigning mood-linked valences to possible outcomes);
3. as a way ofpredicting the future (by biasing an estimation ofthe outcome offuture events
on previous event-generated moods).
The finding of a mood dependent memory effect by Bower et al. (1978), and proposal by
Bower (1981) ofan associative network theory ofmood and memory is frequently mentioned
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in the literature. According to Teasdale and Barnard (1993), the original experiment which
demonstrated mood dependent retrieval, was that done in 1978 by Bower et at. These authors
demonstrated an effect of mood dependent retrieval by means oflists learned by a group of
subjects in two mood states. Later recall was found to be increased when subjects' mood was
the same as that in which the material was learned. These early findings are presently seen as
problematic since these authors' subsequent attempts at replication have failed (Eich, 1995).
This research has been followed by other experiments, and other researchers have had
considerable difficultyin replicating the original findings. A possible explanation was suggested
by Blaney (1986 in Eich, 1995) and is also mentioned by Bower (1987) to explain MDM
(Mood Dependent Memory) effects by a theory of 'mood-congruent' memory. This theory
asserts that 'some material, by virtue ofits affectively valenced content, is more likely to be
stored and/or recalled when one is in a particular mood; concordance between mood at
exposure and mood at recall is not required or relevant' (Blaney, 1986, cited by Eich, 1995).
Debate in the literature regarding MDM is extensive, and for the purposes ofthe present study,
a detailed review would be redundant. The issues of cognition and mood, and MDM are
mentioned simply as a background for the present research, and possible implications ofthese
issues will be considered in a later chapter.
4.2.1 EMOTION AND THE RESOLUTION OF LEXICAL AMBIGUITY
The Main Study in this thesis was designed around the research ofHalberstadt et al. (1995)
which investigated the role of emotion in the resolution of lexical ambiguity. These authors
based their model on that ofBower (1981, 1987), namely the 'emotional network model'. This
models states that emotional arousal causes activation ofrelevant concepts 'as a function of
their strength ofassociation to the emotion unit' (p. 278). Consequently, activation is thought
to spread to 'the semantic codes for emotion congruent words' (ibid.). This signifies that
activation of a word meaning is thought to be a 'function ofvarious sources of activation,
including priming from within the conceptual network, as well as input from the perceptual
system' (ibid.).
To test the theory that emotional states guide the resolution oflexical ambiguity, an effect
predicted by Bower's emotional network model, Halberstadt et al. read out a list of'affective
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homophones' to a group of subjects who were exposed to either a happy or sad mood
induction, expecting an emotion-congruent effect. 'Affective homophones' are homophones
with both an affective, i.e. either' sad' or 'happy', and 'neutral' meaning. Their finding was
that 'sad' subjects 'wrote significantly more affective meanings of sad words, but the two
groups did not differ on the proportion of affective meanings generated for happy words... '
(p.8l). The authors concluded that this finding replicated and extended previous research on
the role ofemotion in low-level cognitive processes... ' (ibid).
4.2.2 SUBLIMINAL MOOD PRIMING
A number of subliminal semantic priming studies have reported positive results (eg. Marcel,
1983; Groeger, 1984; Hirshman and Durante, 1992). These findings appear to give evidence
ofunconscious semanticprocessing where priming is below the subjective threshold, a theory
which appears to be increasingly well supported by empirical studies.
There is a relative paucity of research in the area of subliminal mood priming. One study of
emotional priming was done by Kemp-Wheeler and Hill (1992). Using a binocular backward
maskingtechnique, these authors found that both semantic and emotional priming significantly
reduced latency in word production when the primes were related to the target. While these
authors had some doubt about the replicability of emotional priming, they concluded, on the
basis of combined data from both their experiments, that the effect was robustly significant,
and that effects of emotional and semantic priming were equal in magnitude. Interestingly,
because ofthe difficulty in replicating the emotional priming effect, these authors suggest that
emotional relatedness may be a weaker form of semantic relatedness, and for this reason,
emotionalpriming effectsmay not be reliable when primes are presented for an extremely short
duration. They therefore suggest that further studies of emotional priming effects over a range
of very short prime durations would be interesting (p. 126). A relatively short exposure
duration was used in the present thesis «=9.5 ms) compared with the mean detection threshold
time obtained by Kemp-Wheeler and Hill (33.5 ms).
4.3 METHOD
This section will describe the experiment in terms of the subjects, design, subliminal mood
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priming stimuli and dependent variables. The method, procedure and scoring will be described,
followed by a section in which results ofboth the item analysis and statistical analysis will be
described. A Discussion and Conclusion section will briefly discuss and summarise the findings
and conclusions.
4.3.1 SUBJECTS AND DESIGN
108 undergraduate students from a psychology class participated in the experiment. The
students were required to participate as part of a practical component of their course, and the
practical was referred to as a ' study ofperception' . One subject was excluded from the analysis
because ofa 100% error rate in the homophone task. All analysis which follows was based on
107 subjects. The subjects' age was not recorded, but probably lay between 19 and 24 years.
The participants' home language Table 4.1 Analysis of subject group : English/non-English speaking SUbjects.
groups were recorded and
analysed. Table 4.1 shows the
results of an analysis of home
language (English/non-English) by
gender. Note the relative
proportions of men and women:
women (n=88) outnumbered men
(n=19) in this study. The largest











home language groups into their respective language categories. Note that the majority ofnon-
English speaking subjects were women and had Zulu as their home language. All the non-
English speaking men had Zulu as their home language.
The independentvariable was the type ofsubliminal mood manipulation or priming (sad/happy)
which the subjects received, and the dependent variables consisted ofthe subjects' responses
to a homophone task designedby Halberstadt et al. (1995). A comparison was therefore made
between groups with the independent variable subliminal condition. Other independent
variables were gender (male/female) and language (English/non-English). The classification
English/non-English was used sincenot allnon-Englishspeaking subjects were black, and could
therefore not be accurately categorised as such. The term 'non-English' simply reflects home
language background, and not race or culture per se.
:.:::::::: :::: :.:.:... .
Table 4.4 Condition by language analysis.
An analysis ofthe various groups was Table 4.3 Condition by gender analysis.
performed to determine their relative
compositions since subjects were
assignedto a sad or happy group in a
random manner. Table 4.3 shows the
results of a condition by gender
analysis. The distribution ofmen and
women across the subliminal
condition does not deviate
significantly from chance (X2=O.213,
df=1,p=O.64, with Yates correction).
An analysis ofcondition by language
is displayed in Table 4.4. The groups
were closely matched in terms of
language (English/non-English) and in
terms of the variable condition, the




The method ofdetermining subliminalcondition appeared to have been acceptable (see section
4.3.3) since the resulting groups appeared to be uniform in terms oftheir composition ('sad'
group: 50.5%; 'happy' group: 49.5%) and the groups (gender, language) were fairly evenly
distributed across the happy and sad subliminal conditions.
4.3.2 TEST MEDIUM
All data collection and subliminal stimulation was carried out by computer. This was all done
with a program written in Pascal source code. The executable program file was run from a file
server on a Local Area Network (LAN), and data from each subject's machine was written to
a unique file on the server. The experiment did not entail any written work (pen and paper) on
the part of subjects, but required them to type in all relevant information and responses.
The computer program collected information about subjects' gender and home language group
and determined the subliminal condition that each subject was assigned to. Instructions and
prompts were displayed at each stage, and subjects were prevented from proceeding at certain
stages by the use ofpasswords which had to be keyed in at the demonstrator's instructions.
4.3.3 SUBLIMINAL PRIMING METHOD
In this experiment, mood manipulation was done by means of sub-threshold exposures to
phrases. The phrase designed to induce a sad mood was 'GREY AND SAD', and that designed
to induce a happy mood was 'BRIGHT AND HAPPY'. The phrases were presented in upper
case for the approximate duration of 9.5 ms, and the backward masking by visual noise method
was used to mask them. The phrases were programmed to be displayed 15 times.
Before the experiment, each subject was assigned a separate practical (from I to 220) and seat
number (from 1 to 30). The seat number determined the computer that each participant would
be assigned to in the experimental session, and the practical number determined whether the
subject was assigned to a sad (Group 1) or happy (Group 2) group for the subliminal mood
condition. Subjects with odd numbers were assigned to Group 1, and those with even numbers
were assigned to Group 2. The practical number was also the name assigned to the result file
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of each subject. For example, if subject's practical number was '30' , s/he would be assigned
to Group 2 (happy), and the name ofthe result file written to the file server would be '30 ' .
4.3.4 HOMOPHONE TASK
A task described by Halberstadt et at.
(1995) was used to test for the effects of
the subliminal mood induction. In this
task, a list ofhomophones" (Table 4.5)
was read out, where each word had a
'sad' or 'neutral' meaning, or a 'happy'
or 'neutral' meaning. The list was a
combination of both 'sad/neutral' and
...................-:-: .:.:.:.;.:::: .
·••••••••••••••••1.11:·••1••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ............. ......................•~ .
'banned/band,, and an example of a





'))\i < {{.:~.:•••••••••••• ••••••• •••..•.•..
... ..... . :.: -:.:-:::::::::::-: ;.;.;.:.:::: :;:;:;::rrr:;:;: :.:.:.:.:.::::::.::::.:.: .
........... .. ··········:········M··:.···.··{·:················
.. .. .... .. ... .. .. ......... .::.:-:- :-.-:.: lilfll.I.!.!.•.•ii;;.•.•.:•.•..•.•.•. :.!.!.•.:.•.!.:•.•.~.•..!.••.!•..t.!..•!•.~.!•..!•.• •. .ii..:ii
.. . :1~: 9' ········· ;)t~t.{.::. :. ~r :If:
·+W~~ l:WlBr,.Ef!!:))):/:): ::·\))>............ ....... ·
IS .•.•.•.•.•.•.•.•< <.•< <.•.•••.•<.••.•.•••••••••••••••.•.•.••••••••••••••••.•.<.•••.•.•.•.•••••••••:::::::::::(}{ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••
'bridal/bridle'. A list of 19 words (Table
4.5) compiledby Halberstadt et al. (1995) was read out to the subjects, who then typed them
on the computer. Subjectswere read the list (in which words were placed in random order) by
the demonstrator in the experimental session.
The words were scored accordingto spelling, and the possibilities and scoring assignments are
outlined in the examples below:
Eg. 'Bridal' = 'happy': score = 1
'Bridle' = 'neutral' :
'Banned' = 'sad' :
'Band' = 'neutral' :





12 The American Heritage Dictionary ofthe English Language (1992) defines a
homophone as 'One oftwo or more words, such as night and knight, that are pronounced
the same but differ in meaning, origin, and sometimes spelling. '
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The original word list presented two problems: Firstly, the homophone (medal-meddle) was
intended to be interpreted as either 'medal' or 'metal' when the American pronunciation was
used since the '1' of metal is pronounced as a 'd'. The local pronunciation style prevalent
(South African English) made either 'medal' or 'meddle' possible (respectively 'happy' and
'neutral'). This was not ideal since 'meddle' is possibly more negative than 'metal'. Secondly,
the American pronunciation ofthe homophone 'poor' is equivalent to the local pronunciation
of the word 'pore', and the local pronunciation of 'poor' does not resemble the word
pronounced 'pore'. This difference in pronunciation did not become apparent until the time of
the experiment, so it was decided to exclude this homophone from the analysis. Only 18
homophones (11 'happy/neutral' and, 7 'sad/neutral') could therefore be analysed.
It was hypothesized that subjects who
were exposed to the sad stimulus
(Condition 1) would spell more
homophones from the 'sad/neutral' list
as 'sad' words and fewer as 'neutral'
words, whereas subjects exposed to the
happy stimulus (Condition 2) would
spell fewer 'sad' homophones as 'sad' words and more as 'neutral' words. Subjects in
Condition 1 were expected to spell more words from the 'happy/neutral' homophone list as
'neutral' words and fewer as 'happy' words. Those in Condition 2 were expected to spell more
words as 'happy' and fewer as 'neutral'. Table 4.6 summarises the subliminal priming condition
and the expected direction ofthe scores ofwords from both lists.
Halberstadt et al. rated the emotional valence ofthe homophones by asking a group of subjects
(N=41) to rate them as related to both happiness and sadness on a Likert-type scale. The
average score ofthe relatedness to happiness for 'happy' homophones, and sadness for 'sad'
homophones (where 1 is the weakest relation and 7 is the strongest relation) was 5.85, and 6.06
respectively. Table 4.5 shows the homophone list in the order in which it was presented in the
present study, with the 'happy/sad' word listed first. 'Sad' homophones had to be at least one
standard deviation above the mean for all pretest words in their relatedness to sadness
according to Halberstadt et al., and likewise 'happy' homophones had to be at least one
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standard deviation above the mean for all pretest words in their relatedness to happiness.
4.4 PROCEDURE
The subjectswere required to signup for the class practical, and could choose one of eight 30
minute sessions. Each subject was assigned a seat number and practical number. The seat
designated one of30 seats in the computer room, and the practical number was used to identify
subjects' data files on the file server.
STAGE 1: INTRODUCTION
When the subjects were seated correctly, the demonstrator introduced himself, thanked the
subjects for attending, and informed them that the session was the experimental part oftheir
practical course, and concerned the subject ofperceptual thresholds and auditory responses.
The demonstrator told the subjects that they would be debriefed at the end ofthe session, and
that a comprehensiveexplanationofthe experiment would be given during a lecture scheduled
for the followingweek. It was emphasised that the session did not involve any tests of ability.
Subjects were requested to remain silent at all times, and not to communicate with anyone
except the demonstrator.
In the introduction, general instructions were given, and the subjects were asked to proceed
only at the instruction of the demonstrator. At each stage in the program, the screens were
numbered and subjectswere asked to be aware ofthe screen numbers in the top left hand side
of the screen in order that everyone could work together. Instructions were read by the
experimenter at each stage.
STAGE 2: EXPERIMENT
The program stages were as follows:
Screen 1: Recorded 'practical' number.





Recorded subjects' home language.
Demonstration instructions informing subjects of the sequence of the
'Perception' experiment: 1). A focussing dot ('©') would be displayed in the
Screen 5:
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centre ofthe screen. 2). A phrase would be flashed in that area (in this case at
a relativelylong exposure of2 seconds. 3). A mask ofrandom characters would
then be displayed.
The message: 'This is what you will see... Wait a moment! '
Demonstration.
Screen 6: Subjects were informed that they would be shown 1 phrase 15 times in the same
sequence as the demonstration. They were asked to try as hard as they could
to see the phrase.
Screen 7: The subjects were introduced to the next phase of the experiment.
Screen 8: Subjects were asked to type in the phrase that they saw, and ifthey did not see
anything, to type in the first words that came to mind.
Screen 9 -10 : Subjects were requested to wait for further instructions, and then the word
'GO' had to be entered in order to proceed. This was done in order that
subjects could enter the correct homophone at each stage .
Screensll-29: The homophones were read out in the order that they appear in Table 4.5, and
the subjects typed responses on the computer. Each screen was colour coded to ensure
synchronisation between subjects.
At the end ofthe program, subjectswere thanked for their participation, and asked not to leave
until they had been debriefed.
STAGE 3: DEBRIEF
When all subjects had completed the procedure, they were informed that they had been given
15 subliminal exposures to one oftwo phrases, depending on whether their seat numbers were
odd or even. The meaning ofthe term 'subliminal' was explained briefly, and the phrases were
divulged. The subjects were informed that the aim ofthe experimentwas to see ifthe subliminal
exposure to the phrases could influence the manner in which they interpreted and spelt the
homophones.
STAGE 4: RELAXATION EXERCISE
In order to counter possible negative effect which exposure to the sad phrase may have caused,
participants were given a three minute relaxation exercise.
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STAGE 5: TERMINATION
The subjects were thanked for their participation, and asked to contact the demonstrator if
anything had bothered them during the experimental session.
4.5 RESULTS
This section will describe the treatment of
the data, item analysis and statistical
analysis. Findings that are of interest willbe
presented. At appropriate points, theoretical
aspects ofthe statistical analysis will receive
comment, and a number of issues will be
raised in this regard.
4.5.1 DATA CLEANING
Table 4.7 List of words corrected .
:::::::::::;:;:::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;: .:...:....:.:.:.:.:.:.:.;.:.:.:.:::
Data from the experiment was written to the
:file server in ASCII files. After the data files
had been merged, a spell check was done to correct minor mistakes. A rule was formulated
thus: a word was changed ifone character could be moved, changed, or deleted and the result
of such a change would be a word with the correct spelling corresponding to one of the
possible meanings ofthe homophone. No more than one character was changed in the manner
described unless it was quite clear that the word was a misspelling of one ofthe homophone
meanings. A list of the changes is given in Table 4.7. Some of the word changes listed were
done more than once, and a total of45 minor errors were corrected,
One individual's result file was deleted since all the responses in this file were errors and the
number of files was reduced from N=108 to N = I07. The total number of errors made by all
subjects (N=107) was 240, and the mean number of errors made was 2.24 (another way of
expressing this information). After the data had been cleaned, the number of errors was reduced
to 195 and the mean was 1.8 (SD=2.18). An error score frequency plot is shown in Figure 4.1.
An analysis ofvariance showed a highly significant difference (p<0.001) between English and
non-English home language groups in the number of errors made on all 18 items. The average
number of errors made by the English home
language group (N =72) was 0.68, whereas
that of the non-English speaking group (N
=35) was 4.17 . It seems self-evident that
those whose home language is not English
were less familiar with the language, and








Figure 4.1 Error scores: cleaned data.
A program was written in Pascal source code to score the data from the experiment (Appendix
D). The score coding was given in section 4.3.4 (happy=l; saet-=2; neutral=3; error=4), and
a category score was computed for each word. In addition, score totals were computed for
each subject in the following manner:
1) a happy total as the sum of all the words scored as 1;
2) a sad total as the sum of all the words scored as 2;
3) a neutral total as the sum of all the words scored as 3;
4) a happy/neutral total as the sum of all the 'neutral' words from the 'happy' list of
homophones. In the following list for example, the words in bold would be 'happy/neutral'
ones: 'sweet/suite'; 'won/one';
5) a sad/neutral total as the sum ofall the 'neutral' words from the 'sad' list ofhomophones.
Examples of 'sad/neutral' words are: 'die/dye'; 'mourning/morning';
6) an error total (error-happy) which was the total number of errors made in the 'happy' list
7) an error total (error-sad) which was the total number of errors made in the 'sad' list.
The breakdown of neutral scores in this way was done after analysis showed that the
respectively happy/sad neutral scores did show different patterns ofvariance. For example, an
analysis of variance (one-way) showed a non-significant difference between non-English
(Group 1) and English (Group 2) home language subjects on the happy/neutral scores (F=O.4,
df=l, p=0.53), but a highly significant difference!' between these groups on the sad/neutral
13 Some statisticians believe that the probability level is important in judging the degree
of significance of a statistic (see Howell, 1997, p. 97).
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scores (F=28.3 , df=1, p<O.OOl). The neutral score reflects tills difference (F=15.5, dF1,
p<O.OOl), but the additional breakdown provides potentially valuable information, since the
mean score for Group 1 was 0.37, and that of Group 2 was 0.38 for happy/neutral scores,
whereas for sad/neutralscores, the means were 0.38 and 0.53 for the same groups respectively
(based on 18 items). It can thus be inferred that English home language subjects were
significantly more likely to give 'neutral' spellings ofhomophones in the 'sad' list than non-
English home language subjects.
It was also decided to break down the error scores on the different lists ofwords since there
was a differentpattern oferrors between the 'happy' and ' sad' homophone lists. The variables
were called happy errors and sad errors respectively.
4.5.3 COMPOSITIONAL SCORING METHOD
The totals for each subject described in the last section (happy; sad; neutral; happy/neutral;
sad/neutral; happy errors; sad error) are not all independent of each other. For example, ifthe
number of 'happy' words recorded by the subject was known, the number of 'happy/neutral'
words would be determined, provided that no errors were made. Likewise, if the number of
'sad' words recorded by the subject was known , the number of ' sad/neutral' words would be
determined, provided that no errors were made. Thus, the happy and happy/neutral variables
were dependent on each other, and likewise the sad and sad/neutral variables, apart from the
effects of errors. This dependency would be reflected, for mathematical reasons, in negative
correlations between happy and happy/neutral scores, and between sad and sad/neutral scores,
and the correlation would not be meaningful On the other hand, sad and happy variables were
independent of each other, although both were influenced by errors.
Aitchison (in Lovie & Lovie, 1991) defines compositional data as 'consisting ofvectors whose
components represent the proportions ofsome whole or unit...' (p. 214) and suggests a method
whereby the mutual constraints of the components of a given vector can be reflected. For
example, the total (tj ) score for all 'happy' homophones (where ' i ' represents the components
happy total: XI; happy/neutral total: X2; happy errors: x3) could be expressed thus: tj = Xi /(X I
+ X2 + X3) where tjrepresents unity. Thus, the unit-sum constraint (XI + x2 + x3 =1) is taken into
account and the components of the vector are essentially ratios (Xl: X2 : X3 ).
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between variable, where enlarging one score
necessarily reduces another).
rr t I Happy Hneutral Herrors 1loa = + +---- .
happy 11 11 11
Total =Sad + Sneutral + Serrors=1.
sad 7 7 7
With this logic in mind, subjects' total scores were calculated in accordance with the following
parameters: the total number of 'happy' homophones used for the analysiswas 11, and the total
number of 'sad ' homophones used was 7, a total of 18 items. The scoring equations for 'happy'
and 'sad' homophones respectively, are shown below (in other words, compositional scores
are used when there is a dependency in the data
same score compositions for another subject
Figure 4.2 Score compositions for 2 cases of 'happy' and
(subject 2). The scores are represented as 'sad' homophones.
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Figure 4.2 shows the composition of two cases
for 'happy' and 'sad' homophones: the graph in
the upper left hand side of the figure represents
the scores (subject 1) for the 'happy'
homophones, and that on the upper right hand
side represents the scores for the 'sad'
homophones. The lower figures represent the
HAPPY LIST SAD LIST
(emotionally) valenced (happy or sad), 'neutral' (happy/sad neutral) and errors (happy/sad)
and are presented as percentages. Subject 1 spelled 0.50 (50%) ofthe total number ofwords
in the 'happy' homophone list as 'happy' words, 0.38 (38%) as 'happy/neutral' words, and 0.12
(12%) were errors. Similarly, this subject spelled 0.57 (57%) of the words in the 'sad'
homophone list as 'sad' words, 0.29 (29%) of the words as 'sad/neutral' words, and 14 % as
errors. Note that subject 2 did not make any errors in either list.
4.5.4 ANALVSIS OF VARIANCE
An initial step in analysing the data was to assess the effects of the independent variables
subliminal condition, gender and language. A factorial model was generated with these
independent variables, and the following 6 dependent variables were analysed: happy, sad,
happy/neutral, sad/neutral, happy errors, sad errors. The variables neutral and errors were
also analysed, but will not be presented since the variables sad/neutral, happy/neutral, happy
errors and sad errors yield more precise information. A full explanation of the dependent
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variables is given in sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 . The ANOVA was based on 18 items, and the
results will be presented for each dependent variable (See Appendix H).
4.5.4.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 1: HAPPY
The English group scored significantly higher on this variable than the non-English group
(means 0.68 vs. 0.51 respectively ; F=27.16, df=l , p<0.0009). There were no interactions
between the independent variables.
4.5.4.2 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 2: SAD
Only one significant difference was seen in this variable: females' scores were significantly
higher than those of males (means 0.43 vs. 0.31; F=6.0, df=1, p <0.016). No significant
interactions were found between the independent variables.
4.5.4.3 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 3: HAPPY/NEUTRAL
No significant differences were found between any groups on this variable.
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Figure 4.3 Sad/neutral : condition by gender interaction. Figure 4.4 Sad/neutral: condition by language interaction.
There were 2-way interactions between subliminalpriming condition, language and gender in
thisvariable, but these were not statistically significant (condition by language: F=2.86, df-= 1,
p=0.09 ; condition by gender: F=2.73, df=l , p=O.I). Note in Figure 4.3 that males tended to
have higher sad/neutral scores in the sad condition while there was no change in the female
group associated with subliminal priming. Figure 4.4 shows that non-English subjects tended
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to have lower scores in the happy condition, while English subjects tend to have slightly higher
scores in this condition. These interactions should be regarded with caution since they were not
statistically significant. There is a suggestion however, that generally males and the non-English
group were reactive to subliminal priming.
There were significant main effects ofboth condition and gender in this variable, when these
independent variables were analysed discretely. Subjects spelled more neutral words in the sad
subliminal condition than in the happy condition (means 0.5 vs. 0.46, F=5.15 , df=l, p<0.05)
although this difference is slight. This finding fits with the trends (condition by gender;
condition by language) noted earlier that subjects tended to spell more 'neutral' words in the
sad condition (see Figure 4.3 and 4.4). Male subjects spelled more 'neutral' words than females
(means 0.53 vs . 0.47, F=4.34, df=l , p=0.05), also a relatively small difference.
4.5.4.5 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 5: HAPPY ERRORS
non-English subjects made far more errors in the 'happy' homophone list than English subjects
(means 0.22 vs. 0.04;F=66.48, df=1,p<0.0009). No effects ofthe other independent variables
were evident. 14
4.5.4.6 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 6: SAD ERRORS











-e- non-Engl ish .J1iiI- English
Figure 4.5 Sad errors: condition by language interaction. Figure 4.6 Sad errors: condition by gender interaction.
14 . -
~ese means (happy errors, and also sad errors) are also based on the compositional
sco~g method, and reflect the error ratio relative to the other scoring possibilities, and
not simplythe number oferrors made.
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There was an interaction between language and condition (F=14.52, df=1, p<0.0009). The
group means are shown in Figure 4.5. There was also an interaction between gender and
condition (F=4.79, df=1, p<0.05). The means are shown in Figure 4.6. Significant main
effects of language and condition were also seen in this variable. non-English subjects made
more errors than English subjects (0.25 vs. 0.03, F=78. 97, df=1, p<O.0009) . Subjects generally
made more errors in the happy condition (0.08 vs. 0.13, F=18.1, df=1,p<0.0009).
4.5.4.7 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The general findings ofthis analysis are as follows:
1. English subjects spelled more 'happy' words than non-English subjects.
2. Female subjects spelled more 'sad' words than males, who conversely, spelled more
'sad/neutral' words.
3. The following trends were seen: a) Males spelled more ' sad/neutral' words in the sad
subliminal condition than females. There was virtually no change in females' scores. b) non-
English subjects produced fewer ' sad/neutral' words than English subjects in the happy
subliminal condition.
4. Generallymore 'neutral' words were spelled by all subjects in the sad subliminal condition;
this was a slight, but significant difference.
5. Generallysubjects made more errors in the 'sad' word list (variable: sad errors) when they
were exposed to ahappy subliminal prime.
non·Engllsh (SAD co ndKlon) English (SAD condKlon)
Sad esters (16.00%)
Sad.hel1raI(45.00%)








Sad erc-s (2.43 %)
Sadhlel1ral (54.60%)
Sad score (42.97%)
Figure 4.7 Comparison of sco res for English and non-Eng lish groups across sad and happy sub liminal condit ions ('sad' word list).
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These findings can be seen in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8. In these graphs, the means are
expressed as percentages since this reflects the compositional nature ofthe data, and makes the
relationship between the variables clear. In each figure, note the change in score composition
between the groups and across the variable subliminal condition. In both figures, the groups
represented on the left hand side were reactive to condition. It is clear that the groups most

















Figure 4.8 Comparison of scores for male and female groups across sad and happy subliminal conditions ('sad' word list).
A response to the subliminal condition only occurred with 'sad' homophones. The response
took the form ofan increased number of 'neutral' word spellings in the sad condition, and an
increase in the number oferrors made in the happy subliminalcondition. Sad subliminal priming
was thus associated with a tendency to spell 'neutral' words, and happy subliminal priming was
associated with a tendency to make errors. The former response may be seen as a tendency to
avoid spelling mood-congruent words in the sad condition, while in the happy condition it
could be seen as a response to incongruent priming (where the emotional valence of
homophone was incongruent with that ofthe prime). This effect was most specific to certain
groups of subjects, and to the 'sad' word list. Interestingly, Greenwald et al. predicted that
priming effects could take the form ofhigher error rates with incongruent priming (1995, P 31).
4.5.5 ITEM ANALVSIS
Some evidence for a priming effect was discovered in the preceding analysis. The nature ofthe
priming effect appeared to be an (avoidant) tendency to spell 'neutral' words when subjects
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were exposed to a sad subliminal stimulus, and a marked tendency to make errors in the happy
condition. Effects were also associated with gender and home language factors.
The complexityofthe subliminal priming effect, and the interactions between the priming effect
and other independent variables suggested that a more detailed investigation was needed. A
detaileditem analysis was therefore seen to be necessary to understand the data. This analysis
was done in 4 stages. Each stage will be described under a separate sub-heading.
1. The initialfrequency with which words were selected will be considered as a gross measure.
2. A factor analysis was performed using all 18 items in order to summarise the data and
investigate patterns ofvariance.
3. A chi-square analysis of the effect ofthe independent variables condition, home language
and gender will be considered.
4. The results of a study in which items were rated by another group of subjects will be
presented and discussed.
4.5.5.1 WORD SELECTION FREQUENCY
The items were examined in terms of the relative frequency with which each word was
recorded. For each homophone, two word spellings were possible depending on the valence
of the homophone: for 'happy' homophones, a 'happy' and a 'neutral' spelling was possible
(eg. 'won' and 'one'). For 'sad' homophones a 'sad' and 'neutral' spelling was possible (eg.
'die' or 'dye'). Words that did not conform to the correct spelling were coded as errors. A
good homophone for this task would tend to produce an equal amount ofemotionally valenced
and 'neutral' words, and no errors. Conversely, a poor homophone would not produce similar
numbers of emotionally valenced and 'neutral' words, and an undesirable number of errors.
Table 4.8 shows all items ranked according to their respective emotional/neutral difference.
The emotional/neutral difference refers to the absolute difference between the emotionally
valenced words and their 'neutral' pairs (eg. 'die/dye') and these values are shown in the last
column. The lower the value, the closer the emotionally valenced versus. 'neutral' word
distributionwas, and as explained previously, this was suggested as one ofthe criteria for the
usefulness ofitems. These values do not take into account the number of errors made however,
and the significance oferror responses was not known at this stage.
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Table 4.8 Items ranked according to emotional/neutral difference"lllllilillllllllll
Using these criteria, the best item was the homophone pair (11) 'boredlboard' with 55 'sad'
(s=55) spellings, 43 'neutral' (n=43) spellings and 9 errors (e=9). Another relatively good item
was (9) 'presents/presence' with 37 'happy' (h) spellings (h=37), 61 'neutral' spellings (n=61)
and 7 errors (e=7). Other relatively good itemswere: (14) 'missed/mist' (s=33; n=71; e=3); (2)
'hymn/him' (h=29; n=75; e=3); (12) 'dear/deer' (h=80; n=23; e=4). Items which were rated as
the worst in terms of these criteria were: (4) 'sweet/suite' (h=103; n=O; e=4); (18)
'pride/pried' (h=94; n=O; e=13); (19) 'pain/pane' (s=96; n=l; e=4).
The analysis suggested that some items were unsuitable for this South African sample because
ofdifferences in the degree ofusage and familiarity of some ofthe words across cultural and
home language factors. The most notable examples were seen in the failure of the item (18)
'pride/pried' where no subjects gave the 'neutral' word 'pried', and item (4) 'sweet/suite'
where no subjects were able to give the 'neutral' word 'suite'. Little was known at this stage
of the possible effects of the Lv. condition, and because the criteria for keeping or rejecting
items were tentative, further analysis was considered necessary for clarification, and to
investigate possible effects.
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4.5.5.2 PRINCIPLE COMPONENTS ANALVSIS
A principle components analysis
was done as a preliminary step in
examining the data, and
summansmg determinants of
vanance (varimax rotation
method). The variablesused were:
(subliminal priming) condition,
gender, language , total 'happy'
scores (happy) , total 'neutral'
words scored in the 'happy' list
(happy/neutral) ; total ' sad'
scores (sad); total words scored
Figure 4.9 Factor plot.
in the 'sad' list (sad/neutral) ,
total errors made in the ' sad' word list (sad errors) and total errors made in the 'happy' word
list (happy errors). The analysis was set to display factor loadings of>=3 (greater than or equal
to 0.3), and selectedfactors with eigenvalues of >=1 (greater than or equal to I). These were
based on guidelines suggested by Manly (1986).
The screeplot is shown in Figure 4.9. Factor 1 (eigenvalue=3.21) accounted for 35.6% ofthe
variance, Factor 2 (eigenvalue=1.73) accounted for 19.2% of the variance, Factor 3
(eigenvalue=1.42) accounted for 15.8% of the variance and Factor 4 (eigenvalue=1.04)
accounted for 11.6% of the variance. The total amount ofvariance accounted for by the 4
factors was 82.2%.
Table 4.9 Rotated factor matrix.
The rotated factor
matrix is shown in
Table 4.9 It must be
borne in mind that the
analysis is not easily
interpretable since the
variables are not all
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independent of each other. (See Section 4.5.3.) This can be seen in the case of happy and
happy/neutral variableswhere there is a negative loading on happy in Factor 3, and a positive
loading on happy/neutral. This is a logical relationship rather than an empirical one since
happy/neutral is inversely proportional to happy because ofthe compositional nature ofthe
data. This is also true for the variable sad and sad/neutral in Factor 2. These variables should
not be treated as independent causes ofvariance, but each pair (happy-happy/neutral; sad-
sad/neutral) should be seen as parts of a single vector. The error variables (happy errors and
sad errors) are independent of each other, but each are constraints on the respective happy-
happy/neutral and sad-sad/neutral components. Naturally the vectors happy-happy/neutral-
happy errors and sad-sad/neutral-sad errors are independent, since they are words from
separate lists and have different scoring compositions.
Factor 1 is a bipolar factor and consists of negative loadings on the error variables happy
errors (errors in the 'happy' list) and sad errors (errors in the'sad' list), and positive loadings
on the variables language, sad/neutral and happy. It could be summarised as 'lack oferrors
(in both lists), language and tendency to record 'happy' words in the 'happy' list, and 'neutral'
words in the 'sad' list. Although one runs the risk of over-interpreting, this could be further
reduced to 'linguistic ability and positive selectiveness' .
Factor 2 was also bipolar, and consisted ofsad/neutral as a negative loading, and the variables
sad and gender as positive loadings. The factor could be described as 'sad word production
tendency and gender', or rather roughly as 'sad tendency and gender' .
Factor 3, also bipolar, consisted of a negative loading on the variable happy, and a high
positive loading on the variable happy/neutral. This could be seen as a 'tendency to produce
neutral words' and was a relatively pure factor in this regard.
Factor 4 had positive loadings on the variables gender and condition. The highest loading was
produced by the variable condition (0.93), signifying that it had the strongest influence in this
factor. The factor could be regarded as describing subliminal condition and gender effects on
word selection.
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The factor analysis suggested that home language, error proneness and emotional valence in
the items were strong determinants ofvariance in the data. Gender and condition were also
significant determinants, and subliminal priming condition seemed to have had the smallest
effect.
4.5.5.3 CHI-SQUARE ANALVSIS
Stage 1 ofthe item analysis suggested that there was considerable variability between items
used in the experiment. The measure used to assess items was a coarse one, and did not give
any information about their contribution to the variance in the data. The factor analysis
established that the independent variables language and gender were major determinants of
variability, and that condition contributed to a lesser extent. A chi-square test was done with
each item in order to assess the effects of these variables (N=107 in all tests). The approach
taken to this analysis was to hypothesize what data trends would occur if there was any
subliminalpriming effect. In a sense the analysispresupposed that there was such an effect, and
the items were analysed to find support for, or disconfirm the prediction ofvarious data trends.
Each item was analysed by the variables subliminal condition, language and gender (three one-
way analyses). The chi-square statistic (X2) and Cramer's V 15 was calculated (N=107) and the
results were ranked in descending order by the size of X2 . The Cramer's V is a standardised
measure of association which takes sample size into account. The maximum value of the
statistic is 1, (perfect association) and the minimum value is 0 (no association). It was used
because the X2 measure ofassociation is more difficult to interpret as a measure of effect size
since its value varies with sample size. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 4.9.1.
It can be seen in Table 4.9.1 that the X2 statistic values range from 5.64 to nearly 0, and
Cramer's V ranges from 0.23 to 0.03. The item with the highest level of significance was (3)
'die/dye' (X2=5.64 df=2, p<0.06, Cramer's V=0.23). This was followed by (2) 'hymn/him'
(X
2=4.8,
df-=2, p<0.09, Cramer's V=0.21), after which there is a rapid decline in the level of
significanceuntil item (5) 'won/one' (X2=0, df-=l, p=l, 4>=0.03) and (18) 'pride/pried' (X2=0,
15The Cramer's V and phi (4)) statistic, both measures of association, are identical in the
case of a 2X2 table. The Cramer's V statistic was calculated for larger tables.
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df=l, p=l, 4>=0.03).
Carrying out multiple tests of
significance makes the
adoption of a higher level of
significance obligatory since
some significant results could
be due to chance. It must be
pointed out that this was a
pilot study which sought to
investigate possible effects.
There is reason to believe that
effects due to subliminal
stimulation are small, and
highly specific.
Table 4.9.1 Items ranked in order of subliminal priming condition effect size ()f).
None of the items reached a
conventional level of significance, and this means that 'chance' cannot be ruled out as an
explanation. Failure to reach significance does not therefore mean that chance is the
explanation. The failure to reach conventional significance levels may be due to a small effect
size, and the sample size being too small. Indeed, since subliminal effects appear to be small,
further investigation is warranted.
Correlation analysis shows that there is virtually no association between the effect size and the
absolute difference value calculated in Stage I (r=0.0355). This calls into question the
usefulness of the absolute difference index as an indicator of the value of the items in
discriminating between subliminal prime conditions.
4.5.5.4 DETAILED ANALVSIS
Items most likelyto reveal subliminal effectswere subjected to a more detailed analysis. In this
section, items will be analysed in some detail, and data trends will be discussed. The analysis
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will be presented according to the effect size of subliminal condition in descending order of
significance. Graphs and tables will give the response variable in brackets. This signifies, in each
case, the deviation ofword spellings from the expected level as a function ofthe Lv .
In Section 4.3.4, the expected direction of the data was illustrated in Table 4.6 where the
scores on variables happy, happy/neutral, sad and sad/neutral were predicted as a function of
condition. The general expectation was that score changes would be congruent with the
respective conditions and emotional valence of the homophones. In some cases however,
incongruent responses occurred which were difficult to interpret. Later in section 4.5 .5.5 these
anomalous items will be discussed further in the light of a further stage ofthe item analysis.
ITEM 3. DIE/DYE
According to the X2 and Cramer's V statistic, this
it em showed the clearest association with the
subliminal variable condition (X2=5.64, df=2,
p=0 .059, Cramer's V=0.23). The X2 probability
verges on the generally accepted significance level
of p<0.05. The deviation plot is shown in Figure
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of the words in the 3 categories 'sad' , 'neutral', -Q-sad o happy
'error' by subliminal condition. This result was Figure 4.9.1 Deviationof Word 3 by condition('sad').
considered congruent since in the sad subliminal
condition, more instances ofthe 'sad' word spelling were recorded than in the happy condition
(51 vs. 44, see Figure 4.3).There was a slight tendency for subjects to spell the 'neutral' word
'dye' more in the happy condition (4 vs. 3), although this is non-significant (adjusted residuals
0.4 each - see below for an explanation).
The adjusted (adjusted to have a normal distribution with mean=O and SD= I) standardised X2
residuals, (referred to henceforth as adjusted residuals) were calculated. This enables a
significancetest to be carried out (for this thesis: a=0.05) since the 5% standard normal deviate
value is 1.96, i.e cells with adjusted residuals of 1.96 or greater are likely to occur by chance
less than 1 in 20 times. The adjusted residuals (absolute values) across the variable condition
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(sad/happy) for the 'sad' word ('die') were both 1.9, falling just short of significance. The
adjusted residuals for the category 'errors' were significant (sad:-2.3 , happy: 2.3) at p<O.05.
Errors were thus significantly associated with subliminal condition. All the errors in this item
occurred in the condition incongruent with the meaning of the word (happy condition, 'sad'
word), and this provided grounds for speculation that errors were associated with incongruent
pnmmg.
An effect often associated with condition in this study, was the increased number of errors
made by subjects in the happy condition. This trend was noted in an analysis ofvariance as a
main effect with all 18 items where subjectsin the happy subliminal condition made more errors
than subjects in the sad condition. Importantly, this was only significant in the ' sad' homophone
list (p=O.OI2). This effect was more pronounced in the interaction ofcondition and language
factors (p<O.00009) in that non-English home language subjects (Group 1) made considerably
more errors in the happy subliminal conditionthan English home language speakers (Group 2).
The reason why thiseffect was not seen to any significant extent in the 'happy' homophone list
was thought to be due to the finding that items with a 'happy' valence were less affected by
subliminal priming. This will be discussed later in section 4.5.5.6. Note also that Group 2
subjects (English) were significantly more likely to give 'neutral' spellings for homophones in
the 'sad' list than Group 1 subjects: this is related to the finding that Group 1 subjects made
more errors in the 'sad' homophone list than Group 2 subjects since the variables are not
independent.
Good grounds appear to exist for the
speculation that this effect was due to
the incongruence of the subliminal
prime (happy) with the homophone
which was most likely to be spelt as
'die' since 89% of subjects spelt this
meaning. Because non-English
subjects' vocabulary was likely to be
less extensive than that of English
subjects, they may have had difficulty
Table 4.9.2 Word 3 by home language analysis ('sad').
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accessing the other homophone meaning ('dye ') ,
and made more errors as a consequence. This
effectis illustrated in Table 4.9.2 where it can be
seen that 4 of the 5 errors made were by Group
1 (non-English). In this regard it is also important
to note that Group 2 (English) produced
-& non-English"9- Eng
disproportionately more 'neutral' words than
Group 1 (6 vs. I). The overall X
2
word by Figure 4.9.2 Residual of Word 3 by language (error).
language test was significant (X2=6.21, d:F2,
p <O.05), and the adjusted residuals (non-English: 2.3; English: -2.3) were significant for the
error categories at p<O.05. The standardised residuals are plotted in Figure. 4.9.2. These values
represent each cell's contribution to the overall X2 statistic for the table. Note that the
contribution of errors in the non-English group is the highest in this regard.
ITEM 2. HYMN/HIM
This item had the second largest effect
size (X2 = 4.8, d:F2, p=O.09, Cramer's
V=O .21). However, the effect of the
subliminal condition was incongruent.
The homophone comes from the
'happy' homophone list, and it was
assumed that the word 'hymn' had a
happy meaning to the majority of
subjects and that its counterpart 'him'
was 'neutral' . Therefore it was
Table 4.9.3 Word 2 by condition ('happy).
predicted that the happy conditionwould facilitate the spelling ofthe word 'hymn' and lessened
the likelihood that the 'neutral' 'him' would be spelled. Conversely, it was expected that the
sad condition would prime subjects to produce the 'neutral' spelling more often than the
'happy' spelling. This was not the case, as Table 4.9.3 shows. The number of 'happy' words
spelt in the sad condition (condition I) is greater than that in the happy condition (condition
2). Conversely, the number of 'neutral' words spelt in condition 2 is greater than that in
Condition 1. This is exactly opposite to the pattern expected, and ifthe columns 'happy' and
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' sad' were transposed, the effect of condition
would be congruent. It was speculated at this
stage that the word 'hymn' was actually seen as
a ' sad' word, and 'him' was seen as 'happier' .
Figure 4.9.3 shows each determinant of the
overall X2 statistic by means of the standardised
residuals. Note that the error category
I
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~ sad -e- happy
contributed most to the overall effect. None of Figure 4.9.3 Residual of Word 2 by condition (error).
the adjusted residuals were significant, although the error category was close at 1.8; critical
value =1.96.
ITEM 15. FINED/FIND
This item showed the third greatest Table 4.9.4 Word 15 by condition ('neutral') .
effect size, but was complex to
interpret. The word by condition
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table is shown in Table 4.9.4 . Note
word ('fined') is low (4.7%) and
that of the 'neutral' word ( 'find')
is relatively high (72%). There
were also a large number of errors
made (23.4%). There was a large
language effect in this item
(X2=45.92, N=107, df=2, p<0.00009) in the word by language test.
. that the occurrence of the ' sad'
If the independent variable, home language is taken into account, the picture is different. A
series oftables were constructed, to examine the effects of language. None ofthe subjects in
the non-Englishgroup (Group 1) gave the 'sad' spelling ' fined', and all cases of the 'sad' word
were given by the Englishgroup (Group 2). Group 2 spelt a total of 5 'sad' words, 64 'neutral'
words and 3 errors. A X2 test for the effects of condition in this group was non-significant
(X~0.54, n=72, df=2,p=0.76) ill Group I however, the word by condition test was significant
(X~4.97, n=35, df=l ,p=O.03, with Yates correction, 4>=0.44). The adjusted residuals (neutral
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and errors: 2.6 in each case) were all significant (p<0.05).
Jil- sad Jil- happy
Jil- sad -e- happy
sad neutral error
Word 15 (fined/find) males only
sad neutral error
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Figure 4.9.4 Residual of Word 15 by condition (female
group; error).
Figure 4.9.5 Residual of Word 15 by condition (male
group; 'neutral', 'error').
When the variable gender is taken into account,
the effect of condition is stronger still. In the
femalegroup, there was no change in the pattern
associated with condition and words were
distributed almost evenly between the 2
conditions (X2=0.44, n=88, df=2, p=0.44
Cramer's V=0.07). Figure 4.9.4. shows the
standardised residuals, which are all small in
value and do not exceed 0.4. In the male group
however, there was a highly significant effect
(X2=8.74, n=19, df=2, p=O.013, Cramer's
V=0.68) ofcondition. The standardised residuals
are shown in Figure 4.9.5 . The adjusted residuals
for the 'neutral' word between the sad and happy
conditionswere significant (2.9, -2.9 respectively,
p<0.05), and likewise for errors (-2.5, 2.5
respectively, p<0.05). The typical pattern of an
incongruent result is seen here since the sad
prime appears to facilitate spelling ofthe 'neutral'
word 'find' instead of the 'sad' word 'fined'.
There are also disproportionately more errors in the happy condition, which if one takes the
previouslymentioned incongruent priminghypothesis as an explanation, suggests that subjects
were not able to access a word congruent with the prime.
Further analysis examined each group separately (crosstabulation of word by condition by
gender by language). The group most significantly affected by the prime consisted of non-
English speakingmales (Fisher's exact test, 2 tail: p<0.05, n=IO, <{>=0.82). There were trends
in the same direction in the Englishmale group (Fisher's exact test, 2 tail: p<0.33, n=9, <{>=0.5),
and the non-English female group (X2=0.97, p=0.32, df=l, n=25, <1>=0.28), but not in the
English female group (X2=0.39, n=63, df=2, Cramer's V=0.08).
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It may be concluded that there were significant interactions between subliminal condition and
the independent variables gender and home language. When these were taken into account,
several subgroups were affected to a significant degree by the subliminal priming condition:
namelythe male group as a whole, and the non-English speaking male group in particular. The
effect ofthe priminghowever, was incongruent. This suggests that subjects in this group were
confused about word spelling, and spelledthe word 'find', meaning the negative word, 'fined'.
ITEM 11. BORED/BOARD
A chi-square analysis (N=107) demonstrated that this item showed significant effects ofgender
(X~1O.33, dF=2,p=0.0057, Cramer's V=0.31) and language (X2=6.5, df=2,p=0.04, Cramer's
V=0.25). In the male group, 21.1% of subjects gave the 'sad' spelling ('bored'), 57.9% gave
the 'neutral' spelling ('board'), and 21.1% made errors. In the female group, 58% of subjects
gave the 'sad' spelling, 36.4% gave the 'neutral' spelling, and 5.7% made errors. The male
group spelled 'board' more often than the femalegroup (although not significantly so: adjusted
residual=1.7), but the female group spelled 'bored' significantlymore often (adjusted residuals:
males= -2.9, females=2.9, p<0.05). The male group showed a nonsignificant effect of
condition (X2=2.87, p=0.24, n=19, Cramer's V=0.39) , and this effect size was smaller in the
female group (X2=0.45, p=0 .80, n=88, Cramer's V=0 .07).
Between Group 1 and Group 2 (non-English home language and English home language
respectively), the number of 'sad' words spelled was comparable (54.3% vs 50%), but Group
1 made significantly more errors (17.1 % vs. 4.2%; X2=6.54,p=0.04, n=35). The effect size of
condition observed in Group 1, although nonsignificant (X2=4.29, p=0.12, df=2, n=35,
Cramer's V=0.35), was stronger than in Group 2 where there was no noticeable effect
(X2=0.66, p=O. 72, df=2, n=72, Cramer's V=0.09).
It is interesting that in the group (non-English) thought to have been affected by the prime
(bearing in mind the smalleffect size), the only noticeable shifts due to condition were a slight
increase in the number of 'neutral' words recorded in the sad condition, and an increase in the
number of errors in the happy condition. It thus appears that the sad prime increased the
likelihood ofthe word 'board' being spelt, and the happy prime reduced it, and increased the
. probabilitythat errors would be made. It may be speculated that for these groups, 'board' was
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a sadder word than 'bored' . The reason for this is not clear.
_._.+ ...
The effect associated with the prime condition
was most specific to the non-English speaking
male sub-group. This may be seen from the chi-
square test ofWord 11 by condition by gender by
language (see Figure. 4.9.6 for a plot of the
standardised residuals). In the non-English
speaking male subgroup, the adjusted residual
value for the 'neutral' word was 2.1 which is
statistically significant (p<0.05). No .other
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Figure 4.9.6 Residual of Word 11 by gender by language
by condition (male, non-English group; 'neutral') .
ITEM 12: DEAR/DEER
This item showed a marked effect of home language (X2=12.46, N=107, df=2, p <0.002,
Cramer's V=0.34). English speaking subjects (Group 2) made no errors in either prime
condition, 72.2% of the responses were 'happy' words ('dear') and 27.8% were 'neutral'
('deer'). Non-English speaking subjects ' (Group 1) responses consisted of 11.4% errors, 80%
'happy' words, and 8.6% 'neutral' words. The most noticeable difference was therefore in the
relatively low proportion of 'neutral' words recorded by Group 1 (Group 1: 8.6% vs. Group
2: 27.8%). The difference in the proportion of 'happy' words recorded by either group was less
(Group 1: 72.2% vs Group 2: 80%) , and this suggests that responses were displaced from
being 'neutral' ones to errors, since if these were eliminated, the proportion of 'neutral'
responses would have been 20% bringing this group closer to Group 2 'neutral' responses
(27.8%). It was hypothesized that generally, individuals from Group 1 were less familiar with
the 'neutral' word 'deer' than those in Group 2.
There was generally an incongruent pattern ofpriming in both language groups, and thiswas
seen in an increased number of 'happy' words in the sad condition, and a slightly increased
number of 'neutral' words in the happy condition. There were also more errors recorded by
Group 1 in the happy condition than in the sad condition. The effect of condition was small
(X2=1.83, df=2, p=O.4, Cramer's V=O.13).
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ITEM 19: PAIN/PANE
No effect of home language was noted in this
item, but a relatively strong effect ofgender was
evident (X2=5.96, p=0.051, df=2, N=107,
Cramer's V=0.23 ). An interesting gender
difference was noted in response to the subliminal
condition. In Figure 4.9.7 (male group) it may be
seen that for the ' sad' category over the two
prime conditions, there is a marked deviation
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Figure 4.9.7 Deviation of Word 19 by condition by gender
(male group ; 'sad').
category. There were more 'sad' responses in
the sad condition than in the happy condition, and this was a congruent effect. There were also
more errors made in the happy condition - a finding which is consistent with other ' sad' items,
and which was mentioned previously. The adjusted residuals show that these were both
significant effects, i.e. for ' sad' and error responses over the happy and sad conditions ('sad'
words: 2.6, -2.6 for sad and happy conditions), (error: -2.2 , 2.2 for sad and happy conditions).
These are all significant at p<0.05. The chi-square test of condition in this table is also
significant (X2=6.97, df=2, n=19, p=0.031, Cramer 's V=0.6).
There were no significant differences in the female group (X2=0.004, df=l , n=88, p=0.95,
4>=0.05), and thus no effect attributable to the priming condition. This item seemed to be
sensitive to gender , but not language differences. In the male group , there was a significant and
congruent response to the prime, and it was hypothesized that this was due to the emotional
loading ofthe item which was somehow salient to this group, and to the sad prime. The reason
for this gender difference was not known.
ITEM 6 MOURNING/MORNING
Some effect oflanguage was observed in this item, but the significance level was relatively low
(X2~5.2, df=2, N=107,p=0.074, Cramer 's V=0.22). The non-English group was more likely
to record 'neutral' responses, and less likely to record ' sad' responses than the English group.
The adjusted residualsfor the ' sad' category (by condition) approached (1.9) , but did not attain
significance (1.96) at p <0.05. Overall, there was a congruent pattern of responses, but the
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Table 4.9.5 Word 6 by condi tion ('sad').
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analysis is shown in Table 4.9.5 .
No clear effects of either language or
gender were noted in this item. The
significance level ofthe chi-square test
(word by condition) was relatively low
ITEM 16: PEACE/PIECE
effect size was small (X2= 1.51, df=2,
p=0.47 , Cramer's V=0.12). The
~~ ~
(X2=1.49, N=107, df=2, p=0.47 ,
Cramer's V=0.12) but there was a slightly increased effect size in the word by gender by
condition test in the male group (X2=2.59, n=19, df=2, p=0.27, Cramer's V=0.37). The
direction ofthe effect was incongruent in that there were more 'happy' words ( 'peace') spelled
by subjects in the sad condition than in the happy condition. No clear effects were observed
in the other variables. This item was not sensitiveto the effects ofthe prime conditions, and the
responses attributable to condition were only evident in the male sub-group, and appeared
incongruent. These effects were not statistically significant.
ITEM 17: ROSE/ROWS
It was not possible to detect any effects of condition in this item and only one 'neutral'
response was recorded. Thisitem was probably unsuitable, either because of subjects' apparent
unfamiliarity with the 'neutral' word, or its general lack of salience to the priming.
ITEM 8: BRIDAUBRIDLE
This item showed a highly significant effect oflanguage (X2=16.6, N=107, df=2, p=0.0002).
This was due to the pau city of 'neutral' responses, and high number of errors in the non-
English group (Group I: 'neutral'=2, errors=16; Group 2: 'neutral'=18, errors=9). Both groups
produced more errors than usual.
The priming effect, ifany existed, was slight (X2=0.88, N=107, df=2, p=0.64, Cramer's
V=0.08), but was clearly congruent with the prime conditions in that more 'happy' and less
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'neutral' words were spelledby subjects in the happy condition, and conversely fewer 'happy'
and more 'neutral' words were produced by subjects in the sad condition. Subjects made more
errors in the sad condition (l4 vs. 11), and this may have been due to the incongruent priming
effect suggested earlier.
ITEM 14: MISSED/MIST
A significant word by language effect was noted in this item (X2=6.62, N=107, d~2, p=0.04,
Cramer's V=0.25) and this reflected differences in the number of 'sad' words and errors made
between groups (non-English: 'sad'=26%, errors=8.6%; English: 'sad'=33%, errors=O).
The effect ofthe subliminal prime on word choice, ifone existed, was small (X2=0. 72, N=107,
~2, p=0.69, Cramer's V=0.08) and incongruent. Slightly more 'sad' words ('missed') were
primed in the happy than the sad condition, and more 'neutral' words (,mist') were primed by
the sad condition. This item did not seem particularly sensitive to the effects ofpriming.
ITEM 7: HEAUHEEL
This item was significantly affected by the variable language (X2=1O.13, N=107, ~2,
p=0.0063). The effect was apparent in the relative rates of 'happy' words and errors across
home language groups (non-English: 'happy'=51%, errors=37%; English: 'happy'=74%,
errors=ll%). The effect of condition was weak, (X2=0.65, N=107, d~2, p=O. 72, Cramer's
V=0.078). For reasons, perhaps related to salience, this item did not discriminate between
subliminalprime conditions.
ITEM10:BANNEWBAND
This item showed a highly significant effect of language (X2=31.42, N=107, ~2,
p<0.00009), but a low effect ofcondition (X2=0.51, N=107, d~2, p=O. 77, Cramer's V=0.07).
non-English subjects recorded 43% 'neutral' words and 46% errors, while English subjects
recorded 83% 'neutral' words, and 3% errors. Thus, non-English subjects produced about half
the percentage of 'neutral' words that English subjects did, and made about 15 times the
number oferrors (these values take the group size into account). It is not clear why this effect
occurred, but lack offamiliarity and salience were thought to be a likely explanation.
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ITEM 9: PRESENTS/PRESENCE
No statistically significant effects ofword by gender or language were noted in this item. There
were also no significant effects seen in the word by subliminal priming condition test. It was
concluded that this item was a poor discriminator ofthe subliminal prime condition.
ITEM 4: SWEET/SUITE
No effects of either gender or language were seen in this item, and the chi-square analysis of
condition did not return a significant result (i=O.27,p=O.59). However, the data showed an
increased number of errors in the happy condition - often present when some priming effect
was evident. This item had no 'neutral' responses which suggested that the usage rate ofthe
word ' suite ' was relatively low.
ITEMS 1 (MEDAUMEDDLE); 5 (WON/ONE); 18 (PRIDE/PRIED)
These items willbe discussed together in this section since none ofthem showed any effect of
condition. Only aspects of interest will be discussed.
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Table 4.9.6 Word 1 by language (error).





Items 1 and 18 both showed effects of
language (Item 1: X2=50.99,
p <O.00009; Item 18: X2=4.2,p=O.04).
The analysis of item 1 is displayed in
Table 4.9.6. Note the differences
between the actual frequencies (upper
row in each cell) and the expected
frequencies (lower row in each cell).
The number of errors made by non-
English individuals was
disproportionately high (28), and only one 'neutral' word was recorded. The number of 'happy'
words spelled was also relatively low, in comparison with the English group. In item 18, non-
English subjects made more errors, and recorded fewer 'happy' words than English subjects.
No 'neutral' words were recorded by subjects in either group, and this item was judged to be
poor. No effects ofeither gender or language were noted in the analysis ofitem 5. Because of
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the low to non-existent effect size in the word by condition analysis, these items were
considered poor discriminators ofthe subliminal prime condition.
4.5.5.5 DISCUSSION OF ITEMS
It was evident in the analysis ofthese items that the effects of subliminal priming were varied.
The premise for this analysis (outlined at the beginning of section 4.5.5.1) was the question
'What patterns would be seen in the data ifthere was an effect of subliminal condition? '. Some
ofthe effects seen appeared to confirm the hypotheses set out in section 4.3.4 and illustrated
in Table 4.6, but others were incongruent in that the data showed movement in the opposite
direction to that expected. In some items, there was evidence of group-specific effects of
subliminal condition.
In trying to account for the items which produced an incongruent effect, it is suggested that
the emotional meaning ofthe words was perceived somewhat differently in this subject sample,
in comparison with that ofHalberstadt et al. (1995), and there may have been reversals in the
manner in which subjects perceived the words. An example was the item 'hymn/him' which
suggested that subjects experienced the word 'hymn ' as sad, and 'him' as happy.
Curiously, although the word selectionfrequency analysis suggested that some items were poor
in terms ofthe criteria set out, the word with the strongest effect size ('die/dye') was ranked
12th in terms ofthe absolute difference measure (see Table 4.8) . This suggested that the item
would perform poorly and it was not the case.
There were strong language effects evident in the manner in which subjects spelled words, and
non-English subjects were clearlymore likely to make errors (especially in the condition which
was incongruent with the word's emotional valence), so it appeared that word familiarity was
an important factor. It seemed likely too, that a language factor influenced subjects' responses
to priming, ego analysis of item 'fined/find' showed that there was a significant effect of
condition in the non-English home language group (p<0.03).
Gender was also a determinant ofword spelling, and there were instances in which there was
an interaction with condition (eg. there was a strong effect ofcondition (p=0. 031) in the male
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group with the homophone 'pain/pane', but none in the female group.
There was agreement between the, factor analysis and chi-square analysis with regard to the
effect sizes of the variables home language, gender and condition. It was observed that
language had a high loading in Factor 1, and gender had significant, though modest loadings
in Factor 2 and Factor 4. In Factor 4 condition had a high loading, and gender was represented
as a relativelysmall loading. Sincethe factors explain diminishing amounts ofvariance, this fits
well with the average X2 effect sizes of language, gender and condition (13.08; 2.12; 1.49
respectively).
The chi-square analysis suggested that the effect size of subliminal priming condition was
relativelysmalland while some explanations ofitem performance were offered, further research
was needed in order to clarify the relationship between the item characteristics and the effect
size. In order to do this, local norms on emotional valence, and usage needed to be collected
from a heterogeneous group ofsubjectsin order to be able to investigate gender and language
effects.
The above analysis leads to the following general hypothesis:
The relative strength and type of the emotional valence of items predicts the effect size. The
items with the greatest effect size seemed to be the most negative ('die/dye', 'hymnlhim',
'fined/find' -see Table 4.9.2). Items in the middle of the range with respect to effect size
seemed more 'neutral' ('peace/piece', 'rose/rows', 'bridal/bridle') in comparison. On the other
end of the scale (lowest in effect size) items appeared to be more positively valenced
('pride/pried', 'won/one', 'medal/meddle').
The general conclusion from the item analysis was that local norms needed to be collected on
the items in order to estimate the emotional valence of the items and clarify the reason that
some items had shown incongruent effects. It was hoped that this would also provide further
information on the nature ofthe language and gender differences noted.
4.5.5.6 EMOTIONAL AND USAGE RATINGS
Because of the difficulty experienced in explaining the incongruent reactions of subjects to
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certain words, a rating scale was designed in order to collect data on each item with regard to
emotional valence, and usage.
Subjectswere asked to rate each homophone spelling on its relationship to happiness, sadness,
and how often it was used personally. An attempt was made to match the sample to that ofthe
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Table 4.9.7 Language by gender analysis.
Figure 4.9.8 Comparison of samples .
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Table 4.9.7 shows the sample
composition (N=36). Note that non-
English (home language) speaking
women were in the majority (n=22),
followed by English (home language)
speakingwomen (n=8), with an equal
number of men (n=3) from each
language group. A comparison ofthe
samplesfrom the main study, and item
rating study is shown in Figure 4.9.8.
A major difference between these
samples is that whereas English
speakingwomen were the largest sub- ·
group in the main study (58.9%), in
the item rating study, they were the
second largest group (22.2%). In
effect there was thus a reversal
between the non-English speaking and
English speaking female groups. The
proportion of men, both non-English
and English speaking, was
approximately the same.
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The questionnaire given to subjects asked them to rate each homophone word on 3 dimensions:
(1) relationship to happiness, (2) relationship to sadness, (3) personal usage. A Likert-type
scale was used for (1) and (2) , and ranged from score 1 'not at all' related, 4 'moderately'
related, to 7 'highly' related. The rating range on (3) was from 1 'never ' used, 4 'sometimes',
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Figure 4.9.9 Item ratings ranked according to relationship to happiness.
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4.5.5.6.1 RESULTS
In this section, the word ratings which are of relevance to the items will be presented and
discussed. Means were computed for each item on 3 dimensions (relationship to happiness;
relationship to sadness; personal usage), and Figure 4.9.9 displays the results with items ranked
in order oftheir relationship to happiness (top to bottom).
The word 'pain' had the lowest relationship to happiness (mean = 1.19), and the third highest
relationship to sadness (mean= 6.33). The word 'die' had the second lowest relationship to
happiness (mean =1.216), and the second highest relationship to sadness (mean=6.39). These
words were therefore well defined in terms of their emotional meaning since they had high
ratings in their relationship to sadness and low ratings in terms of their relationship to
happiness.
The word 'peace' was rated highest in relation to happiness (mean=6.7), and was fourth lowest
in relation to sadness (mean=1.86). The second highest in relation to happiness was the word
'won' (mean=6.5l) and was third lowest in relation to sadness (mean=1 .7). These items were
therefore well defined in their relationship to happiness since they had high ratings in their
relationship to happiness and low ratings in their relationship to sadness. One word which was
less well defined was 'hymn'. Note the relative relationships to happiness and sadness.
In general, one can see from Figure 4.9.9 that items on either extreme ofthe graph (top and
bottom) are well defined. Towards the middle of the graph, items such as 'bridle', 'pane',
'rows', 'heel' and 'pried' have almost equal, and relatively low ratings on both emotional
dimensions. These could be seen as relatively 'neutral' items.
A comparison was made between groups to investigate the effects of gender and home
language. This was done by a series of one-way analyses of variance. The results of the
comparisons are set out in Table 4.9.8 to Table 4.9.9.2. Levels of significance are shown as
follows: where p<= 0.05, values are shown in plain type; where p<O.Ol, values appear in bold;
where p<O.OOl, values appear in italics and bold. Discussion ofthe items, and the effects of
home language and gender in relation to the previous analysis will follow.
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The small but significant (F=8.4, df=l, p <O.Ol) difference between language groups found in
the analysis ofvariance (non-English: mean=1.04; English: mean=1.64) in ratings ofthe word
'die' in relation to happiness was not associated at all with an effect ofthe variable condition
in the "I; test. There was a slight, but less significant (F=3.19, df- l , p<O.l) difference between
these groups in the rating of the word 'dye' (non-English: mean=3; English: mean=1.91).
Interestingly, the non-English group also rated 'dye' as more related to sadness (F=3.64, df=1,
p<O.06) than the English group (means were 2.83 vs 1.64 respectively). The reason for this was
not known, but there was a general tendency for non-English subjects to rate words more
highly in relation to emotion than English subjects. Tables 4.9.8 and 4.9.9.1 show this. The
language differencesdid not seemto be associated with word spellings in the homophone task.
The word 'hymn' Table 4.9.8 Language group comparison: relation to happiness.









'4' on the rating
scalerepresented a
moderate relationship to sadness, it seems that 'hymn' has a small, but definite relationship to
sadness. The word 'him' on the other hand had on average, a lower relationship to sadness
(mean=2.94), although it was rated as less happy (mean=3.72). It appears therefore, that there
is some support for the hypothesis that there was a reversal in the valence ofthe words 'hymn'
and 'him' whereby 'hymn' was seen as a sad item, and 'him' as less sad. This would explain
why the spelling ofhymn, was facilitated by a sad prime.
There was a language difference (F=3.79, df=l, p=O.06) in the rating of the word 'fined': non-
English subjects rated it higher in relation to happiness (2.64 vs 1.27) than English subjects.
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This verged on the significance level ofp<0.05, and variability was greater in the English group
than the non-English group (SD=2.29 vs 0.47). 'Thismay be partly explained by the general
tendency ofnon-English subjects to rate words more highly than English subjects. The average
relationship to sadness for all subjects was 4.5, which is slightly above the judgement of
'moderately related to sadness'.
The average relationship of the Tabie 4.9.9 Gender group comparison: relationto happiness.








whereby non-English subjects rated
it higher than English subjects (5.64 vs 4.45). However, there was a significant difference
between male and female ratings ofthe word in relation to happiness. Female subjects' average
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Figure 4.9.9.1 Rated relationship to sadness (group means).
1. 'Find' was not neutral,
but had a ~rong
relationship to happiness
(the mean for the whole
sample was 5.28), and a
low relationship to
sadness.
The ratings can be
summarised thus:
2. Males rated the word
'find' as less related to
happiness than females,
and there was a less
significant effect of
language whereby non-English subjects rated 'fined' as happier than English subjects.
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3. A high relationship of both words to sadness predicted an effect of condition in the X
2
analysis (with regard to the various groups: non-EnglishlEnglish, male/female, non-English
male). This can be seen firstly in the non-English group where mean sadness ratings for both
words are slightly higher than those in the English group (non-English all vs. English all in
Figure 4.9.2). The test for condition was significant for the non-English group (X2 =4.97, df-=l,
n=35, p=O.03, with Yates correction). Secondly, this can also be seen in the comparison of
men and women: Figure 4.9.9.1 shows that the sadness scores for the word 'fined' are slightly
higher for men than for women, although this is not the case for the word 'find'. The X2 test
for condition in the male group was significant (X2 = 8.7, d:f-=2, n=19, p=O.013 ). Thirdly, it
can be seen in Figure 4.9.9.1 that non-English men gave the highest average ratings for both
words. The analysis ofcondition was significant for this group (Fisher's exact: p<0.05, two
tail). 16
It must be emphasized that the differences between the groups on these rating scores are not
statistically significant, but represent trends. The manner in which the sadness scores predict
the effect of condition is not significant from a statistical point of view, but it provides an
interesting basis for speculation.
The word 'board' was third lowest in its relationship to happiness (mean=3.05). non-English
subjects rated it significantly higher in this regard than English subjects (3.56 vs. 1.91, F=5.24,
df-=1, p<0.03). It was ranked 8th lowest in its relationship to sadness (mean=2.33). 'Bored'
was ranked 4th lowest in relation to happiness (mean=1. 73), and 9th highest in relation to
sadness. The homophone was thus judged to be well defined. No explanation was found in the
ratings to account for the incongruence ofthe reactions to the prime.
The word 'dear' was rated 6th in its relation to happiness (mean=6). There was a tendency for
female subjects to rate it higher than male subjects in this regard (6.17 vs. 5.17, p=O.ll). On
average, the word was not rated as particularly sad (2.42). The word 'deer' was rated
significantly higher in relation to happiness by males than females (4.5 vs. 2.83, F=6.78, df-=1,
16 For a discussion of these statistics, see section entitled 'Item 15. fined/fined' under
section: '4.5.5.4 Detailed analysis'.
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p=O.013), but not in relation to sadness (mean=1.86) .
For male subjects, the closeness of the rating of the word 'dear' (mean=5.l7) to 'deer'
(mean=4.5) in relation to happiness is problematic. There was a better distinction in the case
offemale subjects (6.17 vs. 2.83). Another problem is in the relative rates ofusage: 'deer' is
rated as having the 5th lowest usage - which coincides with a relatively low rate of occurrence
('deer' occurred 23 times, while 'dear' occurred 80 times). The finding that the sad prime
facilitated, to a small degree, the spelling of the 'happy' word, or conversely that the happy
prime facilitated the spelling of the 'neutral' word 'deer', may be partly explained by the
relativelyhigh relationship of ,deer' to happiness in the male group. However, the item ratings
cannot be offered as a completely adequate explanation ofthis phenomenon.
According to the ratings, 'peace' had the highest relationship to happiness (mean=6.7), and
'piece' was one ofthe most neutral words (see Figure 4.9.9). One aspect of the rating analysis
which may be associated with the priming effect is the finding that males rated the word 'piece'
as more highly related to happiness than females (4.5 vs 2.97 - see Table 4.9.9). This was a
trend only (p=0.12). No aspect of the rating analysis appeared to predict or explain the
incongruent effect ofthe prime, and this explanation seems inadequate.
The word 'mist' was rated as slightly sadder than 'missed' (4.5 vs. 4.8) and 'missed' was
related as slightly happier than 'mist' (2.73 vs. 2.56). A Hest shows that in terms of both
sadness and happiness, the words were not significantly different from each other (sadness:
t=0.58, df-=35,p=0.56; happiness: t=0.44, df=35, p=0.66). The behaviour ofthis item can thus
not be predicted in relation to the prime conditions by the rating analysis.
The usage ratings ofthe word 'suite' suggested that it had a relatively low rate ofusage (mean
for all subjects=4.6). non-English subjects rated it significantlyhigher in relation to happiness
than English speakers (5.17 vs. 3.09, F=13.36, df-I, p <O.OOOl). This is of academic interest
however, since the word was not spelled by any of the subjects in the main study. The word
'sweet' was rated 3rd highest in relation to happiness (mean=6.46), and there was a tendency
for English subjects to rate it higher in relation to happiness than non-English subjects (see
Table 4.9.9.1).
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words tend to be
used more by i:::•• • ... _
English speakers
than non-English speakers except for the word 'presents' where the opposite tendency is seen.
Some considerations in the interpretation of the item ratings should be pointed out. The
conditions under which subjects rated the words were different to those under which the
subjects were given the homophone task in at least 2 ways:
1. Subjects were under little time pressure in the word rating task, whereas in the homophone
task, they were intentionally given time constraints. Subjects in the former situation had time
to think about their word choices, but in the latter situation, subjects were asked to type the
first response that came to mind. This was similar to the approach which Halberstadt et al. took
(see Halberstadt et al. , 1995 , p. 279). It is possible in the word rating task that subjects were
affected by a response set, whereas in the main study, it was hoped that this was true to a lesser
extent.
2. Subjects doing the word rating task had both spellings of the homophone available, and
would therefore have been more aware of the different word meanings. Less potential for
confusion about the word meaning therefore existed in the word rating task.
The implication ofthese observations is that the differences observed in the word rating data
may have been accentuated in the homophone test session.
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4.5.5.7 WORD RATINGS AND SUBLIMINAL MOOD PRIMING EFFECTS
In the previous section, some suggestions based on the word rating analysis were made, but
conclusive explanations could not be found for the priming effects which were incongruent in
some items. This section willpresent findings which indicate that a relationship exists between
the effect sizeofthe subliminal prime and the ratings of the words. This gives a useful basis for
speculation on the characteristics ofhomophones which were sensitive to priming effects, and
perhaps on the nature ofthe subliminal priming effect.
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Figure 4.9.9.2 Plot of x:- statistic and word sadness ratings .
It was noted previously that as the
effect size diminished in the item
list (ranked in order of effect
size), the emotional valence of the
words seemed to change - roughly
from being clearly negative at the
beginning of the list, to neutral in
the middle of the list, to being
noticeably more positive at the
end of the list . Figure 4.9.9.2
shows a plot of the X2 statistic
(word by condition) for all
homophones (lower line) and the sadness rating of all valenced, i.e. non-neutral words (upper
line). Superimposed on the upper line is a plot of the same data after smoothing using the
polynomial method (third order). Items on the X-axis are ranked according to the magnitude
ofthe X2 statistic (all X2 analysis is based on N =107). Units on the Y-axis represent both rating
scale units, and the X2 statistic. Note that there is a downward trend in the word sadness
ratings, this is shown clearly by the smoothed data line. This is obviously not a time series, and
the fit is quite poor. Extrapolation from the smoothed data would therefore be unreliable, and
because ofthe way it is employed, it would be non-meaningful. The plot of the smoothed data
is given for the purposes of illustration only, and not for the purpose of statistical inference.
The X
2
statistic is used in preference to the Cramer's V in the graphs simply because the range
Figure 4.9.9.3 Plot of 'Ifstatistic and word happ iness ratings.
-e- Chi-square
--D- happiness ratings: smoothed data
of the latter is more compressed
(from 0.03 to 0.22) than that of
the "f values (0 to 5.64). N was
the same for all item analyses, and
the correlation between the effect
size measured by the X2 and
Cramer's V statistic IS close to
perfect (r=0.96).
Figure 4.9.9.3 shows plots ofthe
ratings ofall emotionally valenced
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x2 statistic, and the smoothed data
ofthe happiness ratings. The same third order polynomial smoothing method was used. Note
\
the upward trend ofthe fitted line in the direction ofhappiness.
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___ sadness difference: smoothed data
Figure 4.9.9.4 shows the plot of
the difference between the
sadness ratings of all emotionally
valenced words, and their
'neutral' counterparts'? (eg. The
difference ID rated sadness
between the word 'die' and its
'neutral' counterpart 'dye'), the
smoothed data, and the X2
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Figure 4.9.9.4 Plot of 'Ifstat istic and 'sad/neutral difference values'.
ofexplanation. Note that the fit between the difference value s and the smoothed data is better
than that between the sadness ratings and the smoothed data.
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The data displayed in the previous graphs tends to support the impression that there was a
change of emotional valence which was associated with diminished effect size. A correlation
analysis (Spearman Rank Correlation) was done to estimate the degree of the relationship
between these variables and its significance. The following were ofinterest:
1. There was a negative correlation between the happiness ratings ofthe emotionally valenced
words and the Cramer's V statistic (1' = -0.44, p=0.07).
2. There was a significant positive relationship between the sadness ratings ofthe emotionally
valenced words, and the Cramer's V statistic (1' =0.53, p =0.03).
3. The correlation between sad-neutral difference values and the Cramer's V statistic was
highly significant (1' =0.73, p<O. 01).
It is concluded that a major determinant ofvariability in the items with respect to subliminal
condition in the items was their emotional valence. Correlations SUppOlt the impression gained
earlier, that the effect size was related to the emotions associated with the homophone pairs.
A strong effect size is associated with a negative, or sad emotional evaluation, and a weak
effect size is associated with happy emotional evaluation. A relationship which was even
stronger than this is seen in the correlation between the sad/neutral rating difference and the
effect size. In other words, a large effect size was associated with both a large difference
between the sadness ratings ofthe homophone pairs (eg . 'die/dye': 3.9 was a large difference
and this item showed a large effect size; and 'pride/pried': 0.34 was a small difference, and this
item showed no effect) and the degree of sadness with which the emotional homophone pair
was rated. In short, if the sadness rating of the emotional homophone was high and the
sad/neutral difference was large, a subliminal priming effect was likely to occur.
The rating analysis was of some use in explaining why some ofthe items elicited incongruent
responses. There was support from the ratings for believing that item 2 'hymu/him' had
functioned as a 'sad' word, and there was also some evidence to show that the sadder the
words 'fined' and 'find' were rated, the more likely the homophone would be to show an effect
ofcondition. This is consistent with the general finding of a relationship between rated sadness
and effect. The difficulty with this finding is the incongruence of the reaction to the priming
with this homophone. The other item for which the rating analysis was helpful was the pair
'sweet/suite'. It was pointed out that the rate ofusage ofthe word 'suite' was generally quite
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low, and familiarity was thought to be a possible factor. No correlation was found between
usage rate and effect size however.
The main difficulty experienced in analysing the results ofthis study, was thought to result from
the variability between items in terms of emotional valence. Thus, some items behaved as
predicted, and others in the opposite manner and the effects ofpriming were probably cancelled
out when all items were analysed together. Generally, the data was probably sullied by effects
ofgender and especially home language, since the non-English group was especially prone to
making errors.
In the ANOVA analysis ofall 18 items, the null hypothesis had to be accepted for the variables
happy, happy/neutral happy errors, and sad since there were no significant differences in
scores between the two subliminal mood-priming conditions. Clear main effects of subliminal
priming condition and interactions with gender and language were seen for the variables sad
errors and sad/neutral however. When a detailed item analysis was done, similar evidence was
found for a priming effect in the individual items, where associated changes in word spellings
and the production of errors were seen. The item analysis also showed that specific language
and gender effects were present, and that there were interactions with subliminal priming
condition, ego the item 'fined/find' showed a marked effect oflanguage and gender, and the
item 'pain/pane' showed an effect ofgender only.
Several indicationspoint to the conclusion that the emotional valence ofitems determined the
extent to which they were sensitiveto the effects of subliminal priming. It is understandable that
a significant determinant of sensitivity was the sadness rating of the item since this would be
linked to the nature ofthe priming stimulus. There did appear to be small congruent effects in
the case of 'happy' homophones ('bridal/bridle'; 'presents/presence'), but the priming effects
with these items were relativelysmall(Cramer's V=O.087, p=O.67; Cramer's V=O.051, p=O.87
respectively), and possibly reflect mere randomness.
4.6 AWARENESS CHECK
In the happy subliminal condition, 5 subjects recalled the word 'happy' in the recall test, but
no subjects exposed to the sad stimulus recalled any words related to the prime. The data is
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given in 'Appendix I' for the interested reader. It is not clear why none ofthe subjects recalled
any ofthe words from the 'sad' phrase. This willbe discussed further in Chapter 7.
4.8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that subliminal mood priming could
influence the resolution of lexical ambiguity in a direction consistent with the priming. Some
support was found for a subliminal effect by means of an ANOVA, item analysis and word
rating survey, but the magnitude and direction of the effect varied between items.
It is argued that a subliminal priming effect was obtained in this study although the nature of
this effect was different in some respects to that expected. Priming was expected to facilitate
the spelling of 'sad' words in the sad condition, and 'sad/neutral' words in the happy condition.
This would be a congruent type of priming and to test for this effect, significance tests were
done in the item analysis with the adjusted residual values for each word category (eg. sad,
neutral or error) between priming conditions. Some evidence for congruent priming was found
for the whole subject sample, ego item 3 ('die/dye') showed an increase in the production ofthe
word 'die' in the sad condition,but the adjusted residual (1.9) was slightly less than the critical
value (1.96). Group-specific effects of congruent priming occurred for the item 'pain/pane'
where the adjusted residuals for the 'sad' category were significant ('pain' : 2.6, -2.6 for sad
and happy priming respectively), and the item 'mourning/morning') approached significance
for the 'sad' category ('mourning': 1.9, -1.9 for sad and happy priming respectively). It is
interestingthat these words are the most clearly related to sadness (see Figure 4.9.9). Indeed,
'pain' is rated highest in relation to sadness, followed by 'die' then 'mourning'. It seems
possible to conclude that these congruent effects are related to the intensity of the sadness
ratings. This pattern also makes it less likely, given the correlation between effect size and
sadness rating, that these changes in the frequency of 'sad' word spelling are simply due to
randomness.
It may be concluded that apart from what seemed to be specific congruent priming effects,
(measured by testing the adjusted residual value of the word category in the X2 analysis), the
evidence suggests that a number ofnon-specific subliminal priming effects were more generally
seen (appearing as word by condition effects where a clear, congruent pattern ofpriming was
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not seen). These effects seemed to occur with items whose emotional valence was less clear.
A non-specific priming effect most commonly seen was an increase in the number ofneutral
words in the sad subliminal priming condition. This was seen almost exclusively in the 'sad'
homophone list, with the exception of the word 'hymn' which, according to the item rating
analysis seemed to behave as a sad item. Another non-specific priming effect was seen in the
increased number oferrors made in the 'sad' word list in the happy priming condition. This may
be the result ofincongruent priming since these were sad items and the subjects were exposed
to a happy priming stimulus. Where they were unable to access a meaning congruent with the
prime, subjects may have tended to make errors. This was predicted by Greenwald et al.
(1995), although these authors did not find strong evidence for it.
In short, the following conclusions seem warranted:
1) There is evidence to show that item sensitivity to subliminal priming varied according to
emotionalvalence. Generally a high sadness rating predicted a subliminal priming effect. This
constitutes support for the hypothesis that word selection frequency varied non-specifically (as
defined above) as a function of subliminal condition.
2) There is some support for the hypothesis that mood-congruent priming would occur, and
the items where congruent priming occurred were the most clearly defined in terms of
emotional valence.
The item rating study appears to throw light on conclusion 1, since a statistically significant
correlation was found between the sadness ratings ofthe valenced words in each homophone
pair and the effect size (r = 0.53, p<0.05). This relationship indicates that the effect size
diminishes as a function ofthe rated sadness ofthe valenced words. This finding may be related
to that of Halberstadt et al. who observed that a 'sad' mood manipulation stimulus was
associated with a significant increase in the production of 'sad' words (p<0.005), but did not
find any change in the production of 'happy' words (p. 280-281).
A closer relationship was found between the effect size (r = 0.73, p <O.Ol) and the difference
in the sadness ratings between valenced and 'neutral' homophones. This suggests that the more
distant the word pairs were from each other in terms of their sadness ratings, the higher the
effect size was. It is also suggested therefore, that important properties ofhomophones for this
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purpose, are:
1. The rated sadness ofthe emotionally valenced word;
2. The emotional difference between the word pairs in terms of sadness ratings.
These findings appear to constitute criteria for the sensitivity ofthe homophones to subliminal
mood priming.
The data produced in this study was complex, and modest support was found for the hypothesis
that subliminal mood suggestion, using the masking by visual noise technique, affects word
spelling in a homophone spellingtask. Items in the homophone list varied considerably in their
sensitivity to subliminal priming, and some items behaved in an anomalous manner, It is
concluded that tentative criteria were established for the selection of appropriate homophones
for this type oftask.
The pattern of the priming effects, and the correlations between word ratings and effect size
suggest that the findings of this study do not reflect mere randomness. The fact that all the
significant effects were seen in the 'sad' homophone list (apart from those items which were
anomalous, and where there was arguably a reversal in meaning), together with the correlation
between effect size and sadness ratings suggests that there is a relationship between negative
subliminal mood priming and subjects interpretation of ambiguous stimuli. This is rendered
more plausible by the negative correlation between the happiness ratings ofthe words and the
effect size, since these are independent ofthe sadness ratings. Another strong correlation which
supports this is that between the sad/neutral differenceratings and the effect size. There appears
to be no effect ofpositive subliminal mood priming in this study, and it appears that subjects
did not react to positive stimuli.
The clearest effects ofmood priming, (where production of congruent words was facilitated)
were seen when the emotional valence of the relevant words was most clearly defined as sad.
These results are not altogether secure from a statistical point ofview since multiple tests of
significancewere done, but the pattern ofresults makes them more plausible. Significant non-
specific priming effects were found in the 'sad' homophone list where subjects tended to
produce neutral words when exposed to a sad subliminal stimulus, and produced more errors




The question this research sought to answer is, 'Does some clear change in mood occur
through subliminal suggestion and, if so, can it be reported directly, or would it have to be
inferred indirectly through some pattem in the data?'
In the Main Study, some evidence was produced that priming had occurred without conscious
awareness. While interpretation was complicated by gender and home language factors,
evidence was considered that effects of mood priming were present. The evidence is
summarised below.
The strongest effect for the priming was mood-congruent. This was seen in participants'
responses to sad subliminal mood stimuli which facilitated the production of sad homophones.
The effect ofthe negative stimulus was much stronger than that ofthe positive stimulus (i.e.
for the facilitation ofpositive words) and this was concluded from the following observations:
1. A significant correlation (1-=0.53, p<0.05, 2-tailed) between the rated valence of the sad
words and the effect size" indicated that words (eg. 'die', 'pain', 'mourning') with a high
sadness rating were more sensitive to the effects of subliminal condition than others.
2. A weak negative correlation was found between the happiness ratings ofthe words and the
effect of subliminal condition (1'=-0.44, p<O.I, 2-tailed).
3. When the neutral word ratings were subtracted from the sad word ratings, the correlation
was stronger (r=0.73,p<0.01 2-tailed).
This pattem of correlations suggests that word items with high sad ratings and low happy
ratings were sensitive to below threshold mood priming. Items which were rated as positively
valenced or neutral, were not sensitive.
The question which this experiment sought to address concems the effect of sub-threshold
mood priming on subjects' mood. While some evidence of mood-congruent priming effects
exists (Kemp-Wheeler and Hill, 1992) it is not clear if subjects actually experience a change in
18Based on the Cramel's V statistic
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mood and if so, whether this change could be reported subjectively, or measured using some
kind ofself-report mood scale. In their experiment, Halberstadt et al. (1995) assessed subjects'
mood by means ofthe BriefMood Introspection Scale and excluded those who had not been
influenced by the mood manipulation. They thus had a means ofvalidating the effects ofthe
mood manipulation. In the published subliminal research, it does not appear that direct
measurement of a subliminally induced mood has been attempted. The effects of subliminal
interventions seem, in the literature, to have been inferred exclusively from indirect effects. One
would suppose that logically, this is because subliminal manipulations are assumed (by
definition) to occur without awareness. However, I wondered, if some mood measure was
directlymade, whether any kind ofmeasurablechange would occur that could be related to the
subliminal intervention.
In this chapter, a Method section will describe the subjects, design, subliminal priming stimuli,
procedure and variables used in the follow-up experiment. A Results section will present the
findings and statistical analysis, and these will be discussed briefly and summarised in the
Conclusion section. The findings will be discussed more generally in Chapter 7 (entitled
'Discussion and Conclusion'.
5.2 METHOD
5.2.1 SUBJECTS AND DESIGN
Nineteen undergraduate psychology subjects either volunteered, or were approached to
participate in this experiment. Initially, subjects were chosen at random from 3 groups which
were formed on the basis ofa cluster analysis in the Main Study" and invited to participate. Of
those selected, 11 volunteered. An additional 8 students were then approached, and asked to
participate. The subject group comprised 19 women, ofwhom 3 did not speak English as a
home language. The subjects were approached because they resided in the Pietermaritzburg
area during the vacation, and were available during the winter vacation. A number ofmen were
19 Initially it was thought that there was an important between-subjects effect of subliminal
stimulation, and the clusters were labelled 'Sensitive', 'Paradoxical' and 'Non-sensitive'.
As the labels imply, it was thought that some subjects reacted congruently to the
stimulation, others reacted incongruently, and other subjects did not react at all. The
cluster solution was abandoned when it proved to be unsound.
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randomly selected for the study, but ofthose that volunteered, none responded to the follow-
up contact.
No remuneration was given, except where the subjects had to travel from another city to the
Pietermaritzburg Psychology Department. Subjectswere later sent written feedback in the form
of a brief report on their responses in the experiment.
It is possible that some bias existed in the selectionofparticipants for the Follow-up study. The
group consisted only offemales, and those who volunteered may have done so on the basis of
their interest in the subject. This willbe considered in section 5.4.1.
The participants were randomly assignedto either a negative or positive mood stimulus group.
This was done by the computer program which randomly assigned each subject either a '1' or
a '2'. When a subject was assigned to condition '1', she was exposed to a negative mood
stimulus, and when assigned to condition '2', she was exposed to a positive mood stimulus.
This was done without the knowledge of either the subject or the experimenter, thus a double
blind condition was achieved.
The independent variable was thus subliminal condition, and the dependent variable was scores
on the Profile Of Mood States (POMS) (McNair et al., 1992). This test was administered
before and after the subliminal mood suggestion procedure.
A shortened (12 item - i.e. the 12 best test items) version of the General Health Questionnaire
(GHQ) (Goldberg, 1972) was administered first as a control for the pre-existing effects of
psychiatric status. This scale gives a measure ofpsychiatric disturbance for the purpose of case
identification.
5.2.2 TEST MEDIUM
Both questionnaires were administered on computer, and all data recorded from subjects was
stored on disk. Thus, no interaction was necessary between the experimenter and the subject
once she was seated at the computer. The program source code was written in Pascal, and the
compiled program was run on an IBM-type 80486 machine under the DOS 6.0 operating
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system (see Appendix D).
The computer program administered the test s, recorded and scored the data, performed the
subliminal exposure and randomly determined the subliminal condition that each subject was
assigned to. Instructions, prompts and examples were displayed at various points in the
program.
5.2.3 SUBLIMINAL PRIMING METHOD
In the Follow-up Study, subliminal mood suggestion was
done by means of exposures to phrases below the
subjective threshold. The same threshold which was
Figure 5.1 Modified visual noise mask.
determined at an earlier stage ofthis research (described in
the chapter entitled 'Pilot Study') was used (9.5 ms). The same method ofbackward masking
by visual noise was used, although the mask was altered slightly (after pre-trials) to reduce
recognition rates, without changing the exposure time. The mask is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
The characters used for this mask were randomly selected from ASCII characters 232 to 241
using the IBM character set.
The phrase designed to induce a negative mood was' SAD AND ALONE' , and that designed
to induce a positive mood was 'HAPPy AND FRIENDLY' . These were presented in upper
case for 9.5 ms, and were programmed to be displayed 15 times.
-------------------------------------==---------------------GENERAL HEALTH QUESTIONNAIRE : DAUID P, GOLDBERG
London: Oxfopd Univepsity Ppess 1912
==============================================================================
Please pead this ca~efully:
We should like tl;l know if you have had any heal th cOMPlaints
l
and how you~
hea~th has been.In gene~al, OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS. You wil be asked a
Se~IeS of questIons 7 please answep theM ALL. You ~hould pespond by looking
ca~efully at the.optIons pPesented wIth each questIon. Once you have decided
which of the options Most nea~ly applies to you, please type the nUMbe~
undepnea th the opt i on and then pl'ess t he "E N T E R" key.
ReMeMbep that we want to know about ppesent and pecent cOMplaints not
those that you had in the past. •
It is iMPo~tant that you tpy to answep ALL the questions.
Thank you ue~y Much fop youP coopepation
P~ess ENTER to continue »
Figure 5.2 Instruction screen for GHQ.
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5.2.4 PSYCHOMETRIC MEASURES
5.2.4.1 GENERAL HEALTH QUESTIONNAIRE
The GHQ is commonly used as a screening instrument , and was used in the Follow-up Study
in order to identify cases of psychiatric illness. The 12-question version was adapted for
computerised administration. Subjects were asked to answer questions on the status oftheir
health over the last few weeks, i.e. present and recent complaints. The instructions were given
on an introduction screen shown in Figure 5.2. The items were answered on a Likert-type scale
between 1 and 4. Question 1 ofthe GHQ is displayed in Figure 5.3. Note that all questions take
the form 'Have you recently' followed by the item, ego'Been able to concentrate on whatever
you 're doing?'.
HAVE YOU RECENTLY:
1::~ : : :: B~Hitf{:a:b.:l:e:to : ::: :c:Oltcent~a:teon : ::whateVe:t'. : : :Y6'U' ~:~:e : : :d6j;rtg:?:
BETTER THAN SANE AS LESS THAN HUCH LESS THAN
USUAL USUAL USUAL USUAL
TVPE "1" TV,PE ":2:" TYPE "3" T!;'PE "'4 "
}}
Figure 5.3 Computerised form of the questions and rating scale .
" - - :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;:;;...::::.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.;.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.'.:.;.;.:.:.;.
to each subject beforehand,
and she was guided in the
The procedure was explained Table 5.1 GHQ items.--------"""--"""
initial stages of the
experiment. The subjects were
encouraged to ask questions at
:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.;.'.:.:.;.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:::.::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::: :::::::::::: : : : : : : : ::: : : : ~ : : :
rrtf~~~~~ : ~
any stage, and the
experimenter was available at
all times.
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;:;::: :.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:::::::::::::::::::::"':':':':':':" ':':':':':' ; ~ :::~: ::::: : ~ : : : : : : ;r:::: : : : :: : :: : . ::::: : ~ : ~ : ~:~ : : : : : ~ : ~ : ~ : ~ : ~ . :. : . :. :. : . :.: . :.:, : , :,:. :::::::: : : ~:r~;~:~:~:;:~:~;~:~:~: ~:~ ; ~ ;~ ; ~ :~ :f
A list ofthe 12 questions used
is given in Table 5.1.
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Responses to the items were recorded and scored on completion of the GHQ. Two totals were
calculated: a 'Simple Likert Scoring Method' where responses were scored 0-1-2-3 (derived
from the 1-2-3-4 item responses respectively), and a GHQ scoring method (0-0-1-1). These
methods were suggested by Goldberg (1972) who found that the GHQ scoring method was
superior with respect to case identification. The 0-0-1-1 (GHQ) method was used for analyzing
the GHQ items in this study.
5.2.4.2 PROFILE OF MOOD STATES
The Profile of Mood States (POMS) (McNair et al., 1992) consists of 65 adjective items
which require a response of '0' to ' 4' from the subjects. Seven scores are derived from the
scale, 6 ofwhich are factor scores, and the 7th is an index oftotal mood disturbance. The scale
is recommended primarily for the assessment of mood states in psychiatric outpatients. The
authors state that it is designed to identify and assess transient, fluctuating affective states and
they claim that it 'has proved to be a sensitive measure of the effects ofvarious experimental
manipulations upon normal subjects and other nonpsychiatric populations' (1992, p. 1). It was
therefore considered an appropriate scale for measuring self-reported mood before and after
the subliminalmood suggest ion. The 'li ght-now' phrasing was used, asking subjects to report
on their feeling s at that present moment (see Figure 5.4) .
==============================================================================:
P 0 M S
==============================================================================:
This wopd is part of a list of words that describe feelings that people have.
PLEASE READ ERCH ONE CAREFULL~ .
Thepe a~e options and nUMbe~s presented with each word. Please select one of
the opt i ens that bes t descl' 1 bes H:OW ':?:i':.QU}Jl:R!;}FEEIWtfG}Ql \ /IH:lS:'}PRESENI}::J10MEHT4':
- I.E. RIGHT NOW! Please type t he nUMber underneath the option and then
press the nE N TERn key.
NOT AT ALL




MODERATEL~ QUITE A BIT
TYPE "2 " l''I'PE "3 "
EXTREMELY
" T'i'PE 4 "
Figure 5.4 Computerised form of the POMS scale.
For convenience sake, and to minimise the experimenter's interference with the subjects, this
scale was also administered by computer. Figure 5.4 illustrates the POMS instructions,
questions, and rating scale.
The POMS consists of65 items, and from these, 6 factor scores are computed (scoring system
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designed by the authors, based on their factor analysis). These are described as follows:
(1) Tension-anxiety: heightened musculoskeletal tension, somatic tension, psychomotor
agitation and diffuse anxiety.
(D) Depression-dejection: depressed mood, feelings ofinadequacy, worthlessness, isolation,
guilt and futility.
(A) Anger-Hostility: anger, and antipathy; both overt and milder feelings ofhostility, and more
sullen, suspicious aspects are represented.
(V) Vigour-activity: mood ofhigh energy, vigorousness, friendliness, and generally positive
affect.
(F) Fatigue-inertia: weariness, inertia, and low energy.
(C) Confusion-bewilderment: bewilderment, 'muddleheadedness' , disorganisation.
From these factors, a 'Total Mood Disturbance Score ' is computed. The POMS factors listed
above and used in the Follow-up study result from an oblique factor solution, and are therefore
correlated.
5.3 PROCEDURE
Each subject was tested individually. The procedure started with an introduction to the test
laboratory and procedure, and a brief interview. The interview was done to get a brief
impression ofthe subject 's mental status (Mental Status Examination: MSE) and to establish
rapport. After this the subjectswere seated at the computer, and the procedure explained. Since
these subjects had participated in the previous experiment (Main Study), they were told that
the subliminal messages were different to the ones used in the previous experiment.
The experiment ran in the following sequence, once subjects were seated at the computer.
Screen 1: Recorded 'practical' number.
Screen 2: Recorded subjects ' name.
Screen 3: Recorded subjects ' gender.
Screen 4: Recorded subjects ' home language.
Screen 5: GHQ instructions and prompt (see Figure 5.2).
Screen 6-18 : GHQ items I to 12.





Screen 85: Demonstration instructions informing subjects of the sequence of the
experiment: 1). A focussing dot ('©') would be displayed in the
centre ofthe screen. 2). A phrase would be flashed in that area (in this case at
a relatively long exposure of2 seconds. 3). A mask ofrandom characters would
then be displayed.
The message: 'This is what you will see... Wait a moment! '
Demonstration.
Subjects were informed that they would be shown 1 phrase 15 times in the same
sequence as the demonstration. They were asked to try as hard as they could
to see the phrase.
Subjects were asked to type in the phrase that they saw, and ifthey did not see
anything , to type in the first words that came to mind.
The message: 'You will be asked again to do the POMS questions. Please
answer according to how you feel at this point in time ' .
Screen 90-155 POMS items 1 to 65.
Screen 156: The subject was thanked for her participation, and informed that she would be
debriefed.
Screen 86:
After the test was completed, the subject was asked if she saw the stimulus or not. The subject
was then asked if she had observed any changes in the way she felt. Scores were examined
briefly, and each subject was shown the phrase to which she had been exposed. The experiment
was explained in detail, including the rationale behind it. Some time was spent discussing the
subjects' response to the subliminal phrase, and a briefMSE-type assessment ofthe subject 's
affect, and mood was made. Questions regarding the procedure were invited, and the subjects
were all asked to contact the experimenter if they experienced any mood change , or unusual
emotions after the experiment.
5.4 RESULTS
The results ofthe various scales used in the experiment are presented and discussed separately.
Firstly, the General Health Questionnaire scores will be presented, then the Profile OfMood
States scores and the various statistical procedures are described.
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5.4.1 GENERAL HEALTH QUESTIONNAIRE (GHQ)
The mean scores and standard deviations of the GHQ items are presented in Figure 5.5 (see
Table 5.1 for a list of the items). The last bar in the graph (Gscore) represents the Likert total
which is the total score ofthe 12 items. All items were scored using the GHQ scoring method:
0-0-1-1 see section 5.2.4.1 for details. Goldberg suggests a cutting score of 1 or 2 for the,
identification of cases and the mean GHQ score for this group was 5.57.





























Figure 5.5 GHQ mean and standard deviation scores, Superimposed star icons : item standard deviation ranges: mean minus 1
standard deviation ; mean plus 1 standard deviation.
In his local study using both English and Zulu versions ofthe GHQ, John (1996) recorded a
mean score of3.54 for the English version, and 4.22 for the Zulu version. These scores are
substantially higher than those suggested by Goldberg, and on the basis ofhis research, John
suggests that ' South Afiican samples tend to score higher on the GHQ than their western
counterparts'. He proposes that the cut-oft's used for western samples are too low, rather than
concludingthat the South Afiican Samples were more distressed. It is possible that the sample
was biased, and a proportion ofthe individuals who volunteered may have been distressed and
seeking help.
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It is apparent that the mean score ofthis sample follows a similar trend to that in John's South
African sample. Another, or additional reason for the elevated GHQ scores seen in this sample
may have been due to fatigue experienced as a result of mid-year examinations. All of the
subjects in the sample were either in the process ofpreparing for, or had written examinations
shortly before the experiment, and most commented that they were 'feeling stressed' on this
account. On the basis of the scores, and the informal MSE interview, it seemed that some
subjects were sufferingfrom an adjustment disorder ofmild to moderate severity. Subjects such
as these who seemed distressed, were asked to contact the experimenter if the symptoms
persisted.
Figure 5.5 shows that the item with the highest mean score was GHQ item 5 (GHQ5) (' ...felt
constantlyunder strain'). The next highest item was GHQ7 (' ...been able to enjoy your normal
day to day activities'), followed closely by GHQ9 (' ...been feeling unhappy and depressed'),
GHQ] (' ...been able to concentrate on whatever you're doing') and GHQ]2 (' ...been feeling
reasonably happy, all things considered' ). All questions were rated in such a way that a score
was always in the negative direction, thus a high score GHQ]2 would signify that the subject
was not feeling reasonably happy, all things considered. The scores ranges (shown by the star
icons) within plus or minus one standard deviation of the mean is shown superimposed in
Figure 5.5. These show the variability ofthe scores, and illustrate the range ofthe majority of
the scores (66%) on each item. Note that the variability of GHQ3 was the highest (SD=l.06).
Generally the variability between items was reasonably constant. Since Gscore is the total of
the 12 sub-scores (GHQI-12), the variability is naturally higher.
It may be concluded that the GHQ scores reflected a higher than usual degree of distress in the
subject group. Generally, average scores suggested that subjects were suffering from stress.
The range ofmost ofthe Gscore totals was well above the cutting score suggested by Goldberg
(1 or 2), and the sample mean (5.57) was above that of John's sample (3.54). The comparison
is fair, since this sample was comprised ofmainly English home language speakers (17 out of




In this section, the results ofthe POMS test will be presented as an analysis between groups,
and as an analysis of pre/post conditions.
5.4.2.1 GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Observations ofa general nature will be made in this section regarding the POMS factor scores
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Figure 5.6 Mean POMS factor scores: pre/postexposure and normative scores, all SUbjects.
The POMS factor scores appear in Figure 5.6. These are the means for all subjects (n=19). The
norms shown in Figure. 5.6 are based on the 'light now' form with a sample of 113 college
males in the baseline condition. Norms for C and TMD were not available.
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In all factors except V, there is a tendency for scores to be lower in the post-exposure
condition. Scores on factor D are noticeablyhigher than the published norm (pre=10; post=8.9,
nonn=5.2). Scores on factor F are also higher in this sample than the norm (pre=ll; post=9.4;
nonn=6.1). The scores on factor T are comparable to the normative mean, and the scores on
factor V are almost identical to the published norm.
The pattern of scores (+D,+F) reinforces the impression gained also from the MSE that
generally, the subjects' mood was somewhat dysphoric. When this data is seen together with
the GHQ data, it seems clear that the participants were feeling strained, fatigued, experienced
some difficulty with concentration and were generally not happy. Much ofthis is explained by
the fact that they had recently been under severe work pressure.
5.4.2.1.1 BASELINE POMS MEASURES (BETWEEN GROUPS)
No significant differences were found on Table 5.2 (-tests: pre-exposure, between groups.
pre-intervention measures between
groups. The results of the t-tests are
shown in Table 5.2. The greatest
difference between groups was on factor
F (Fatigue), although this was not
statistically significant. The mean score
on this factor for Group 1 was 13.1, and
7.9 for Group 2.
5.4.2.1.2 POST-EXPOSURE POMS Table 5.3 (-tests: post-exposure, between groups.
MEASURES (BETWEEN GROUPS)
No statistically significant differences
were observed between groups in the
post-intervention condition, although one
trend is worth noting. Subjects in the sad
condition tended to score lower 011 the
















mean=2.64; Group 2: mean=5.00.
5.4.2.1.3 CHANGE WITHIN GROUPS
Figure 5.7 illustrates the mean factor scores between conditions and groups. Note the changes
in mean scores on factors T,D,A and F between groups in the pre/post exposure conditions.
In Group 1 (sad condition) there is a slight decline in the post-exposure condition on these
'-=t=----""i=~-=pl '-------"'+1>---""'f"'--"'fill------"'"1~-=P-----""'P"---"'"P"-----""'f=---'''f''2_--''''+'''-.J
T pre T post D pre D post V pre V post A pre A post F pre F post C pre C post M pre M post
Factors (pre/post)
Sad ... ·e···· Happy
Figure 5.7 Comparison of pre/post-exposure mean scores .
factors (represented by bars in Figure 5.7), whereas in
Group 2 (happy condition) this pattern is generally
absent on all factors (see the dashed line in Figure 5.7).
The abbreviations 'M pre' and 'M post' in Figure 5.7,
refer to Total Mood Disturbance (TMD) pre-test, and
post-test respectively. Note that the factor V (Vigour)
mean did not change between conditions in Group 1,
and increased slightly in Group 2.
Table 5.4 t-tests : pre/post-test , (Group 1), paired
samples .
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The significance levels of the z-tests (for paired samples) are shown in Figure 5.8 with the
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criticalvaluesforp<O.05 ofthe 2 groups. The critical value oft for Group 1 is 2.228 (df=lO),
and that for Group 2 is 2.365 (df=7), and these are shown by the lower and upper line
respectivelyin Figure 5.8. Note that none of the tests were significant at the level p <O.05 . The
actual values are shown in Table 5.4. The significance level ofthe pre/post-exposure difference
in factor A for the sad group is p =O.086. This approached statistical significance.
2.5



















• SAD liiili~il:i::i1:1 HAPPY
~ Critical Value (p<O.05) df=10 -H- Critical Value (p<O.05) df=7
Figure 5.8 Significance levels of pre/post-exposure differences between groups.
It seems fairly clear from the pattern of results, that exposure to the sad stimulus was
associated with a trend towards lower mood factor scores in the case of the variables
T,D,A,F,C,TMD. While none ofthese changes is statistically significant, the fact that there is
a pattern oftrends in the data is ofinterest.
5.4.2.1.3.1 THE BOOTSTRAP
In this section, the bootstrap technique will be described briefly, and its usefulness for
estimating the reliability of the t statistic in the test data will be discussed.
Bootstrapping is a technique invented by Efron (1977, in Diaconis and Efron 1983, p. 96)
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which allows for a relaxation ofthe assumption that data conform to a Gaussian distribution.
It is a technique which allows for the exploration of other statistical properties of a sample.
Bootstrapping is a resamplingmethod which involves iteration of statistical calculations, using
samples drawn from the original sample on a random basis.
According to Efron and Gong (1983), bootstrapping is highly applicable, and requires little in
the way of 'modelling, assumptions, or analysis, and can be applied in an automatic way to any
situation, no matter how complicated' (p. 36). The major factor constraining its use, is the fact
that it is highly intensive with regard to computation, and requires large numbers of arithmetic
operations to be carried out. Efron and Gong remark that the bootstrap substitutes theoretical
analysis with computational power.
Essentially, boot strapping involves resampling (with replacement) at random from the original
sample a large number of times, and calculating the statistic in question that number oftimes
from each random sample. The object of this is to obtain an estimate ofthe true value ofthe
statistic in question, and so estimate the true value of the statistic in the population from which
the sample was drawn.
In their article, Efron and Gong demonstrate the validity of this method with the estimation of
the true value ofPearson's r in a random sample of 15 sets of scores drawn from 82 such sets
of data where the tlUe value of r was known. In this case, the true value (based on 82
measures) was 0.761. The bootstrap estimate of the true value ofr was done by taking a
random sample of 15 sets ofscores, and then resampling, on a random basis from this sample,
1000 times, and recalculating r for each bootstrap sample. In this way, 1000 samples were
taken at random from the original sample of 15 scores, and r was calculated for each sample.
The result of the 1000 bootstrap replications is a frequency distribution of the correlation
coefficientr. The bootstrap estimate ofr is made from the resulting frequency distribution. One
standard deviation either side ofthe mean is an 'estimate ofthe average amount by which the
observed value of r for a sample differs from the true value of r.' (Diaconis and Efron, 1983,
p. 100). For 1000 iterations, the bootstrap estimate of r is estimated as the mean of the
bootstrap replications, in which case it would be 0.781.When compared with the true value of
r (0.761) for the 82 data sets, from which the sample of 15 was drawn, it is a reasonable
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estimate. Another estimate could be obtained from the standard deviation of the bootstrap
whereby there is a 68% probability that the true value of r lies within 1 standard deviation of
the mean.
It is assumed that the larger the number ofbootstrap replications, the more reliable the estimate
ofthe true value ofthe statistic in question will be. The logic behind the bootstrap procedure,
is that the process ofrandom sampling is mimicked within the existing data set. Diaconis and
Efron suggest that the bootstrap is the statistical equivalent of the hologram in that the
properties of the population from which the sample was drawn are preserved in the sample
which is a 'fragment' ofthat sample. In the same way that a scene can be reconstructed in detail
from the light waves that are emitted from a fragment, it is suggested that the properties ofthe
population can be reconstructed from a sample (p. 102).
The sampleused in the present study was relatively small, and the estimations of change likely
to be less reliable than in a larger sample. For this reason, it was thought that the bootstrap
would be an appropriate way of estimating the reliability of the changes associated with
condition. Specifically, an estimate of the reliability of the t statistic, means and standard
deviations were desired (See Appendices E,F,G).
A program was written in Pascal to calculate bootstrap estimates of the t statistic for the
change scores ofeach group, and the means and standard deviations ofboth groups for each
factor in the pre/post-test conditions. These will be presented in the following section.
5.4.2.1.3.1.1 BOOTSTRAP ESTIMATION: MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATION
Table 5.5 shows the sample and bootstrap estimates of the pre/post-exposure scores ofGroup
1. The bootstrap estimates ofthese statistics are means, based on 106 iterations. Note that the
means in the 'BOOT section of the tables are the mean of 106 bootstrap samples. The
bootstrap estimates of the standard deviations are the means of 106 bootstrap standard
deviations. It can be seen in Table 5.5 that the bootstrap estimations ofthe standard deviation
are generally lower than the sample statistics. These differences are illustrated in Figure 5.9.
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Table 5.5 sample and bootstrap estimates (mean based on 1et iterations) of mean and standard deviation for Group 1 pre/post.
In Figure 5.9, the
notation is as follows:
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Table 5.6 Differences between
sample and bootstrap estimates
of standard deviation (%).
In Table 5.6, the differences between the samples and bootstrap
estimates of standard deviation are expressed as a percentage
difference. All values represent the percentage by which the
bootstrap estimate was less than the sample estimate. (Note that in
bootstrapping, the SD is calculated separately for each sample so
that the lower values of the bootstrapped estimate do not result
from the cancellation of errors which occur when many items are :;:;::;;;.;:iiiiii _
amalgamated into a single test statistic). The greatest difference in
the pre-test estimate is seen in the variable D which was 6.92% less than the sample estimate.
The smallest difference is seen in the variable C (5.12%). The greatest difference in the post-
test estimate is seen in the variable C (9.56%), and the smallest difference is seen in the variable
V (5.76%). It is interesting to note that the standard deviation of the variable V generally
showed the smallest changes between pre/post-test conditions (5.58% vs. 5.76%). It can be
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concluded that generally the sample standard deviation estimates are likely to be higher than
the true values.
Some of the bootstrap frequency distributions are presented for brief comment. These
distributionswere plotted after the data was smoothed (exponential method) and are the result
of5000 iterations. Figure 5.9.1 shows the frequency distribution ofthe pre-test mean offactor
V for Group 1 and similarly in Figure 5.9.2, the standard deviation.
The distribution ofthe mean in Figure. 5.9.1 is close
to normal (kurtosis = -0.2; skewness = -0.1) and the
mean, median and mode are close to each other:
13.43, 13.45, 14.36 respectively. The sample mean
was 13.45, and the bootstrap estimate based on 106
iterations was 13.45. This suggests little variability in
the estimation ofthe mean.
The standard deviation distribution shown in Figure.
5.9.2 shows a negative skew, and is slightly more flat
than a normal curve (kurtosis = 0.14; skewness =
-0.42). The 95% confidence level indicates that the
mean value of the standard deviation lies between
8.25 and 8.31.
The post-test frequency plot ofthe mean is displayed
in Figure 5.9.3 . The properties of the post-exposure
frequency plot show little change between the pre-
and post-exposure condition (kurtosis = -0.08;
skewness = -0.1), and other measures of central
tendency and variability remain almost unchanged.
Figure 5.9.1 and 5.9.3 compared the distributions of
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Figure 5.9.5 Frequency distribution of the mean for
factor A (post-test).
variable V(5000 iterations). This comparison was made because the variable showed the least
amount ofchange in Group 1 (see Figure 5.8). The variable which showed the highest degree
ofchange was A (Anger-hostility). The mean scores decreased from 4.73 to 2.63 in Group 1,
and was largely unchanged in Group 2 (see Figure 5.7). The frequency plots of this variable
appear in Figures 5.9.4 and 5.9.5 (pre/post-test).
The frequency distributionbefore and after the subliminal intervention shows some differences.
In the pre-exposure condition, the distribution is close to normal (mean = 4.74 ; median = 4.72;
mode = 4.72; kurtosis = -0.08; skewness = 0.02), and in the post-exposure condition, a marked
positive skew is evident (mean = 2.64; median = 2.54; mode = 2.09; kurtosis = 0.31; skewness
= 0.49).
In the post-exposure condition, a relatively large number ofbootstrap replications fell below
the mean. This indicates that there were a number of subjects who scored considerably lower
on A after the intervention.
The bootstrap procedure was intended to give an estimate of the true value ofthe mean from
the population from which this sample was drawn. While the bootstrap estimate ofthe mean
did not vary significantly from the sample value in any of the variables, the change in
distributionbetween the pre/post condition suggests that the subliminal intervention is reliably
associated with a positive skew in the data. Admittedly this analysis was based on only 5000
iterations, since larger data files became unmanageable for the analysis of a frequency
distribution. However, the fact that the estimates made with a much larger number ofiterations
(10
6
) were comparable, suggests that the frequency distribution generated was reliable.
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5.4.2.1.3.1.2 BOOTSTRAP ESTIMATION OF t
Table 5.7 shows the sample and bootstrap estimation (mean) of the t statistic for pre/post
conditions (paired). This data is graphed in Figure 5.9.6. The lower and upper line in the top
part of the graph represent the critical values of t for 7 and 10 dfrespectively, p<0.05. The
number of iterations varied between 2000 and 2x106 . The reason for the difference in the
number ofiterations is that with some data sets, the bootstrapping program tended to terminate
after a short number of iterations with a run-time error (division by zero). The algorithm
calculating the t statistic was correct, and this error occurred more often with some data sets,
than with others. It seemed that the error occurred when a possible, but unusual bootstrap
sample was made which consisted ofzeros and caused a divide-by-zero enor.
Table 5.7 Sample and bootstrap estimates of t (paired samples).
The bootstrap estimates of t were mostly higher than the sample estimates, but this was not
invariably the case. The scores which show little change are italicised in Table 5.7, those
showing relatively large negative changes appear in bold, and those showing relatively large
positive changes are underlined. The bootstrap estimates where the number ofiterations was
low are probably less reliable (see the discussion which follows below). This data is perhaps
more comprehensible when seen in graph form. Figure 5.9.6 displays the same data as that in
Table 5.7. The lower line in the figure represents the critical value of t for p<0.05 , df= 10 (this
applies to Group 1), and the upper line represents the critical value of t for p<0.05, df= 7
(applicable to Group 2). The level of significance for t with the variable A for the sample
estimate is p=0.086, and that for the bootstrap estimate is p=0.0585. This brings the change
close to being statistically significant.
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Figure 5.9.6 Sample and bootstrap estimates of t (paired samples)
30 ~-------- -,
The bootstrap estimate of t varies in the following ways:
1) less than the sample estimate
2) approximately equal to the sample estimate
3) greater than the sample estimate
This shows that the bootstrap estimate of t is
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Figure 5.9.7 Frequency distrib ution of t statist ic (group 1).
not a function of the number of iterations. The
bootstrap estimates of t for factors F and C in
Group 2 were lower than the sample values,
but number ofiterations was also low. It is not
likelythat the estimate was low simply because
ofthe smallnumber ofiterations. In the case of
factor C a further 5 runs (2000 iteration s each)
yielded estimates that were comparable (0. 125;
0.138 ; 0.155 ; 0.087; 0.163). The mean of these estimates is 0.133. In the case offactor F, 2
further runs (10000 iterations each) were done (0.064; 0.072), both ofwhich are reasonably
close.
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Figure 5.9.7 shows the frequency plot of the bootstrap estimation of t (5000 iterations) for
group 1. This estimate (2.15) agrees well with the previous one which was based on IxlO"
iterations (2.157). Whether the t statistic is negative or positive is arbitrary, and the absolute
value is used. The distribution in Figure 5.9.7 shows a negative skew (-0.4) which signifies that
a number bootstrap replications were done which resulted in high values (on the left side of
the graph). This caused an increase in the value of the mean. The conclusion that can be drawn
from this is that the true value of t is likely to be higher than the sample value, and is probably
close to the p<0.05 level.
30 -,---- - - - ---- - -------,
Figure 5.9.8 Frequency distribution of t statistic (group 2).
The frequency distribution for Group 2 (A) is
shown in Figure 5.9.8 (5000 iterations). This
distribution has a positive skew (skewness =
0.24). While the difference in scale is
somewhat misleading, it can be seen that the
distnbution ofthe t statistic differs from that of
group 1. Group 2 has a mean of 0.06 and a







-4 ·1.93 0.14 2.21
Anger (T statistic)
4.28
The bootstrap replications suggest that the true value of t is close to zero for Group 2.
There is a single result (A) in the experiment which approached significance, and this was in
Group 1. It may be seen from Figure. 5.8 that the means ofthe factor s in Group 2 did not vary
much between the pre/post condition, but the means of Group 1 did, although the amount by
which they varied was not statistically siguificant. TIle bootstrap estimations of t suggested that
the true values of t were higher for factors D,A,F,C and TMD. Although only one measure
approaches significance, the pattern of differences between group s is interesting and will be
commented on further.
5.4.2.2 PREDICTION ANALYSIS
The prediction analysis procedure developed by Hildebrand et al. (1977) will be described in
this section, and applied to the analysis of the data pattern found in this study.
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Hildebrand et al. (1977) developed this procedure as a way of analysing patterns in ordinal,
non-parametric data. Specific predictions are made concerning the state ofvariables in various
categories, and the success ofthe prediction (P) is measured by the magnitnde ofthe delta ('1)
statistic. The V statistic ranges from 0 (no prediction success) to 1 (highest prediction success).
An assumption made by this method is that the variables are independent of each other, and it
must be noted from the outset that this was not the case in the factors derived in the POMS.
The POMS factors resulted from an oblique factor solution, and these were therefore correlated
with one another. This complicates any conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis. The
prediction analysis is therefore offered as illustrating a potentially useful method of analysing
data patterns such as the one found in the Follow-up Study.
A second consideration in the use ofthis technique is that it was applied as a post hoc method
ofanalysis. In terms of a scientific approach this is not ideal, but its use was considered to be
justified in this thesis since it is an exploratory study which has generated a number offurther
research hypotheses.
The analysis was done by comparing the pre/post-exposure scores on the 6 POMS factors. This
was done for Group 1 (sad Group) only, since it was seen that positively valenced ('happy')
stimuli were not likely to evoke changes. Group 2 (happy) functioned more or less as a control
group in terms ofresponses, so it was not sensible to make a post hoc prediction ofno change
for this group. TIle prediction tested by the analysis was that scores would be less in the post-
exposure condition for Group 1.
The intervals for judging score categories were decided as follows:
WWER: a negative change in the factor mean between pre/post conditions that was greater
than 0.5.
SAME: the mean post-exposure factor score was within 0.5 of the pre-exposure score.













The resulting contingency table appears in Table Table 5.8 Post-exposure score categories by group.
5.8. Two possible predictions are shown by
shading in the relevant cells and are expressed:
P l: SAD =* LOWER (darker shading)
P2: HAPPy =* SAME (lighter shading)
The second prediction.P , is given for the
purpose ofillustration only, and was not seriously entertained.
P
l
predicts that factor scores in the ' sad' group will be concentrated in the upper left hand cell
('LOWER'). Essentially, they are predicted to be lower.
P
2
predicts that factor scores in the 'happy' group will be concentrated in the middle cell of the
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Table 5.9 Prediction statistics.
Had the independence assumptions of the
prediction analysis been met, reasonably strong
evidence would be seen for the prediction that
scores would be lower in the ' sad' condition, and hence that a pattern of changes in the data
The statistics calculated for these predictions are
shown in Table 5.9. Note that the prediction
success of P 1 is good (V=O.71), and that of P2 is
mediocre (V=0.43).
may actually be demonstrated. In other words, there was a good fit in the data for this
prediction of pattern. As it stands, no definite conclusion can be drawn from the test, and it
merely illustrates the hypothesis suggested earlier, that there is a pattern of differences
associated with the 2 subliminal exposure conditions.
5.5 CONCLUSION
No clear findings can be reported from this experiment, but the existence of a number oftrends
strongly suggests a pattern. TIle following trends were considered to be ofinterest:
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1. There was little difference between the means of two groups on the pre-exposure POMS
factor A (Anger) (Group 1: 4.73; Group 2: 5.1; p<0.82), but a larger difference in the post-
exposure condition (Group 1: 2.6; Group 2: 5.0, p<0.2). Thus, the mean score in Group 1
declined, while that in Group 2 remained constant. Thus, two trends are observable in this
variable: the between-groups change (p = 0.2 , and the within-groups change (p = 0.08).
2. After subliminal exposure, scores on factors T, D, A, F showed noticeable trends towards
lower values in Group 1, but no such trends in Group 2. The bootstrap estimations show that
it is likely that the true values of the relevant t-test statistics were higher than the' sample
statistics, hence it is arguable that the magnitude of the changes associated with the sad
subliminal exposure was underestimated in this experiment.
·3. Following on from the argument made in point 2 above, bootstrapping suggested a value of
t for the change (pre/post) in Group 1 which is close to significance (p = 0.058) on the variable
A. In Group 2, bootstrapping suggested that the hue values ofthe t statistic for two variables
F and C were lower than the sample values. On the other hand, bootstrapping suggested that
the true values of t (pre/post) were underestimated for T and D. It is not known what the
direction of these changes would be. However, it was generally the case that bootstrap
estimates of change statistics were smaller in Group 2 than in Group 1.
The question posed at the beginning of this chapter was 'Does some clear change in mood
occur through subliminal suggestion, and if so, can it be reported directly, or would it have to
be inferred indirectly through some pattern in the data? ' The answer which is suggested by the
data is that a negative subliminal mood stimulus (Group 1) appears to be associated with the
tendency to report improvements in mood. Trends in the data suggested that subjects exposed







This is an unexpected reaction to the subliminal mood stimulus, and it is interesting that a
negative stimulus appeared to evoke positive changes in self-reported mood. Acceptance ofthe
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null hypothesis is justified in the case ofthe group exposed to a positive mood stimulus (Group
2). No single significant change was evident in this group , and no pattern of trends was
observed. The only slight change seen was a small improvement in the factor V (Vigour-
activity).
The trends obtained in this study provide a basis on which to speculate that a paradoxical
improvement in mood occurred after exposure to a noxious (sad) stimulus. Such a change in
mood was reported even though subjectswere not able to record the stimulus phrase to which
they had been exposed.
It is interesting that there was no change evident in the POMS factor Vigour-activity in Group
1. This factor was unique in that it represents a 'positive affect factor ' . In other words, the
trends suggested a reduction on negative (tending towards a negative or pathological mood)
mood factors, but no accompanying improvement on a positive factor.
It must be pointed out once more that no single result was statistically significant at p<O.05,
although one change approached this level very closely. From a strict statistical point ofview,
this study shows null findings. On the other hand, it is argued that since a coherent pattern of
differences exists in the data, these are likely to reflect the effects of the subliminal mood
suggestion, and not mere randomness. It must be acknowledged that a further study with more
subjectswould have been preferable to the amount of analysis undertaken in this chapter, but
there were severe time constraints, and recruiting another, larger group of subjects would have
proved costly.
146
6. A REFLECTION ON EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In this thesis, a number of statistical methods have been employed in the analysis ofthe data,
and, it has to be acknowledged that a simple confirmatory model has not been followed. It may
seem that license has been taken in the use of multiple tests of significance in both the Main
Study and Follow-up study, and there are reasons why this practice may be frowned upon. I
would like to make the point in this chapter however, that there is some legitimacy in the
practice of exploring the data thoroughly, and this practice has indeed been turned into a
distinct approach, along with various associatedtechniques. Tukey, for example is a proponent
of the method of Exploratory Data Analysis, and has developed various techniques for
exploring and describing data.
6.2 EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS
This thesis is offered as a preliminary study of subliminal mood priming, and in the course of
the research, I have proceeded from a position of almost complete ignorance on the subject,
to the point where some clear findings from the literature have been established in my mind.
The data from the initialexperiment appeared to be exceedingly complex, and after the efforts
which were made in getting it seemed to deserve more than a cursory glance and a few
hypothesistests. Coming to grips with the data and the information it contains has taken a great
deal ofeffort, and I would like to apologise to the reader for the complexity of the analysis
presented. I accept the criticism that 'data mining', or 'data dredging' (Tukey, 1991, p. 103)
was done in that multiple tests ofsignificancewere used - especially in the item analysis where
a large number of Chi-square tests were done, but would like to suggest that a reasonably
coherent pattern offindings have emerged which tend to refute possible accusations that they
may be due to chance.
On reflection, it may seem that the claims in this thesis were worded a little too strongly, and
suggest a certainty which is not warranted, and perhaps the case was made a little defensively,
that subliminal priming effects existed. TIns may have been in some cases, where significance
tests were used, and the rather deceptive language of 'certainty' which accompanies
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significance tests where p<0.05 was used.
I would like to try and correct the perception that may have unintentionally been given, that this
study produced cast iron evidence for subliminal priming effects. The claims made, are all of
a tentative nature, and the language of certainty associated with the significance test may be
(especially in this case) largely illusory. Positive results of individual tests of significance,
especially where they are accompanied by other tests of significance, do not allow clear
conclusions to be drawn. As Ableson remarks, 'random patterns will seem to contain
something systematic when scrutinised in many particular ways' (1995, p. 70). It is possible to
err on the conservative side however. As Abelson puts it, 'Ifyou look at enough boulders,
there is bound to be one that looks like a sculpted human face', but if overly strict criteria for
what is to be recognised as a human face are applied, one is likely to 'miss the whole show on
Easter Island' (ibid.) .
It is suggested that a reasonably systematic pattern of significant, or near significant results is
less likely to reflect randomness. TIle pattern of results found in this series of experiments may
simply be due to chance - this explanation cannot be ruled out completely. Tukey remarked that
'Every statistician has the obligation to admit that each particular set of data could have come
about randomly - given the oddest states ofnature, (1969, p. 84). This is not impossible in the
present case. The fact that there are some apparent similarities between the results of these
experiments and those ofother researchers is encouraging, however. For example, the finding
in the Main Study that the effect size was positively correlated with the sadness ratings ofthe
items, and negatively correlated witht the happiness ratings, came as an interesting surprise. In
the subsequent search for related literature, the series of studies termed the Preattentive Bias
Studies came to light, and offered a precedent for the finding of a subliminal effect linked to a
preattentive bias for negative information.
6.2.1 TUKEY'S APPROACH
In an address at Princeton University, Tukey (1969) contrasted the views of statistics as being
either a means ofdetective work, or sanctification. This was a way of contrasting exploratory
data analysis with confirmatory data analysis. Increasingly, there has been a move in the social
sciences, away from simple hypothesis testing in the hypothetico-deductive approach prevalent
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in the forties and early fifties (ibid. , p. 90). This has often been held up as the ideal scientific
approach, and is characterised by the setting up and testing of an experimental hypothesis
deduced from some principle. Statistical tests are used simply to test this experimental
hypothesis against a predetermined level of chance (p<0.05), and the hypothesis is accepted if
the probability ofit being due to chance factors is less than this percentage.
In the view of Tukey, and other authors (eg. Cohen, 1994), this method ofhypothesis testing
is limiting, and hypotheses tested successfully in this manner are not thereby sanctified. Cohen
insists that the 0.05 level of significance is not sacred, and refers to Bakan's remark that 'a
great deal ofmischiefhas been associated with the test of significance... ' (in Cohen, 1994, p.
997).
Tukey emphasised the need for exploration of data, and suggested that the statistician adopt
. the role of a detective, instead oftrying to be a high priest (ibid.). He suggested that data be
explored before it is analysed, even to the extent of saying that we need to examine it to find
out what it seems to be saying: 'We want to know what the data seem to say, whether or not
data mean what they seem - a fortiori whether or not we can prove that they mean it' (ibid.).
Stressing the uncertainty of the process of learning, Tukey insists that 'empirical knowledge
is always fuzzy'. He suggested that an essential aspect of 'the information revolution' is
'leaming to live with fuzziness' (1991, p. 101). The most dangerous aspect of simply accepting
the null hypothesis, he asserts, 'is the givingup ofexplicit uncertainty' (ibid.) . He suggests that
mathematics as a discipline may be at odds with the world to the extent that its depictions are
'black and white ' in terms of truth, whereas our knowledge about the world is not.
The null hypothesis significancetest gives an illusory sense of certainty about hypotheses, and
according to Cohen (1994), ' it does not tell us what we want to know' but gives the illusion
that it is telling us what we want to know. (p. 997). In the case where a null hypothesis is
accepted, there is no information available on the actual truth ofthis hypothesis.
In an early paper, Tukey (1962) suggested that three essential constituents of science are:
1. Intellectual content.
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2. Organisation into an understandable form.
3. Reliance upon the test of experience as the ultimate standard ofvalidity (p. 5).
He suggests that data analysis, and statistic should take on the characteristics of a science,
rather than that ofpure mathematics in the following respects:
1. Data analysis must seek for scope and usefullness rather than security.
2. Data analysis must be willing to en moderately often in order that inadequate
evidence shall more often suggest the right answer.
3. Data analysis must use mathematical argument and mathematical results as bases for
judgement rather than as bases for proof or stamps ofvalidity (p. 6).
He thus sets aside statistics as a way ofmaking authoritative judgements, and emphasises its
use as an exploratory tool, and hands the question ofjudgement back to the observer who is
guided by statistical method in his/her own judgements. In fact , Tukey lays a heavy burden of
judgement on the observer. According to Tukey, the judgements an observer makes are
conditioned by his/her own experi ence ofthe subject in question, the knowledge ofhow various
data analysis techniques have been previously applied, and on the body of theory on which the
various techniques is based (from ibid. p. 9).
6.3 CONCLUSION
Tukey de-emphasises the role of statistics as a means of sanctifying conclusions, and suggests
that statistical methods be used flexibly for exploring, describing and understanding data. He
suggests that many possible views or pictures may be po ssible from a given set of data, and
argues that this reflects the fuzziness of the world. He insists that the search for certainty
through single statistical te sts is illusory, and reiterates the point made by Fisher, that
'Repetition is the basis for judging vari ability and significance and confidence. Repetition of
results, each significant, is the basis, accordin g to Fisher, of scientific truth ' (1969, p. 85).
In this thesis, I have therefore taken the view that statistics is a useful exploratory tool, and not
an authoritative touchstone. Inevitably, much of the theorising has been of a post hoc nature,
suggested by the rather vigorous exploration of the data. I offer the various results in a
tentative way as one possible interpretation of the data , and as a basis for future
experimentation. I suggest also that the exten sive data analysis and use of statistics was done
in the spirit of Tukey' s approach, and was justified as a method ofpreliminary investigation.
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7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
7.1. INTRODUCTION
In previous chapters the burden of the argument has been that the results of the research are
not random in the statistical sense. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to show that they
are not random in the theoretical sense, and that they can be given a meaningful interpretation.
Obviously the pattern offered will reflect the author's philosophical and theoretical biases, and
also more than one interpretation could be given to the findings. The interpretation offered in
the present chapter is necessarily sketchy and preliminary.
This section will briefly describe the results of the various experiments, and briefly compare
them to the findings of other research. The subject of affective arousal will be introduced as a
helpful theoretical tool, and theoretical models ofmood will be briefly presented and discussed
with particular regard to the findings ofthe Follow-up study. The limitations of this study are
mentioned, and suggestions are made for future research.
7.2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
This section will present the major findings of the 3 experiments in summary form, and the
various hypotheses, where applicable, will be reviewed in the light of the experimental
conclusions.
7.2.1 PILOT STUDY
The Pilot Study was designed to test the potential of two types ofmasking (masking by light,
masking by visual noise) for use in subliminal stimulation. To begin with, there was reason to
think that a more central type ofmasking occurred with the masking by visual noise technique.
While this could not be verified in the Pilot Study, the masking by light procedure was found
to be a more efficient method of masking to prevent awareness.
In the Pilot Study, it was speculated that free association responses had a semantic relationship
to the subliminal stimulus . It is interesting that Marcel (1983) also remarks on this
phenomenon. In an experiment, Marcel conducted an investigation of reading in children and
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adults. In this experiment, single words were briefly exposed to the subject, followed by a
pattern mask, and the subjects' task was to report whatever words or letters they were able to
recall. Marcel remarks that a 'small, but significant proportion of erroneous word responses,
while showing little graphic or phonological relation to the stimulus, bore a striking semantic
relationship to it. Thus green led to responses such as "blue" and ''yellow'', queen to "king",
apple to "orange", light to "dark", happy to 'Joy", clock to "time", chair to "table" (p. 20 I).
Marcel concluded that unless these responses occurred purely by chance, subjects seemed to
be demonstrating knowledge ofthe stimulus at a 'lexical or semantic level' (ibid.). This link is
difficultto demonstrate conclusively, but is a hint of the finding that semantic processing may
occur in the absence of awareness.
The Pilot Study established that no subjects were able to recognise the test phrase at exposures
ofless than or equal to «=) 12.9 ms. Interestingly, single words were recalled by subjects at
the 12.9 ms ('she') and <=9.5 ms ('the') level, although subjects were unable to recognise the
phrases. It was thus established with a reasonable degree of certainty that subjects were unable
to detect the stimulus phrases. On the basis that they were unable to recognise targets at a level
greater than that of chance, it could be claimed that this corresponds with the objective
threshold. A small sample was tested in this experiment however, so caution is advocated.
What is clear however, is that exposures were made below the subjective threshold of
awareness.
7.2.2. MAIN STUDY
Thisexperiment was done as an alternative to the research ofHalberstadt et al. (1995) to see
if subliminal mood priming was possible. Halberstadt et af. showed that the spelling of
ambiguous words (homophones) could be affected by a negative mood induction. They found
that a 'sad' mood induction was associated with the tendency of subjects to spell the negative
meaning of the homophones, but no such priming tendency was found for subjects given the
positive mood induction. They concluded that emotional context was implicated in 'low-level
cognitive processes' (p. 281) in that emotion-congruent meanings were primed by the mood
induction. Halberstadt et al. were not able to account for the lack of a positive mood priming
effect whereby it was expected that a happy mood would be associated with a tendency to spell
'happy' meanings ofwords. This research extends that ofHalberstadt et af. in that the mood
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priming stimuli were presented below the threshold for conscious identification.
Two basic questions are raised by the research in the Main Study. These are set out as follows:
1. Were subjects unaware ofthe stimulus?
2. Did any priming effect occur, and if so how was this manifested?
These questions will both be addressed.
7.2.2.1 STIMULUS UNAWARENESS
It is interesting that only one word was correctly identified in the recall test: the word 'happy'.
Five subjects identified this word, four of whom were exposed to the 'happy' stimulus. It is
curious that one subject gave this word after exposure to the 'sad' stimulus. This may have
been a chance event.
The fact that none of the words from the 'sad' stimulus were recognised may be, as Dixon
(1991) suggests, that different words have different sensitivity thresholds. Dixon believed that
an elevated threshold was related to an underlying emotional complex. This was also suggested
by Bengtsson who asserted that when the perceptual threshold for an emotionally loaded word
is raised compared to a more neutral stimulus, it is evidence of a defensive operation (1991,
p. 38). It seems plausible that different words have different recognition thresholds, and that
this may be related to their emotional loading. This implies that the word 'happy' had a lower
recognition threshold than the other words.
This finding is interesting since it suggests that the subjects in this study were, for the most
part, unaware of the stimulus. No evidence exists that subjects were aware of the negative
stimulus, and only 4 subjects were aware of one ofthe words from the positive stimulus. This
finding might be similar to those of Dixon (199 1), and Bengtsson (1991). Hirshman and
Durante (1992) also suggest that an item's semantic characteristics may affect the latency or
accuracy of its identification, and Balota (1990, in Hirshman and Durante, 1992) concurs.
Hirshman and Durante do not offer clear reasons as to why this may occur though.
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7.2.2.2 PRIMING EFFECTS
Firstly, it was seen that male subjects generally produced more neutral words in the sad
subliminal priming condition. This was interpreted as a tendency to avoid spelling 'sad'
meanings ofwords in this group. Female subjects spelled more 'sad' words than males, and did
not appear to be reactive to the subliminal priming condition.
Secondly it was seen that with more strongly valenced words (die/dye, mourning/morning,
pain/pane) deviation ofthe 'sad' word category due to subliminal exposure condition was close
to significance for the first two items cited and exceeded the level of significance (adjusted
residual> 1.96) for the third. It seems too much of a coincidence that these items showed the
strongest patterns ofdeviation for the 'sad' category, and were also rated as the three saddest
words. It is thought therefore, that there was a priming effect found in these items, and that it
was in a direction consistent with, and predicted by the initial hypotheses (congruent), although
this tended to be stronger in some groups than others for the latter two items (mainly the male
subject group).
Thirdly, with incongruent priming (i.e. a 'happy' prime was given with words in the 'sad' word
list), subjects made significantly more errors. TIns was a main effect in the ANOVA, but
significant interactions also occurred: it was most pronounced in the non-English and male
groups. The explanation given for this is that the 'happy' prime was incongruent with the
valence ofthe word which was likely to be either 'sad' or 'neutral'. The prime was therefore
non-facilitative, and subjects may have had difficulty in accessing appropriately congruent
words. This suggests a non-specific type ofpriming,
III short, the following effects are claimed:
1. A priming effect associated with the subliminal mood stimulus: a specific, mood congruent
effect which was generally small, and limited to strongly negative items.
2. A priming effect related to the male group which as a whole tended to spell fewer 'sad'
words. In this group there seemed to be a general avoidance of' sad' words, and a tendency to
spell neutral words - an effect opposite to the predicted.
3. A general incongruent priming effect by which errors were made in the incongruent priming
condition.
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The non-specificpriming effectprobably occurred because most ofthe homophone items were
not sufficiently salientto the priming stimuli. The item ratings made it apparent that there were
reversals in the meanings of some items, and that there were definite effects oflanguage and
gender present which affected subjects interpretation of the words. Thus, effects of mood
priming were probably muddied by the fact that a substantial proportion ofthe subjects were
hazy about word meanings - therefore priming effects were unpredictable. The finding that
more errors were made in the incongruent condition seems to confirm this.
An important correlation was discoveredwhich appears to corroborate the claim that a priming
effect existed. The effect size (Cramer's 11) was correlated with the sadness ratings of the
emotionally valenced words in each homophone pair, and there was a negative correlation
between the happiness ratings of these words and the effect size. Also, the most clear
correlation existedbetween the sad-neutral difference ratings and the effect size. This suggests
that the effect ofthe negative subliminal condition (since no significant, or even clear priming
effectswere found for the positive stimulus) was seen most clearly in the most negative items,
and least clearly in the positive items. The general explanation offered is that subjects were
sensitive to negative priming without awareness, but not to positive priming.
7.2.3 FOLLOW-UP STUDY
The experiment was done in order to test whether a change in mood occurred in response to
subliminal stimulation. While no single significant mood change occurred, (although one
variable approached significance, (bootstrap: p<O.06, sample estimate: p<O.09) a pattern of
changes was evident in the group exposed to the sad stimulus whereby there were
improvements in self-reportedmood on 5 ofthe 6 factors. The only factor on which there was
no change was factor V (Vigour-activity). In the group exposed to the positive mood stimulus,
no changes were evident on any ofthe factors.
The above findingspoint to the conclusionthat semantic analysis did occur without awareness,
and that responses were affected only by the negative subliminal stimulation. The reason for
the reported change in mood is not clear however, since it ran counter to predictions. The
question motivating this study asked whether any reportable change in mood occurred in
response to subliminal stimulation. It seems that the answer is complex, since the pattern of
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changes was paradoxical. Why did subjects report an improvement in mood when they were
exposed subliminally to a 'sad' mood stimulus, while those exposed to a 'happy' mood stimulus
reported no change? This question will be addressed in the general discussion and theoretical
review which will follow.
The similarity between the Follow-up study and the Main study, is that in both, the only
changes were associated with the negative subliminal stimuli, and no measurable changes were
associated with the positive stimuli.
7.3 COMPARISONS WITH OTHER STUDIES
In this section, some comparisons ofthe results ofthis study are made with relevant findings
of other studies.
Perhaps the single most important finding in the present thesis is that subjects were reactive
only to the negative priming stimuli. It has already been mentioned that the Halberstadt et al.
(1995) study did not observe any priming effect in the group exposed to the happy mood
induction. In this respect, there is some agreement with these authors' experiment, although
the mood-congruent priming found in the Main Study was neither as clear nor as strong. These
authors suggest that the explanation might lie in the nature ofthe influences ofnegative and
positive emotion in language processing, but they do not elaborate this idea further.
An important difference between this study, and that ofHalberstadt et al. is that these authors
were able to establish that a mood change occurred in their subjects, whereas this study did not.
The follow-up study suggested that a paradoxical improvement in mood may have occurred
in response to the stimulus. Halberstadt et al. established that their mood induction had been
effective by rating their subjects mood with a self-report mood scale, and their conclusion that
(negative) mood-congruent priming occurred was therefore justifiable.
In their research, Halberstadt et al. were not able to determine the stage at which the observed
priming effects exerted their influence. They report findings consistent with the claim that
contextual influences may influence processing in a top-down manner, and include mood as one
possible influence, but these authors were not able to speculate whether the observed effects
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'occurred at the level oflexica1 access or at a later stage ofprocessing' (p. 281). The general
conclusion of their research however, in that it was consistent with Bower's theory in which
an 'emotion unit spreads activation to emotion-related lexical items in memory, thereby
affording them a processing advantage' (ibid).
Some support was found in the Main Study, for an emotion congruent priming effect, although
this effect was small, and isolated to the most strongly negative items. It seems too, that the
results may also be compared to those obtained by Kemp-Wheeler & Hill (1992) who found
that emotionally aversive primes facilitated the production of (congruent) emotionally aversive
target words, although these authors used decision latency time as a dependent measure:
congruent primes reduced latency and vice versa.
Greenwald et al. (1995) predicted that priming effects could also take the form ofhigher error
rates, although this did not occur in their study. In the Main Study, non-English subjects made
significantlymore errors than English subjects, especiallyin the happy subliminal condition, and
males made significantlymore errors than females - also in the happy subliminal condition (see
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 in the Main Study) . The explanation of Greenwald et al. (1995) is thought
to be plausible (that errors were a function ofincongruent priming in groups which, for some
reason, were more sensitive to subliminal priming than others).
It is interesting, though initially confusing to compare the results ofthe Follow-up study to the
results ofthe experiment of Talbot et al. (1991). These authors confirmed Bornstein's (1990)
finding that behavioural indices are more sensitive indicators of SPA influences than either self-
report measures or projective measures. However, they report that subjects exposed
subliminally to the phrase 'Mommy is leaving me' reported significantly less self-confidence
than subjects exposed to the phrase 'Mona is loaning it'. This was apparently due to the
influence ofthe 'anaclitic' group in their study, since there was an interaction between group
and stimulus type. The anaclitic group also scored significantly higher on the Beck Depression
Inventory.
The results of the Follow-up study suggested a pattern of changes which indicated that a
positive change in mood had occurred in the group exposed to the negative subliminal stimulus.
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This was unexpected, and certainly different to the changes on self-report measures found in
the experiment of Talbot et al. Perhaps the difference in response is due to the fact that the
sample used in these authors' study consisted of subjects diagnosed with depression.
7.4 PREATTENTIVE BIAS STUDIES
The studies by Mogg et al. and Bradley et al. are important, and are treated separately since
they are highly relevant to the findings ofthis thesis. These authors propose that with anxiety,
a specific bias operates in favour ofnegative information at a preconscious level ofprocessing.
A number of studies thus point to the possibility that this bias corresponds with an automatic
type ofprocessing which takes place before awareness occurs (Mogg et aI.,1993; Mogg et aI.,
1995). Now Williams et al. (1988 in Bradley et al., 1994) use Graf and Mandler's (1984)
distinction between integration and elaboration to characterise the difference, respectively,
between automatic processes, such as word recognition, which occur without awareness, and
processes which require awareness. The process ofintegration has been studied by assessing
the effects ofpriming on implicitmemory, i.e. these involve indirect effects, and do not involve
conscious or intentional retrieval of material. Elaboration involves a more strategic process
whereby words are linked to other material in memory and associations are formed. This
process takes place within awareness, and can be measured by explicit memory tasks. Williams
et al. suggest that anxiety exerts a bias in terms of the integration of information, whereas
depressive conditions exert bias in terms of the elaboration of information. They produced
support for this theory when they showed that anxious patients produced more (primed) threat
than neutral word completions (implicit memory) when given a word stem, but not when
explicit memory was directly tested in a cued recall task.
The pattern ofresults found in the present thesis is consistent with the findings ofthese authors
in that subjects seemed sensitive to negative priming stimuli. The task in the Main Study, in
terms ofthe distinction used by Williams et al. is comparable to the primed word completion
task used by Matthews et al. (1989, in Bradley, et al., 1994). Matthews presented word stems
(a few letters of a word), and asked subjects to complete the words. Some subjects were
primed subliminallyby negative words, and others were primed supraliminally. Bradley et al.
argue that 'if priming occurs due to subliminal presentation, then clearly the effect is
automatic, and does not depend on conscious strategic processes' (p. 67). Thus, if the
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subliminal priming effect could be partialled out, the effect of the conscious strategy only
(involving explicit memory) would be left . In this way, it may be theoretically possible to refer
to the subliminal priming effect as testing implicit memory.
The mood priming experiment in the Main Study involved the resolution oflexical ambiguity.
The homophone experiment may be understood in the following way: There was an apparent
bias whereby word meanings were affected by the subliminal priming (as noted before, some
congruent priming effects occurred, but mainly non-specific effects , and they were correlated
with the sadness ratings ofthe words) . This may be referred to , in the terminology ofWilliams
et al. as an effect of a bias in integration whereby negative information was selectively
attended to and processed. In other words, perception of the subliminal prime may have been
affected by some kind ofintegrative, preconscious bias in favour ofnegative information.
Now, the similarity between this present thesis, the work ofHalberstadt et al. and that ofthe
Preattentive Bias Studies is that subjects in virtually all cases were reactive to a negative type
ofpriming. Thisorientation was not unique to clinical subjects, but also occurred in non-clinical
'high negative affect ' subjects too (Bradley et al., 1994). The conclusion ofthis study is that
non-clinical depression was associated 'with a mood-congruent bias in automatic aspe~ts of
memory' (ibid.) .
In the literature consulted in this area (Mogg et al.,1993 ;Bradley, et al. , 1994; Mogg et al. ,
1995), a preconscious bias for emotionallynegative words was associated mainly with clinically
significant anxiety, and non-clinical depression. Interference was produced in anxious and non-
clinically depressed subjects, by both supraliminal and subliminal exposure ofnegative stimuli.
This interference was not seen in the case ofclinically depressed patients, nor was it seen in the
non-clinical control groups.
The finding that subjects experiencing anxiety and 'negative affect' selectively process negative
information suggests as (Bradley et al. 1995) remark, 'a natural orientation towards
threatening stimuli in the environment' (p. 536). It is easy to see that aspects of the
experimental situation described in the Main Study may have been anxiety-provoking for some
subjects. Subjects may have been more vigilant than usual, and this vigilance could have been
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associated with a preattentive bias for threat, or negative information since this would naturally
be salient to a state of anxiety . The bias operated at some early (integrative) stage of
information processing, and was unavailable to consciousness.
A possible explanation for some ofthe language- and gender-specific priming effects reflected
by the interactions in the ANOVA analysisis that some language and gender groups were more
prone to anxiety, or experienced more negative affect, but this is mere speculation. It might
therefore be suggested that generally mood in the male and non-English groups was more
negative than in the female group, especially the English speaking female group where effects
were generally less. An interesting aside is that males spelled significantly fewer ' sad' words
than females, and more ' sad/neutral' words, and English subjects spelled significantly more
'happy' words than non-English subjects. These findings may suggest various psychodynamic
interpretations, egothat male subjects were more defensive than feinale subjects, and hence that
their mood was more negative. It could also be inferred that non-English speaking subjects
mood was less positive because ofthe lower number of 'happy' words produced by this group .
Inferences ofthis kind are tentative however, and additional corroboration would be required
in order to establish them more clearly.
It seems clear from this discussion, that anxious and non-clinically depressed subjects are
generally more sensitive to negative information than 'normal' subjects. Several studies point
to the likelihood that thisbias occurs at an early stage ofinformation processing - in the terms
ofGrafand Mandler (1984), at the stage ofintegration. These effects appear to be distinct from
those encountered with recall tasks which entail awareness, and hence the elaboration of
associations which takes place within awareness, and under its control.
7.5 AFFECTIVE AROUSAL AND AWARENESS
This section will discuss the question of awareness as it is related to affective arousal. The
cognitive theory of mood is associated with autho rs such as Amold (1960), Lazarus (1966)
(both cited in Weiner, 1985) who conceive of emotions as consisting of different levels of
processing and complexity. These authors suggest that there are different levels of appraisal
which occur in response to a stimulus. The primary appraisal, is regarded as a 'rather primitive
emotional reaction' (in Weiner, 1985, p. 560), whereas a secondary appraisal is associated with
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more 'advanced psychological mechanisms' referred to sometimes as 'ego defences' (ibid.). The
essential aspect ofthistheory, is that the various types of arousal are relatively undifferentiated
feeling states before they are given a cognitive, emotional interpretation.
The term 'affective arousal' is used to refer to the unelaborated feeling state associated with
an increased level of cortical and physiological arousal. Several theorists suggest interesting
links between affective arousal, and the phenomenology of emotion. These theories are
potentially useful in understanding the mechanism by which experimental effects, may be
evoked. In this discussion, the position taken is that emotion entails awareness, and involves
a conscious appraisal and interpretation of an affective state. Emotion is therefore seen as a
conscious elaboration of states ofphysiological and cortical arousal.
7.5.1 ATTRIBUTION THEORY
'Attribution theory' is a vast body oftheory and research, and cannot be adequately reviewed
here. Nevertheless, it is useful to refer to it as a possible interpretive framework. Weiner
suggests that the general principle in attribution theory is that complex cognitions arise to
'refine and differentiateexperience'(Weiner, 1985, p. 560). These cognitions involve appraisal,
and seek causal explanations for events. Bornstein (1992). suggested a model by which SPA
effects could be explained. This was a reaction to the difficulties researchers have experienced
in trying to explain experimental effects psychodynamically. The traditional model used to
explain SPA effects is the Ego-Defence model ofwhich Silverman (1983 , in Bornstein, 1992)
and Dixon (1981 , 1991) are proponents. Psychoanalytically orientated interpretations entail
ego-defence constructs and these rather narrow explanations are often not tested against
alternative theoretical backgrounds, as Bornstein (1992) remarks.
The phenomenon for which Bornstein sought an alternative explanatory model, is the inhibiting
effect which awareness has on responding to subliminal stimuli. This finding is well established
by several meta-analyses, and was discussed in the Survey ofLiterature. Bornstein asserts that
in SPA research, drive-related messages influence behaviour by temporarily either gratifying,
or exciting drives and needs. Bornstein states that SPA stimuli are all affect-laden whether,
negative or positive. He suggests that SPA messages commonly increase or decrease subjects
levels ofanxiety, depending on the affective tone of the stimulus. This change in anxiety levels
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is associated with changes in subjects responses on the dependent measures used in experiments
which, according to Bomstein, are deliberately formulated to be sensitive to changes in anxiety
levels. When subjects become more anxious as a result of a subliminal message, Bomstein
suggests that they consciously attempt to formulate an explanation. The phenomenon that
' subjects spontaneously generate causal attributions for changes in internal states' may indeed
be ubiquitous (Hastie, 1984, in Bomstein, 1992). When SPA stimuli are perceived consciously,
an attribution is available whereby subjects can relate their increased anxiety to the experimental
message, and thereby discount it as being experimentally induced. This a type of situational
attribution, and its effect is to diminish the amount of anxiety experienced. Now when a
message is presented subliminally, subjects cannot attribute the increase in experienced anxiety
to an external source since it occurred without awareness. Consequently, a situational
attnbution is not possible, and subjects are forced to the conclusion that the increase in anxiety
is dispositional. There is no reduction in anxiety in this situation, and measures sensitive anxiety
are affected.
It is interesting that Bomstein's explanation makes anxiety centrally important in alternately
motivating attributions or evoking experimental effects. It is not altogether clear why other
emotions could not play a part, or be of more central importance in this process. It seems
possible that anger, for example, may be evoked by stimuli such as 'Leaving mom is wrong'
(Dauber, 1984) . Different emotions - specifically linked to the subliminal stimuli, could cause
a shift in subjects' affective state, and energise experimental effects. On the other hand, it is
interesting that Bomstein singles out anxiety as being of central importance in terms of
subliminal stimulation. This suggests links to the Preattentive Bias Studies, but the nature of
the link is not clear.
7.5.2 PHYSIOLOGICAL AROUSAL, COGNITION AND EMOTION
Schachter and Singer (1962) conducted an interesting series of experiments in which they
examined the relationship between cognition and physiological arousal. (Again, a vast literature
has developed around their findings and this literature cannot be adequately reviewed here. I
simplywish to refer to this literature in order to develop an interpretation ofthe findings ofthe
present research). They suggested that cognitive factors are determinants ofmood, and they
have a guiding, or ' steering' function in relation to the experience of physiological arousal.
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Thus, emotions are guided by cognitive factors which label and interpret internal states of
arousal, as these authors put it, ' ...in terms of the characteristics ofthe precipitating situation...
(p. 380). The resulting emotional state, these authors suggest, is a 'function of a state of
physiological arousal and of a cognition appropriate to this arousal ' (ibid).
Schachter and Singer's research was an attempt to answer the question ofhow a person would
respond when a state of physiological arousal was induced, 'for which no immediately
explanatory or appropriate cognitions were available' (ibid). If, for example, subjects were
covertly given epinephrine, a state of physiological arousal would exist, but they would be
unaware ofwhy they felt this way. Schachter (1954, in Schachter and Singer, 1962) suggested
that this would lead to the arousal ofwhat he termed 'evaluative needs'. This is the need one
would have to understand and label one's feelings. These authors conducted an experiment in
which subjectswere injected with epinephrine, and then placed in various contrived situations
in which certain moods (namely anger and euphoria) were suggested by the behaviour of a
' stooge'. They found a pattern of results consistent with the predictions that subjects were
susceptible to the stooge's mood, and tended to label their state in terms of the cognitions
available to them.
The pattern ofresults seen in these authors' study is ofinterest to the present thesis since the
situation where subjects experiencedphysiological arousal, but were unaware ofthe reason for
this arousal, seems comparable to the situation where a subject has been exposed to an
emotionally-laden subliminal stimulus, and has no way of explaining the resulting level of
arousal. In such a situation, ifit were similar to that described by Schachter and Singer (1962) ,
subjectswould have a need to find reasons for this state of arousal, and would tend to describe
their emotions in terms of available cognitions. Clearly, the experimental situation would be
regarded as a source of explanations.
TIns explanationis strikinglysimilarto that described by Bornstein (1992) who suggested that
subjects would seek attributions to account for their increased (in terms ofhis explanation)
levels of anxiety. Bornstein suggests that when no appropriate attributions are available,
subjects experimental behaviour will increase in terms of dependent measures which are
sensitive to the effects of anxiety.
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The important aspect ofthese explanations is the suggestion that following a change in arousal,
there is a conscious search for explanatory cognitions, or attributions which would elaborate
the state of arousal and allow it to be understood and explained in terms of a particular
emotion.
7.5.3 INTERPRETATION OF FOLLOW-UP STUDY RESULTS
The results of the Follow-up study were puzzling since a paradoxical improvement in mood
was observed in the group exposed to the 'sad' stimulus. The question was posed, 'Why did
subjectsreport an improvement in mood when they were exposed subliminallyto a 'sad' mood
stimulus, while those exposed to a 'happy' mood stimulus reported no change'. An answer to
this question will be ventured on the basis ofthe theory on affective arousal and awareness.
Bornstein (1992) suggests that anxietyresults from subliminal exposure of aversive stimuli, and
that this is reflected in dependent measures which are sensitive to the effects of anxiety.
Schachter and Singer (1962) offered a model with some interesting similarities to that of
Bornstein. The common element is that subjects, when faced with a change in levels of arousal
willactivelyseek explanations, primarilyfrom the 'characteristics ofthe precipitating situation'.
In addition, Schachter and Singer found that subjects in this situation were highly suggestible
to situationalexplanations or attributions. Bomstein asserted that when situational attributions
were unavailable, subjects would not be able to discount the shift as arising from the
experiment, and hence would be unable to achieve a downward regulation of their arousal
levels. This would lead to changed behaviour on dependent variables sensitive to anxiety.
It is interesting to speculate that subjects exposed to the 'sad' stimulus in the Follow-up study
might have reacted to their negative arousal in terms of the demands of the experimental
situation. The subjects were naive in the sense that they did not know what the subliminal
stimulus phrase was. However, they had already participated in an experiment in which they
were exposed to subliminal stimulation. They were also required to write up the experiment as
an assignment, and were assigned a certain amount of reading in the area. By the time they
came to participate in the Follow-up study, subjects were fairly well-informed on the subject.
The experimentwas introduced as a study ofthe effects ofsubliminal stimulation on mood, and
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the dependent measure was a direct measurement ofthe subjects' mood. Because of this, the
experiment may have been rather focussed on mood, and this could have created an
expectation in the subjects that their mood would change, hence an increased likelihood that
changeswould be framed in terms ofmood. An awareness that their mood was being assessed
may have been threatening to the subjects who were exposed to the 'sad' stimulus and
experiencednegative arousal. These subjects would not have had any discounting attributions
available from the situation, although they would have been consciously aware ofthe fact that
their mood was of central interest in the experiment. The negative arousal would have been
threatening, and they may have become defensive because oftheir inability to account for it,
and thereby lower it. Now the perception and processing ofthe negative stimulus must have
taken place without their awareness. They would not have been consciously aware ofthe nature
ofthe threat, though they were primed to believe that their mood might change.
If these subjects had not been exposed to the negative stimulus, and experienced negative
arousal, the need for an attributionwould not have arisen, and presumably, no change in mood
would have been reported, as appeared to be the case with the subjects exposed to the 'happy'
stimulus.
The dependent measure required subjects to reflect on their mood. Subjects who felt an ill-
defined sense of threat or anxiety, would presumably act in accordance with this, i.e. react
defensively, or adaptively in order to counter the threat, given the non-availability of
attributions by which the anxiety could be discounted, especially if their mood was being
monitored, and represented an additional source of threat. Ifthey had seen the stimulus, the
threat could have been countered more directlyand perhaps the negative state could have been
avoided because the threat could be discounted as an experimental manipulation, and subjects
could have attenuated their anxiety.
Perhaps, because subjects consciously needed to cope with the demands ofthe experimental
situation (and not withdraw from it, since this would cause embarrassment), their negative
arousal would be incapacitating, although presumably if the threat had increased - ego ifthe
experimenterhad threatened subjects with a knife, they would have adopted a strategy which
was appropriate to this direct level ofthreat. Because of the attention that was focussed on
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their mood, subjects may consciously have reinterpreted, or construed their arousal as positive
because oftheir need to cope with the demands ofthe situation.
In short, because subjects experiencing a state of arousal for which they have no explanation
are thought to be suggestible (Schachter and Singer, 1962), the situation may have cued
subjects to strategically interpret their mood as positive, since negative self-reports ofmood
could have reinforced their anxiety, and been non-adaptive in an already threatening situation.
The admittedly curious conclusion is therefore suggested, that subjects exposed subliminally
to the negative stimulus showed indirect effects (paradoxical improvements) on a direct
measure ofmood, while those exposed to a positive subliminal stimulus showed no change.
7.5.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION RESEARCH
It is interesting to link the previous discussion of arousal, cognition, and emotion with the
earlier discussion ofsubliminal perception presented in the Review ofLiterature. A number of
authors pointed to the finding that conscious awareness of stimuli is needed in order for
strategising to occur (eg. Marcel, 1980, 1983; Cheesman & Merikle, 1986). This distinguishes
subliminal from supraliminal processing of stimuli. Bornstein (1992) showed that stimulus
unawareness was needed for the production of SPA effects. It seems likely that awareness is
associated with subjects being able to make inferences about their intemal states of arousal, and
as Bomstein and Schachter and Singer suggest, subjects appear to have a need to find
explanations for these shifts in arousal. When stimuli are presented within awareness, subjects
are able to reflect consciously and strategically about the task - this was also suggested by
Marcel, and Cheesman and Merikle (op cit.), and this agrees with Bomstein's theory that when
subjects are aware ofstimuli, they are able to strategically discount them as being 'not real' and
thereby attenuate their feelings of anxiety.
By contrast, there is a consistent finding that semantic analysis occurs when subjects are
exposed subliminally to stimuli, but this is not accompanied by more integrative, higher level
types ofprocessing. The distinction between conscious and unconscious processing is therefore
captured by the differences observed between above and below threshold responses to
experimental stimuli, and the difference is attributed to levels of awareness. This distinction fits
with Bomstein's attribution theory, in that subjects are only able to neutralise arousal when
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they are able to consciouslygenerate situation attributions, and this may only occur when they
are aware of stimuli.
Bomstein accepts that attribution theory is not incompatible with a defence mechanism theory.
The implication of his theory is that subjects' regulation of their negative arousal is self-
protective. Bomstein makes the point that the notion of 'discounting attributions' is more
acceptable to the experimental psychologist than that of 'ego defences' since in his view, the
former is more clearly tied to a 'solid foundation of empirical research', and is easier to
operationalise.
The Preattentive Bias Studies suggest that with anxiety and non-clinical depression, there is
a preattentive bias in favour ofnegative information. This bias occurs at an automatic stage of
information processing, and does not require higher level processing. Their findings are
compatiblewith the general theory that processing of stimuli below the threshold ofawareness
takes place in a automatic manner, and is not accompanied by the higher order types of
processing seen when subjects are aware of stimuli. The authors ofthese studies use Graf and
Mandler's distinction between integration and elaboration to refer to the difference between
the two types ofprocessing, and these correspond well with the distinctions described by other
authors.
It would be of interest to elaborate Dixon's notion of perceptual defences in terms of the
findings ofthe Preattentive Bias Studies, since both theories refer to bias in the perception of
information in terms ofits emotional valence.
It is difficult to comment on the relationship between conscious and unconscious processes (see
Section 2.6.5.1) in terms ofwhether they are associated or not. Greenwald et al. suggested that
'when stimuli produce unconscious effects, they also produce associated but perceptually
indistinct conscious effects' (1995, p. 23). In the preceding discussion, it was suggested that
when a (negatively) emotionally loaded stimulus was presented below the recognition
threshold, arousal resulted, and a conscious process of 'seeking attributions' was activated.
This suggests that conscious processes by which individuals strategically, perhaps self-
defensively seek explanations for changes in arousal are related to the unconscious process
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which caused the arousal in the first place. To this extent, they seem to be dissociated. Perhaps
conscious processes are supervenient on unconscious processes, but not independent ofthem
The link between conscious and unconscious processes is certainly intriguing, and a number
of questions are raised by subliminal methodology.
In summary, it seems that the research done for this thesis has tentatively established a number
of links with other authors. The pattern of results obtained suggests that modest mood-
congruent priming effects were found in the most negative homophone items. This agreed with
the finding ofHaIberstadt et al. that mood-congruent recall may be elicited for a negative mood
induction (but not for a positive mood induction), but extends this research by the possibility
that a subliminalmood-congruent priming effect was demonstrated. A number ofnon-specific
effects were associated with the negative priming, and the size of the effect was predicted by
the sadness ratings of the items. This finding migbt be explained by the findings of the
Preattentive Bias Studies in that subjects who were most sensitive to priming, might have
experience negative affect - an effect shown by the authors ofthis study. There is certainly a
strong link between the findings ofthis thesis, and those of other researchers in that subjects
tend to respond to negative stimuli, and not to positive stimuli (a major exception being the
symbiotic oneness studies).
The Follow-up Study also suggested that subjects were sensitive to the effects ofnegative
subliminal priming, but not positive subliminal priming. This was inferred from a pattern of
improvements in mood in subjects who were exposed to the negative mood stimulus. The
reason for thisimprovement in mood was explained in terms of Schachter and Singer's (1962)
theory ofemotion, and Bornstein's (1992) attributional theory. It was suggested that attribution
theory was compatible with a the idea that individuals seek attributions for their mood changes
as part ofa strategy of self-regulation and self-protection. (A notion which seems compatible
with certain psychic defences - those that operate within consciousness). When consciousness
is bypassed, as is thought to occur in the case of subliminal stimulation, conscious strategies
cannot be used, to explain and counter the change in arousal, and indirect anxiety-related
effects occur. It is possible that some ofthe SPA findings may be explained by this mechanism
7.6 LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDIES
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Thisresearch project began with the author's interest in developing a technique of subliminal
stimulationwhich could utilise the common computer, and VGA screen, since a tachistoscope
was not available. All the work that followed the development of a masking by visual noise
procedure was of a tentative nature. Since I have never tried this method of subliminal
stimulation before, the data admittedly, was subjected to intensive examination - far beyond
hypothesis testing as it is done in the usual rigorous, scientific way. It would have been easy
to simply declare that the experiment had shown a null finding, and to have left it at that.
However, it seemed apparent at several stages that the data contained patterns, and these were
tantalising. It has to be admitted though, that much of the theorising has been of a post hoc
nature, and the results described must be treated cautiously.
The basic argument used in this thesis is that a pattern of differences is not likely to be due to
randomness. There was a pattern of specific (mood-congruent) and non-specific differences in
word spelling associated with the subliminal priming in the Main Study. An independent sample
of subjects emotional ratings of the items was correlated with the effect size (positive
correlation between the sadness rating, a weaker, negative correlation with the happiness
ratings, and a strong positive correlation between the effect size and a measure ofthe sadness
of the items when the neutral ratings were subtracted from them). In the Follow-up Study,
there was a pattern of differences in the mood scores between the two subliminal exposure
conditions and again, these differences were associated with the negative subliminal priming.
There were no differencesseen in the group exposed to the positive priming stimulus. Another
argument is that links have been suggested with the findings of other experimenters in this and
related areas. This fact also suggests that the findings ofthis study are not due to randomness.
It would be important to replicate the findings ofthis thesis in a future series of experiments.
Successful replications would reduce the possibility that these findings were due to chance.
Some specificproblems ofthe research have been pointed out already, but a general weakness
of the design has been the lack of a supraliminal control condition. Comparisons were made
between the 'sad' and 'happy' stimulusphrases when they were both exposed subliminally, but
not when they were exposed supraliminally. This would need to be done in order for valid
comparisons between aware and non-aware conditions to be made.
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It appeared the many ofthe homophones were unsuitable because ofthe nature ofthe priming
effect. The magnitude ofthe effect may have been diminished as a result ofthe delay between
the presentation of the prime, and the presentation of the homophone. In a future study, it
would be interesting to interleave priming with presentation of items in order to increase
proximity, and possibly enhance the effect ofpriming.
It would have been useful to add in another dependent measure such as response latency. This
would be another way of testing facilitation vs. non-facilitation. This would have provided
additional information in the homophone task.
It would have been useful to have run forced-choice tests in order to test for awareness.
Besides a simple free-recall test asking subjects to recall any ofthe words they saw, this would
have given additional information regarding stimulus identification.
Because ofthe amount ofvariation between items in the Main Study with regard to gender and
home language differences, it would have been useful to have had a more homogenous sample.
Also, given the possible link between negative mood, it would have been useful if subjects
mood had been assessed on various relevant dimensions before the task, so that a possible
relationship between subliminal sensitivity and anxiety could be elucidated.
The nature of the inferences drawn with regard to mood is complicated - this was seen
especiallywith the Follow-up Study when a direct measurement of subjects' mood was made
before and after subliminal stimulation. The interpretation ofthis finding is admittedly sketchy,
and requires further elaboration. It would be useful to have physiological measures of arousal,
such as galvanic skin response, EMG (electromyogram), and EEG (electroencephalogram)
measures to compare the self-reports with, and assess whether claims that subliminal
stimulation causes a change in levels of arousal have any empirical foundation.
7.7 CONCLUSION
The findings ofthe various experiments were discussed in this chapter, and compared with the
findings of other authors. A number of similarities emerged. It is suggested that small mood-
congruent priming effects were seen in the Main Study, along with some non-specific effects
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associated with the subliminal priming condition. The sensitivity to negative information
presented below the threshold of awareness found in the Main Study corresponds with the
preconscious processing bias found in the Preattentive Bias Studies. Generally, anxiety seems
to have a major role in evoking experimental effects, and these studies indicated that both
clinically significant anxiety and non-clinical depression were predictors of sensitivity to
negative subliminal information. Bornstein's theory of attribution, also singled out anxiety as
having a major role in SPA effects.
Generally, there are large areas where SPA and non-psychoanalytically orientated research
complement each other. SPA research has emphasized the clinical aspects of subliminal
stimulation, but the non-psychoanalytically orientated research has provided support for the
claims made by researchers of the former persuasion by demonstrating that semantic priming
effects exist. Both SPA research and non-psychoanalytically orientated research suggests that
differenttype ofprocessing occur when stimuli are perceived with and without awareness , and
this is an important area of common ground.
An interpretation, based on attribution theory, and Schachter and Singer 's theory of emotion
was suggested to explain the results ofthe Follow-up Study. This may be related to theories
ofdefence mechanisms in the sense that an adaptive strategy may have adopted by subjects who
were exposed subliminally to a negative mood suggestion. This may have been a reaction to
the demands ofthe situation.
Given the substantialbody ofresearch on subliminal research, it would seem that it is fairly well
established as a worthy field ofinvestigation. The conclusion reached by this author, is that
further research into the nature of subliminal effects is warranted. In particular, it would be
interesting to investigate e1ectrophysiological correlates of subliminal stimulation.
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Delay(10000);{only 2 seconds - multiply by factor of 0.2}
































































































































































FOR Line:= 1 TO 3 DO
BEGIN
Spaceloop1 ;






Delay(5000);{old value 5000 - seemed cool}
TextColor(LightGray);
END;


































Write(' You will first see a focusing spot in the middle of the screen.');
Writeln;
Write(' Then you will see a phrase flashed very quickly on the screen');
Writeln;
Write(' followed by a white block which will cover the phrase.');
Writeln;
Write(' You need to look carefully at the focussing spot, and see ifyou');
Writeln;









Stimulus:='test phrase: LOOK HARD';
Flash(Flashtime, Stimulus);
ClrScr;
Write(' There will be ten phrases in the test, each repeated ten times.');
Writeln;
Write('For each one, please watch the focussing dot in the centre of the screen');
Writeln;
Write(' and try as hard as you can to see the phrase which will be ');
Writeln;

























IF (Reply ='Y' ) OR (Answer = 'y') THEN Flag := TRUE;
IF Flag = TRUE THEN
BEGIN
Write (Outfile,'Subject indicates that phrase was seen.');
Writeln(Outfile);
Write(Outfile,'Test Phrase was: ',Stimulus);
Writeln(Outfile);
Real_time:=Flashtime*Factor;
Write(Outfile,'ACTUAL Exposure time was : ',Real_time:5:2,' milliseconds');
Writeln(Outfile);
ClrScr;




Write(Outfile,'Subject recalled the following phrase: 'Answer);
END;
IF Flag = FALSE THEN
BEGIN
Write (Outfile,'Subject was not able to recall phrase');
Writeln(Outfile);
Write(Outfile,'Test Phrase was: ',Stimulus);
Writeln(Outfile);
Real_time :=Flashtime*Factor;
Write(Outfile,'ACTUAL Exposure time was: ',Reattime:5:2,' milliseconds');
Writeln(Outfile);
ClrScr;
Write(' Please have a guess at what the phrase was.' );
Writeln;




Write (Outfile,'Subject guessed the following phrase: 'Answer);
END;
END;










Write(' You will now see below, a list of phrases, each numbered.');
Writeln;
Write(' See ifyou are able to recognise the phrase you saw earlier');
Writeln;
Write(' in the last trial');
Writeln;
Writeln;








Write('Please type the number of the phrase displayed which is the same');
Writeln;





Write(Outfile,'The CORRECT ANSWER WAS: ',Correct);
Writeln(Outfile);
Write(Outfile,'The ANSWER GIVEN WAS: ',Answer);
Writeln(Outfile);








Loopl, Loop2, Flashtime : Integer;
BEGIN
Flashtime := 220; {effective 45ms... down to 4 ms}
ClrScr;
{Inform;}
FOR Loop1 := 1 TO 10 DO {changed}
BEGIN
Flashtime := Flashtime - 20;
Write(Outfile,'BEGINNING OF TEST ',Loopl,'.');
Writeln(Outfile);
Readln (Infile2,Stimulus);
























MASKING BY VISUAL NOISE: PASCAL SOURCE CODE
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Program Pilot_test;


















Write(' CALIBRATION CHECK, PLEASE ADJUST MO NITOR TO STANDARD BRIGHTNESS.');
Writeln;
Write (' BRIGHT CHARACTERS');
Writeln;
Delay(l 0000);{only 2 seconds - multiply by factor of 0.2}














VAR Brightness : INTEGER;
BEGIN
TextColor(Yellow);















































UNTIL Keypressed = True;
Filenamel := Defaultfilel;
Filename2 := Defaultfile2;































































































{ FOR Line:= 1 TO 3 DO}
{ BEGIN}
Spaceloop 1;





























FOR Flashtime:= I TO 4 DO
BEGIN












Write(' You will first see a focusing spot in the middle of the screen.');
Writeln;
Write(' Then you will see a phrase flashed very quickly on the screen');
Writeln;
Write(' followed by random characters which will cover the phrase.');
Writeln;
Write(' You need to look carefully at the focussing spot, and try your ');
Writeln;









Stimulus:='test phrase: LOOK HARD';
Flash(Flashtime , Stimulus);
ClrScr;
Write(' There will be ten phrases in the test, each repeated ten times.');
Writeln;
Write(,For each one, please watch the focussing dot in the centre of the screen');
Writehl;
Write(' and try as hard as you can to see the phrase which will be ');
Writeln;

























IF (Reply ='Y') OR (Answer = 'y') THEN Flag := TRUE;
IF Flag = TRUE THEN
BEGIN
Write(Outfile,'Subject indicates that phrase was seen.');
Writeln(Outfile);
Write(Outfile,'Test Phrase was: ',Stimulus);
Writeln(Outfile);
Real_time:=Flashtime*Factor;
Write(Outfile,'ACTUAL Exposure time was: ',Reattime:5:2,' milliseconds');
Writeln(Outfile);
ClrScr;




Write(Outfile,'Subject recalled the following phrase: 'Answer);
END;
IF Flag = FALSE THEN
BEGIN
Write(Outfile,'Subject was not able to recall phrase');
Writeln(Outfile);
Write(Outfile,'Test Phrase was: ',Stimulus);
Writeln(Outfile);
Real_time:=Flashtime*Factor;
Write(Outfile,'ACTUAL Exposure time was: ',Real_time:5:2,' milliseconds');
Writeln(Outfile);
ClrScr;
Write(, Please have a guess at what the phrase was.');
Writeln;




Write(Outfile,'Subject guessed the following phrase: 'Answer);
END;
END;










Write(, You will now see below, a list of phrases, each numbered.');
Writeln;
Write(, See ifyou are able to recognise the phrase you saw earlier');
Writeln;
Write(' in the last trial');
Writeln;
Writeln;








Write(,Please type the number of the phrase displayed which is the same');
Writeln;





Write(Outfile,'The CORRECT ANSWER WAS: ',Correct);
Writeln(Outfile);
Write(Outfile,'The ANSWER GIVEN WAS: ',Answer);
Writeln(Outfile);








Loopl, Loop2, Flashtime : Integer;
BEGIN
Flashtime := 420; {effective 81.7ms... down to 4 ms}
ClrScr;
{Inform;}
FORLoopl ;= 1 TO 10 DO {changed}
BEGIN
Flashtime := Flashtime - 40;
Write(OutfJ.le,'BEGINNING OF TEST ',Loop1,'.');
Writeln(Outfile);
Readln (Infile2,Stimulus);






























Prac , Seat,Gender : Integer;








Grey=' GREY AND SAD';




















VAR Top : INTEGER;
BEGIN


























































Procedure Get_details (VAR Prac,Seat,Gender : Integer; VAR Lang : CHAR) ;














































Write('GENDER: IF you are MALE, TYPE "M"');
TextColor(LightMagenta);










UNTIL (Sex ='F') OR (Sex ='f) OR (Sex ='M') OR (Sex ='m');
Writeln ;



















Writeln('PLEASE TYPE IN THE NUMBER CORRESPONDING WITH YOUR HOME LANGUAGE');
Writeln(' THEN PRESS "E N T E R" ');
Writeln;
Writeln(' ZULU 1. XHOSA 2.');
Writeln('OTHER AFRICAN LANGUAGE 3.








Procedure Happy_sad(Seat : Integer);
BEGIN
Tone := Happy;
IF Frac(Seat/2) > 0 Then Tone := Sad;
END;









Procedure Write_details(prac,Seat,Gender : INTEGER; Tone : String; Lang : Char);
BEGIN -
Writeln(Outfile,'Subject PRAC number: ',Prac);
Writeln(Outfile,'Subject SEAT number: ',Seat);
Writeln(Outftle,'Subject Gender : ',Gender);
Writeln(Outfile,'Subject Home Lang : 'Lang);
















































































FOR Flashtime:= 1 TO 4 DO
BEGIN














Write(' The first part of the Prac involves an experiment in PERCEPTION.');
Writeln;
Write(' You will see a focusing dot - a smiley face in the middle of the screen.');
Writeln;
Write(' Then you will see a PHRASE flashed very quickly on the screen,');
Writeln;
Write(, followed by random characters which will MASK the phrase.' );
Writeln ;
Write(' You need to look carefully at the focussing spot, and try your ');
Writeln;





















Write(, There will be ONE PHRASE in the test, repeated 15 times.');
Writeln;
Write(, For each one , please watch the FOCUSSING DOT in the centre of the screen');
Writeln;
Write(, and try as hard as you can to see the phrase which will be ');
Writeln;









Write(, After the perception phase you will then be asked to wait for instructions.');
Writeln;
Write(' The next phase of the experiment will consist of words read out to you');
Writeln;









































PLEASE W A I T FOR NEXT INSTRUCTION FROM DEMONSTRATOR');
N.B. PLEASE DO NOT TOUCH THE KEYBOARD UNTIL YOU ARE TOLD TO');
















Write('********************* RE COR DIN G PH A S E *********************');
WriteIn;


















WriteIn(Outfile,'WORD # ',Spell,' ',Word);
Color:=Color+1;




















Write(' Thank you for participating.');
Writeln;
Write(, PLEASE WAlT TO BE DEBRIEFED BEFORE YOU GO');
Writeln;
TextColor(LightGreen);
































wordl ,word2,word3 ,word4,word5 ,word6,word7 ,word8 ,word9,wordl0,wordll ,










VAR Space : INTEGER;
Junk: Char;
BEGIN















VAR Space : INTEGER;
Junk : CHAR;
BEGIN





Procedure Read_data(VAR Prac,Seat,Gender,Home_lang,Tone : INTEGER;
VAR HNEUTRAL,SNEUTRAL, H_tot,S_tot,Neutral,Errh,Errs : REAL ; VAR Error,
word 1,word2,word3,word4,word5 ,word6,word7,word8 ,word9 ,word 10,wordl1 ,word 12,
word13,wordI4,wordI5,wordI6,wordI7,wordI8,wordI9 : INTEGER);































IF (Word ='medal') OR (Word='Medal') OR (Word = 'MEDAL') THEN
BEGIN { HAPPY1}
Spelling :=True;
H_tot := H_tot + 1;
WS:=I;
END;
IF (Word ='Meddle') OR (Word = 'meddle') OR (Word = 'MEDDLE') THEN
BEGIN {HNEUTRALl}
Spelling := True;












IF (Word = 'hymn') OR (Word = 'Hymn') OR (Word = 'HYMN') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True; {HAPPY2}
H_tot:= H_tot + 1;
WS:=I;
END;
IF (Word = 'him') OR (Word = 'Him') OR (Word = 'HIM') THEN
BEGIN {HNEUTRAL2 }
Spelling := True;



















IF (Word = 'dye') OR (Word = 'Dye') OR (Word = 'DYE') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True;












IF (Word = 'sweet') OR (Word ='Sweet') OR (Word ='SWEET') THEN
BEGIN { HAPPY3}
Spelling := True;
H_tot := H_tot + 1;
WS:=1;
END;
IF (Word ='suite') OR (Word = 'Suite') OR (Word ='SUITE') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True;












IF (Word = 'won') OR (Word = 'Won') OR (Word = 'WON') THEN
BEGIN





IF (Word = 'one') OR (Word =' One') OR (Word = 'ONE') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True; {HNEUTRAL3}












IF (Word = 'mourning') OR (Word = 'Mourning') OR (Word = 'MOURNING) THEN
BEGIN
Spelling :=True; { SAD2}
S_tot:= S_tot + 1;
WS:=2;
END;
IF (Word = 'morning') OR (Word='Morning') OR (Word='MORNING) THEN
BEGIN
Spelling:= True; {SNEUTRAL2}












IF (Word='heal') OR (Word='Heal') OR (Word='HEAL') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True; { HAPPy4}
H_tot:= H_tot + 1;
WS:=l;
END;
IF (Word='heel') OR (Word='Heel') OR (Word='HEEL') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True;













IF (Word='bridal') OR (Word='Bridal') OR (Word='BRlDAL') THEN
BEGIN { HAPPY5}
Spelling := True;
H_tot := H_tot+ I;
WS:=I ;
END;
IF (Word='bridle') OR (Word='Bridle') OR (Word='BRIDLE') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True;












IF (Word='presents') OR (Word='Presents') OR (Word='PRESENTS') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True; {HAPPY6}
H_tot := H_tot + 1;
WS:=I ;
END;
IF (Word='presence') OR (Word='Presence') OR (Word='PRESENCE') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True;












IF (Word='banned') OR (Word='Banned') OR (Word='BANNED') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling :=True; { SAD3}
S_tot := S_tot + I;
WS:=2;
END;
IF (Word='band') OR (Word='Band') OR (Word='BAND') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling:= True; {SNEUTRAL3}













IF (Word='bored') OR (Word='Bored') OR (Word='BORED') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling :=True; {SAD}
S_tot := S_tot + 1;
WS:=2;
END;
IF (Word='board') OR (Word='Board') OR (Word='BOARD') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True;












IF (Word='dear') OR (Word='Dear') OR (Word='DEAR') THEN
BEGIN




IF (Word='deer') OR (Word='Deer') OR (Word='DEER') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True;















IF (Word='missed') OR (Word='Missed') .OR (Word='MISSED') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling :=True; {SAD5}




IF (Word='mist') OR (Word='Mist') OR (Word='MIST') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True;












IF (Word='fmed') OR (Word='Fined') OR (Word='FINED') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling :=True;
S_tot := S_tot + 1; { SAD6}
WS:=2;
END;
IF (Word='find') OR (Word='Find') OR (Word='FIND') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True;












IF (Word='peace') OR (Word='Peace') OR (Word='PEACE') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True;
H_tot:= H_tot + 1; {HAPPY8}
WS:=I;
END;
IF (Word='piece') OR (Word='Piece') OR (Word='PIECE') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True;













IF (Word='rose') OR (Word='Rose') OR (Word='ROSE') THEN
BEGIN { HAPPYI0}
Spelling := True ;
H_tot := H_tot+ 1;
WS:=I;
END;
IF (Word='rows') OR (Word='Rows') OR (Word='ROWS') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling:= True; {NEUTRALI6}












IF (Word='pride') OR (Word='Pride') OR (Word='PRIDE') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True; { HAPPY 11}
H_tot := H_tot + 1;
WS:=I ;
END;
IF (Word='pried') OR (Word='Pried' ) OR (Word='PRIED') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True;
HNeutral:= HNeutral + 1;
WS:=3;
END; { NEUTRAL I 7}
IF (Spelling=False) THEN
BEGIN







IF (Word='pain') OR (Word='Pain') OR (Word='PAIN') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling :=True; { SAD7}
S_tot := S_tot + 1;
WS:=2;
END;
IF (Word='pane') OR (Word='Pane' ) OR (Word='PANE') THEN
BEGIN
Spelling := True;



















H_tot,S_tot,Neutral,Errh,Errs : REAL; Error,wordl,word2,word3,word4,word5,
word6,word7,word8,word9 ,word 1O,wordll ,word 12,word13 ,wordI4,wordI5,word 16,






































































word 10, word11 ,word 12,word13,word14,word15 ,word 16,word17 ,word18,word19);
Output(prac,Seat,Gender,Home_lang,Tone,H_tot,S_tot,Neutral,Errh,Errs,





























Grey=' SAD AND ALONE' ;





















VAR Top : INTEGER;
BEGIN



























VAR Spaces : INTEGER;
BEGIN
ClrScr;




























Procedure Get_details (VAR Prac : INTEGER; VAR Gender : Integer;
VAR Lang : INTEGER);


























Wr ite('Please type in your');
Tex tColor(L ightGreen+Blink);
Write(' N A ME');
Norm'Video;
TextColor(Green);










Write('GENDER: IF you are MALE, TYPE "M'");
TextColor(LightMagenta);











UNTIL (Sex ='F') OR (Sex ='f) OR (Sex ='M') OR (Sex ='m');
Writeln;




















Writeln('PLEASE TYPE IN THE NUMBER CORRESPONDING WITH YOUR HOME LANGUAGE');
Writeln(' THEN PRESS "E N T E R" ');
Writeln;
Writeln(' ZULU 1. XHOSA 2.');







{ Error during conversion to Integer? }
ClrScr;
UNTIL ((Code=O) AND (Lang<7) AND (Lang>O));
END;
END;
Procedure Happy_sad(VAR Tone: INTEGER);


































Procedure Write_details(prac:INTEGER; Name: String; Gender: INTEGER;
Lang,Tone: INTEGER);
BEGIN





































NO MORE RATHER MORE MUCH MORE');

















Procedure Questionl (Var Ql : INTEGER);







Writeln(' l. Been able to concentrate on whatever you' re doing?');
NormVideo;
Writeln;
Writeln('BETTER THAN SAME AS LESS THAN MUCH LESS THAN');





{ Error during conversion to Integer? }
ClrScr;
UNTIL ((Code=O) AND (Ql <5) AND (Ql >O));
END;


















{ Error during conversion to Integer? }
ClrScr;
UNTIL ((Code=O) AND (Q2<5) AND (Q2>O));
END;








Writeln('3. Felt that you are playing a useful part in things?');
NormVideo;
Writeln;
Writeln('MORE SO SAME AS LESS USEFUL MUCH LESS');





{ Error during conversion to Integer? }
ClrScr;
UNTIL ((Code=O) AND (Q3<5) AND (Q3>O));
END;








Writeln('4. Felt capable of making decisions about things?');
NormVideo;
Writeln;
Writeln('MORE SO SAME AS LESS SO MUCH LESS');





{ Error during conversion to Integer? }
ClrScr;
UNTIL ((Code=O) AND (Q4<5) AND (Q4>O));
END;
Procedure Question5(Var Q5 : INTEGER);








NO MORE RATHER MORE MUCH MORE');
THAN USUAL THAN USUAL THAN USUAL');
NO MORE RATHER MORE MUCH MORE');
THAN USUAL THAN USUAL THAN USUAL');









{ Error during conversion to Integer? }
ClrScr;
UNTIL «Code=O) AND (Q5<5) AND (Q5>O» ;
END;
Procedure Question6(Var Q6 : INTEGER);
















{ Error during conversion to Integer? }
ClrScr ;
UNTIL « Code=O)AND (Q6<5) AND (Q6>O» ;
END;
Procedure Question7(Var Q7 : INTEGER);







Writeln('S. Been able to enjoy your normal day-to-day activities?');
NormVideo;
Writeln;
Writeln('MORE SO SAME AS LESS SO MUCH LESS');





{ Error during conversion to Integer? }
ClrScr;
UNTIL « Code=O)AND (Q7<5) AND (Q7>O» ;
END;
224
NO MORE RATHER MORE MUCH MORE');
THAN USUAL THAN USUAL THAN USUAL');
NO MORE RATHER MORE MUCH MORE');
THAN USUAL THANUSUAL THAN USUAL');








Writeln(,9. Been able to face up to your problems?');
NormVideo;
Writeln;
Writeln('MORE SO SAME AS LESS ABLE MUCH LESS');





{ Error during conversion to Integer? }
ClrScr;
UNTIL ((Code=O) AND (Q8<5) AND (Q8>O»;
END;
Procedure Question9(Var Q9 : INTEGER);
















{ Error during conversion to Integer? }
ClrScr;
UNTIL ((Code=O) AND (Q9<5) AND (Q9>O»;
END;














NO MORE RATHER MORE MUCH MORE');
THANUSUAL THANUSUAL THAN USUAL');
NO MORE RATHER MORE MUCH MORE');





{ Error during conversion to Integer? }
ClrScr;
UNTIL ((Code=O)AND (QIO<5) AND (QlO>O»;
END;

















{ Error during conversion to Integer? }
ClrScr;
UNTIL ((Code=O) AND (Qll<5) AND (Qll>O»;
END;

















{ Error during conversion to Integer? }
ClrScr;
UNTIL ((Code=O)AND (VI<5) AND (VI>O»;
END;





NO MORE RATHER MORE MUCH MORE');














{ Error during conversion to Integer? }
ClrScr;
UNTIL ((Code=O) AND (V2<5) AND (V2>O));
END ;
Procedure Question12(Var Q12: INTEGER);







Writeln(,14. Been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered?');
NormVideo; .
Writeln;
Writeln('MORE SO ABOUT SAME LESS SO MUCH LESS');





{ Error during conversion to Integer? }
ClrScr;
UNTIL ((Code=O) AND (Q12<5) AND (Q12>O));
END;
Procedure Score(Question : INTEGER; VARL_Score, G_Score : INTEGER);
BEGIN
CASE Question OF





3 : G_Score:=G_Score+ I ;
4 : G_Score:=G_Score+1 ;
END;
END;













Writeln(' GENERAL HEALTH QUESTIONNAIRE : DAYID P. GOLDBERG');





Writeln('Please read this carefully:');
Writeln;
Writeln('We should like to know ifyou have had any health complaints, and how your);
Write('health has been in general, ');
TextBackground(B lue);
Write('OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS.');
NormVideo ;
Writeln(' You will be asked a');
Writeln('series of questions - please answer them ALL. You should respond by looking');
Writeln('carefully at the options presented with each question. Once you have decided');
Writeln('which of the options most nearly applies to you, please type the number');
Writeln('undemeath the option and then press the "E N T E R" key.');
Wr iteln ;
Writeln ('Remember that we want to know about pre sent and recent complaints, not' );
Writeln('those that you had in the past.');
Writeln ;
Writeln('It is important that you try to answer ALL the questions.');
Writeln;








































































Writeln('This word is part of a list of words that describe feelings that people have.');
Writeln('PLEASE READ EACH ONE CAREFULLY.');
Writeln('There are options and numbers presented with each word. Please select one of);
Write('the options that best describes ');
TextBackground(Blue);
Writeh1('HOW YOU ARE FEELING AT THIS PRESENT MOMENT,');
NonnVideo;
Writeh1('- I.E. RIGHT NOW! Please type the number underneath the option and then');






Writeln (' NOT AT ALL A UTILE MODERATELY QUITE A BIT EXTREMELY');
TextColor(LightMagenta);
















Questions = ARRAY[1..6 5] OF STRING[26];





























































































FOR Ro:= 1 To 22 DO
BEGIN
R[Ro]:=(Random(9)+232); {old =69+176 new=14+224}
END;
END;
Procedure Expose(Flashtime : INTEGER; Stimulus : String);
VAR Loop : Intege r;
BEGIN
Stimulus := Bright;





















FOR Flashtime:= 1 TO 4 DO
BE GIN













flashed on the screen .');
best to see the phrase which follows it.');
followed by random characters which will MASK the phrase.');
You need to look carefully at the focussing spot. and try your ');
and try as hard as you can to see the phrase which will be ');
There will be ONE PHRASE in the test, repeated 15 times.');
The first part of the task involves an experiment in PERCEPTION.');
You will see a focusing dot - a tiny face in the middle of the screen.');












































































Write(' Thank you for participating.');
Writeln;








UNTIL (Flag='go') OR (Flag ='GO');
NonnVideo;
ClrScr;
Writeln('ENTER GROUP CLUSTER NUMBER');
Prompt;
Readln(Group);
Writeln('ENTER NUMBER OF WORDS RECOGNISED');
Prompt;
Readln(Words);





Writeln('You will be asked again to do the "POMS" questions. Please answer according');


























FOLLOW UP STUDY: BOOTSTRAP ALGORITHM
ESTIMATION OF t FOR 'SAD' GROUP (n=11) USING DIFFERENCE SCORES
PASCAL SOURCE CODE
Program bootstrap_T;




DIFFERENCES = Array[ l..ll] OF REAL; {Input file of difference values}
D_SQUARED = Array[l..l1] OF REAL; {array of DIFFERENCES squared}








Dsq , Diff_mean,Sumd2 ,T,Sums_squares ,T_total,Count,T_average,N : REAL;





PROCEDURE Filenames(VAR FLAG: Boolean);
VAR Y : String[I];
BEGIN
ClrScr;
Write('INPUT FILE NAME - MAX 25 CHARACTERS » ');
Readln(Input);
Write('OUTPUT FILE NAME - MAX 25 CHARACTERS » ');
Readln(Output);
Write('INPUT VARlABLE NAME » ');
Readln(Name);
Write('DO YOU WISH TO OUTPUT ACTUAL STATISTICS? YIN »');
Readln(Y);






























{This procedure calculates Osquared}
Procedure Calc_dsquared(VAR Dsq : REAL);
BEGIN
Dsq:=O;
FOR D_Loop := 1 TO DIFF_NO DO
BEGIN
02[D_loop]:=(DifflD_loop]*DifflD_loop]);
Osq:=Dsq + D2[D_Loop] ;
END;
END ;
{This procedure calculates the mean of the differences - i.e. just the mean}
{of the input values which are difference values }




FORD_Loop := 1 TO Oiff_no DO
BEGIN




{This procedure calculates the (sum of d)squared IN }




{N.B. This procedure calculates the first T value only!!!!}
Procedure Calc_first_T(VAR T: REAL);



















{I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I }
{ ALL PROCEDURES NOW USE ARRAY SI WHICH 18 A RANDOM SAMPLE FROM THE ORIGINAL }
{ I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I 1 I I 1 I I 1+++++++++++++++++++1 1 I I I I I I I I I 1++++++++++++++++1 I I I 1 1 I I }
{This procedure calculate s Dsquared}
Procedure Calc_dsquaredSl(VARDsq : REAL);
BEGIN
Dsq :=O;
FORD_Loop:= 1 TO DIFF_NO DO
BEGIN
D2[D_loop]:=(S1[D_loop]*Sl [D_loopD;
Dsq :=Dsq + D2[D_Loop];
END;
END;
{This procedure calculates the mean of the differences - i.e. just the mean }
{of the input values which are difference values}




FOR D_Loop := 1 TO Diff_no DO
BEGIN




{This procedure calculates the (sum of d)squared IN }




{N.B. This procedure calculates the T value from the random sample}
Procedure Calc_Sample_T(VAR T: REAL);





Calc_sumd2S 1(sumd2 , Total);
Sums_squares := Dsq-(Sumd2/Diff_no);
E~~iff_mean/(Sqrt(Sums_squares/(Diff_no*(Diff_nO-l))));
{ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I 1 1 1 I I I I I I 1 1 I I 1 1 1 I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I}
240







Write(Outfile,'T STATISTIC FOR THE PREIPOST DIFFERENCE FOR THE ');
Write(Outfile,'VARIABLE ~' ,Name,'~: ',T:8:5);
Writeln(Outfile);
END ;
Procedure Report2(Count ,T_average: REAL);
BEGIN
Write(Outfile ,'Bootstrap estimate ofT for ',Count: 15:0,' iterations: ');
Writeln(Outfile,T_average:12:7);
END;
Procedure Progress (Count ,N : REAL);
BEGIN







































































FOLLOW UP STUDY: BOOTSTRAP ALGORITHM
ESTIMATION OF t FOR 'HAPPY' GROUP (n=8) USING DIFFERENCE SCORES
PASCAL SOURCE CODE
Program Boot_T2;
{does N iterations to calculate T for one sample based on difference
scores pre/post. Happy group}
USES CRT;
TYPE
DIFFERENCES = Array[1..8] OF REAL ; {Input file of difference values}
0 _SQUARED = Array[1..8] OF REAL; {array ofDIFFERENCES squared}














PROCEDURE Filenames(VAR FLAG: Boolean);
VAR Y : Stringl l ];
BEGIN
ClrScr;
Write('INPUT FILE NAME - MAX 25 CHARACTERS » ');
Readln(Input);
Write('OUTPUT FILE NAME - MAX 25 CHARACTERS » ');
Readln(Output);
Write('INPUT VARIABLE NAME » ');
Readln(Name);
Write('DO YOU WISH TO OUTPUT ACTUAL STATISTICS? YIN » ');
Readln(Y);






























{This procedure calculates Dsquared}









{This procedure calculates the mean of the differences - i.e. just the mean}
{of the input values which are difference values}










{This procedure calculates the (sum of d)squared IN}




{N.B. This procedure calculates the fIrst T value only!!!!}




















{ I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I}
{ ALL PROCEDURES NOW USE ARRAY SI WHICH IS A RANDOM SAMPLE FROM THE ORIGINAL
}
{I I I 1 1 I 1 I I 1 I 1 I 1 1 I I I I 1 I I 1 I I 1 1 I I I I 1 1 I I I I I 1·1 1 I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I }
{This procedure calculates Dsquared}
Procedure Calc_dsquaredS1(VAR Dsq : REAL);
BEGIN
Dsq:=O;
FOR 0_Loop := I TO DIFF_NO DO
BEGIN
D2[D_loop]:=( S l [D_loop ]*SI[D_loopD;
Dsq :=Dsq + D2[D_Loop];
END;
END;
{This procedure calculates the mean of the differences - i.e. just the mean}
{of the input values which are difference values}










{This procedure calculates the (sum of d)squared IN}




{N.B. This procedure calculates the T value from the random sample}
Procedure Calc_ Sample_T(VAR T: REAL);










{+++++ 1 1 1 I 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 I 1 I 1 1 1++++ I I 1 1 1 I 1+ 1 1 1 I I 1++ I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 I 1 1 I I 1 1 1 I 1 1 I I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I}





Procedure Reportl (T: REAL);
BEGIN
Write(Outfile ,'T STATISTIC FOR THE PREIPOST DIFFERENCE FOR THE ');
Write(Outfile,'VARIABLE ~' ,Name,'~: ',T:8:5);
Writeln(Outfile);
END;
Procedure Report2(Count ,T_average: REAL);
BEGIN
Write(Outfile,'Bootstrap estimate ofT for ',Count:15:0,' iterations: ');
Writeln(Outfile ,T_average:12:7);
END;
Procedure Progress(Count,N : REAL);
BEGIN






































































FOLLOW UP STUDY: BOOTSTRAP ALGORITHM




{does N iterations to calculate mean and std of a given sample}
USES CRT;
TYPE
DIFFERENCES = Array[ 1..11] OF REAL; {Input file of difference values}
D SQUARED = Array[1..11] OF REAL; {array of DIFFERENCES squared}















PROCEDURE Filenames(VAR FLAG: Boolean);
VAR Y : String[I];
BEGIN
ClrScr;
Write('INPUT FILE NAME - MAX 25 CHARACTERS »');
Readln(Input);
Write('OUTPUT FILE NAME - MAX 25 CHARACTERS» ');
Readln(Output);
Write('INPUT VARIABLE NAME » ');
Readln(Name);
Write('DO YOU WISH TO OUTPUT ACTUAL STATISTICS? Y/N »');
Readln(Y);






























{This procedure calculates the mean of the original data set}










{This procedure calculates the sum ofthe squared values (SX2)}
{of the input values which are difference values}
Procedure Calc_ SumXsquared(VAR SX2 : REAL);
BEGIN
SX2:=O;






{This procedure calculates the (sum ofX)squaredlN}












{N.B. This procedure calculates the first mean (X) and STD value only!!!!}
Procedure Calcjirst(VAR Std, X : REAL);


















{+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++I I I I I 111111I I I I I I I 1+++++++1 I I 11 I I I 11 I I I 1 Ill}
{ ALL PROCEDURES NOW USE ARRAY SI WHICH IS A RANDOM SAMPLE FROM THE ORIGINAL }
{++I I I 1 I I I I 1 I I 1 I I 1 I I 1 I I 1 I I I 1 I I I 111 I I I I 111 I I I I I I I I I I 11+++++++++++1 I I I 11 I I 11 I I I}
{This procedure calculates the mean of the original data set}










{This procedure calculates the sum of the squared values (SX2)}
{ofthe input values which are difference values}
Procedure Calc_SumXsquareds(VAR SX2: REAL);
BEGIN
SX2:=O;
FOR D_Loop := 1 TO Diff_no DO
BEGIN




{This procedure calculates the (sum ofX)squaredlN}
Procedure Sumx_squareds(VAR SUMX2: REAL; Total: REAL);













{N.B . This procedure calculates the mean (X)for the samples}
Procedure Calc_sample(VAR Std, X : REAL);









{Ill 11 11 111 11 111 111111+++++++++++++++1111111111111111 I 1111 I 111 11111 1 I I I I I 1 Ill}







Write(Outfile,'Mean for variable ');
Write(Outfile,'VARIABLE ~' ,Name,'~: ',x:8:5,' Std deviation: ',Std:8 :5);
Writeln(Outfile);
END;
Procedure Report_finakCount.X_ average ,Std_average: REAL);
BEGIN
Writeln(Outfile,'Bootstrap estimate for ',Count:l5:0,' iterations: ');
Write(Outfile,' Mean ',x_average: 12:7,' ');














































































MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (18 ITEMS)
SPSS RESULT FILE
254
SPSS/PC+ The Statistical Package for IBM PC
@c:\new\manova.txt
DATA LIST /PRAC 1-3 (A) SEAT 6-7 GENDER 10 LANG 13 COND 16 HAPPY 19-22
SAD 25-28 NEUTRAL 31-34 HNEUTRAL 36-39 SNEUTRAL 42-45 ERRORS 47-48






107 cases are written to the uncompressed active file.
This procedure was completed at 15 :33:41
VALUE LABELS GENDER 1 'MEN' 2 'WOMEN'
/ LANG 1 'ZULU' 2 'XHOSA' 3 'OTHER AFRICAN LANG' 4 'ENGLISH' 5
' AFRI KAANS '
6 'OTHER '
/COND 1 'SAD' 2 'HAPPY' .
/WORD1 TO WORD19 1 'HAPPY' 2 'SAD' 3 'NEUTRAL' 4 'ERROR'.
COMPUTE LANGX=LANG.
RECODE LANGX (2=1) (3=1) (5=1) (6=1) (4=2).
VALUE LABELS LANGX 1 'NON ENGLISH' 2 'ENGLISH' .
MANOVA Errs Errh Happy Sad Sneutral Hneutral BY COND(l,2)
The raw data or transformation pass is proceeding






The last subcommand is not a design specification--A full factorial model
is generated for this problem .
107 cases accepted .
o cases rejected because of out-of-range factor values.
o cases rejected because of missing data.
8 non-empty cells .
1 design will be processed.
------------- ------------ ------------------------ ----- -------------------------
Page 2 SPSS/PC+ 12/18/96
* * ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - - DESIGN 1 * *
EFFECT . . COND BY GENDER BY LANGX
Multivariate Tests of Significance (S = 1, M = 2 , N = 46
Test Name Value Approx. F Hypoth. DF Error DF Sig . of F
Pillais .06270 1.04802 6.00 94.00 .400
Hotellings .06689 1 .04802 6.00 94.00 .400
wilks .93730 1.04802 6.00 94.00 .400
Roys .06270
- - - - -










. 0 0 67 0
. 0 04 9 8
.025 76
. 0 0 84 0
. 0 0 0 0 9
.00848
Erro r SS Hy p oth. MS Er r o r MS F S i g . o f F
.95104 . 0 0 6 7 0 . 0 0961 . 6 9 71 5 .406
.77 0 0 0 . 0 04 98 . 0 0 7 7 8 .64024 .426
1. 57889 . 02 57 6 .01595 1.61542 . 2 07
2 .64866 . 0 084 0 . 02 6 75 .31382 .5 77
2.3 3406 .00009 . 023 5 8 . 0 03 98 . 95 0
1 . 19328 .00848 .0 1205 .7 03 1 6 . 4 04
-- - - - - -- --------------- ---- - --- -- - - ------ - - - ----- ---- - --- - - --- -- --- - ----- - -----
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* * ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE DESIGN 1 * *
EFFECT . . GENDER BY LANGX
Multivariate Tes t s of Signi ficanc e (S = 1, M = 2 , N = 4 6
Te s t Name Va l u e Approx. F Hypo t h . DF Er r o r DF S ig. o f F
Pi llais . 04 5 2 1 . 74 1 81 6.00 94.00 . 61 7
Hote l lings . 04 7 3 5 . 74 181 6.00 94 .00 .617
wilks .954 79 . 74 1 81 6 .00 94 .00 . 617
Roy s . 04 52 1
- - - - -
Univar iate F-tes t s wi th (1,99) D. F .
Variable Hypoth . SS Er r o r SS Hypo t h. MS Er r o r MS F Sig . of F
ERRS . 0 14 4 4 .95104 .01444 . 0 0961 1 .50268 . 223
ERRH . 00 458 . 7 7 0 0 0 . 0 04 5 8 . 00778 . 5 8 83 4 . 4 4 5
HAPPY . 0 04 92 1 .57889 .00492 .0 159 5 . 3 083 7 . 5 8 0
SAD . 0 0 61 7 2 .64866 .0061 7 . 02 67 5 . 2 3 05 3 .632
SNEUTRAL . 0 0 1 8 2 2.33406 .00182 .02358 .0 7721 . 782
HNEUTRAL .00 000 1 . 1 93 2 8 .00000 . 01 2 05 .00019 . 989
- - - - -
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* * ANALYSIS OF VARI ANCE DESIGN 1 * *
EFFEC T .. COND BY LANGX
Multivariate Te s t s of S ignificance (S = 1 , M = 2 , N = 46
Te st Name Va l u e App r ox . F Hypo t h . DF Error DF S i g . o f F
Pi llais . 1 8 8 95 3.649 79 6 .00 94.00 .003
Hotelling s .2329 7 3.649 79 6.00 94.00 .003
wilks . 8 11 05 3.64979 6 .00 94 . 0 0 .003
ROYs .18 89 5
- - - - -
Uni v ariate F-test s with (1, 9 9) D. F .
Va ria ble Hypo t h. SS Erro r SS Hypo t h . MS Er r o r MS F S i g. of F







. 0 0 35 5
. 01 2 02
.0 675 9
. 02666
. 7 7 0 0 0
1 .57889
2 .64866
2 . 3 3406
1 .1 9328
. 0 0 97 7
. 0 03 55
. 01 2 02
. 0 6 75 9
. 02 6 6 6
. 0 0 7 7 8
. 01 5 95
.0 26 75
.023 5 8
. 01 2 05
1.25674
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* * ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE DESIGN 1 * *
EFFECT . . COND BY GENDER
Mu lt ivariate Te s t s of s ignif ica nce (S = 1 , M = 2 , N = 46
Te st Name Value Approx . F Hypo t h . DF Error DF Sig . of F
Pillai s . 11 2 6 9 1. 9 8 9 6 6 6 .00 94. 0 0 . 075
Hotellings .127 0 0 1 .989 6 6 6. 0 0 94 . 0 0 . 0 7 5
wilks . 8 87 3 1 1 . 9 8 96 6 6. 0 0 94 . 0 0 . 0 75
Roy s .1126 9
- - - - -
Univar i ate F-tests wi t h (1,99) D. F .
Va r i a b l e Hypoth. SS Er r o r SS Hypoth. MS Error MS F sig. o f F
ERRS . 04 5 9 8 .95104 . 04 5 9 8 . 0 0 9 61 4 . 78686 . 03 1
ERRH . 00556 .77000 . 0 05 5 6 .00778 .71477 .4 0 0
HAPPY .0 13 40 1 .57 8 8 9 . 013 4 0 . 01595 . 84 027 . 3 62
SAD . 0 0 1 54 2 . 64 8 6 6 . 0 0154 .026 7 5 .0 5 76 2 .8 11
SNEUTRAL . 064 4 2 2 . 3 3 40 6 . 0 64 4 2 . 02 3 5 8 2. 73 2 4 4 . 1 01
HNEUTRAL . 03 6 61 1 .19328 . 03 6 61 . 01 2 05 3 .0370 8 .084
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* * ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - - DESIGN 1 * *
EFFECT . . LANGX
Mul tivariate Te s t s o f Significanc e (S = 1 , M = 2 , N = 4 6
Te s t Name Value Approx . F Hypoth. DF Error DF Sig . o f F
Pillais . 5 5 4 8 0 1 9 .5 2345 6 . 0 0 94. 0 0 . 0 0 0
Hotellings 1 .24 61 8 19 .52345 6 . 00 94.00 .000
wi lks . 4 4520 19 .52345 6 .00 94 .00 . 00 0
Roys .55480
- - - - -
Univariate F-test s with (1 , 9 9) D o F .
Va r i a b l e Hypo th. SS Error SS Hypoth. MS Error MS F Sig . o f F
ERRS .75860 . 95 1 04 . 75 8 6 0 .00961 78 .96 715 . 0 0 0
ERRH . 5 1 7 0 9 . 7 7 0 0 0 . 51 7 0 9 . 0 0 7 7 8 66 .48317 . 0 0 0
HAPPY . 4 3 3 1 2 1 .57889 .43312 . 01 5 95 27.15772 . 0 0 0
SAD . 04 02 8 2 .64866 .04028 . 02 6 75 1 .5 054 3 . 2 2 3
SNEUTRAL .43285 2 .33 4 06 .43 2 85 .0235 8 1 8 . 3 5 94 5 . 0 0 0
HNEUTRAL .00529 1.19328 . 0 05 2 9 .01205 . 4 3 85 6 .509
- --- -- - - - - - - - - - - -- - -- -- - - - - - - - - --- --- --- - --- -- -- -- -- ---- ----- -- -------- --- -----
Page 7 SP SS / PC+ 12 / 1 8 / 9 6
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* * ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - - DESIGN 1 * *
EFFECT . . GENDER
Multivariate Tests of S i g n i f i c a n c e (S = 1, M = 2 , N = 46
Test Name Value Approx . F Hypoth . DF Error DF sig . of F
Pillai s . 14 7 76 2. 7163 1 6.0 0 94 .00 . 01 8
Hotell i n gs . 1 7 33 8 2 . 7163 1 6.00 94.00 . 01 8
wi l ks .8 5 2 2 4 2 . 7163 1 6.00 94.00 . 01 8
Roys . 1477 6
- - - - -
Univa r i a te F- t e sts with (1, 99) D . F .
Variable Hypoth . SS Er r o r SS Hyp oth. MS Error MS F Sig . o f F
ERRS . 0 0 63 9 .95104 .0063 9 . 0 0 9 61 . 6 64 7 2 .417
ERRH .0059 2 . 7 7 0 0 0 .00592 . 0 0 7 7 8 . 7 61 0 0 . 3 85
HAPPY .00954 1.5788 9 .00954 . 0 1 5 9 5 . 5 9 83 5 .441
SAD . 1 6 0 6 8 2 .6 4 866 .1 6 0 68 .026 7 5 6 .0056 7 . 01 6
SNEUTRAL . 1 02 3 2 2 . 33 406 . 1 02 3 2 . 02 3 5 8 4 . 34 01 3 . 04 0
HNEUTRAL . 02 84 6 1 . 1 93 2 8 . 02 84 6 . 01 205 2.36085 . 1 2 8
- - - - -
Page 8 SPSS/PC+ 12/18/96
* * ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE - - DESIGN 1 * *
EFFECT . . COND
Mu lt i v a r i a te Te s t s o f significan c e (S = 1, M = 2 , N = 4 6
Test Name Va lue Approx . F Hypoth. DF Error DF S i g . o f F
Pillais . 1 9 2 91 3. 74 4 7 2 6 .00 94 . 00 . 0 02
Hotellings .23 9 02 3. 74 472 6 .00 94 . 00 . 00 2
wi lks .8070 9 3 . 74 4 72 6 .00 94 .00 . 0 02
Roy s . 1 92 91
- - - - -
Univariate F-te st s wi th (1, 9 9) D . F.
Vari ab l e Hypo t h . SS Erro r SS Hypoth . MS Er ror MS F sig . o f F
ERRS .1 7 386 .95 1 04 . 1 7386 . 0 096 1 18 . 0 9767 .0 00
ERRH .00214 . 7 7 0 0 0 .00214 . 0 07 7 8 . 2 7 5 1 5 . 6 01
HAPPY . 0 3 2 3 3 1 .57 88 9 .03 2 33 . 01 5 95 2 .0 2735 .158
SAD . 0 04 1 5 2. 64866 .0 041 5 .0 2 6 75 . 1 5 5 11 .695
SNEUTRAL . 1 2 1 5 6 2. 33406 . 1 2 1 5 6 . 02 3 5 8 5 .15613 . 02 5
HNEUTRAL .01740 1.19328 .01740 . 012 05 1.44378 .23 2
- - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---- ---- ---- ------ - ----- --- --- ----- -- --- -- ----
Page 9 SPSS/PC+ 12/18 / 9 6
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* * ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE DESIGN 1 * *
EFFECT .. CONSTANT
Mul tivariate Tests o f signifi cance (8 1, M 2 , N 46 )





1 .00000 3147054 .77
200 875.837 3147054 .77
.00000 3147054.77
1.00000
6 . 0 0
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6.00





. 0 0 0
Univariate F-tests with (1, 99) D. F .
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1 2 5 28 BYTES OF WORKSPACE NEEDED FOR MANOVA EXECUTI ON.
APPENDIX I
MAIN STUDY:

















































Subject recalled phrase: do not know
Subject recalled phrase: don't know
Subject recalled phrase: Easier
Subject recalled phrase: BE AT SCHOOL
Subject recalled phrase: dont know
Subject recalled phrase: don't know
Subject recalled phrase: run around
Subject recalled phrase: DONT KNOW
Subject recalled phrase: dont know
Subject recalled phrase: don't know
Subject recalled phrase:
Subject recalled phrase: dont know
Subject recalled phrase: confused
Subject recalled phrase: don't know
Subject recalled phrase: DONT KNOW
Subject recalled phrase: don't know
Subject recalled phrase: dont known
Subject recalled phrase: don not know
Subject recalled phrase: Don't Know
Subject recalled phrase: don't know
Subject recalled phrase: don"t know
Subject recalled phrase: DONT KNOW
Subject recalled phrase: donotknow
Subject recalled phrase: don,tknow
Subject recalled phrase: dont know
Subject recalled phrase: summsum
Subject recalled phrase: horse
Subject recalled phrase:
Subject recalled phrase: flashed
Subject recalled phrase: dont know
Subject recalled phrase: dont know
Subject recalled phrase: happy
Subject recalled phrase: psychology
Subject recalled phrase: under
Subject recalled phrase: HELP
Subject recalled phrase: abn
Subject recalled phrase: no idea
Subject recalled phrase: HELP
Subject recalled phrase: HELP
Subject recalled phrase: please help
Subject recalled phrase: SCREEN
Subject recalled phrase: away
Subject recalled phrase: HAPPy
Subject recalled phrase: HOSTEL
Subject recalled phrase: running
Subject recalled phrase: I don't know

















































Subject recalled phrase: ok
Subject recalled phrase: e pi
Subject recalled phrase: Thabani Mbhele
Subject recalled phrase:
Subject recalled phrase:
Subject recalled phrase: MATHS SYMBOLS
Subject recalled phrase: PATTERNS
Subject recalled phrase: be
Subject recalled phrase: happy
Subject recalled phrase: psychology
Subject recalled phrase: dont know
Subject recalled phrase: music
Subject recalled phrase: house
Subject recalled phrase: b
Subject recalled phrase: dont know
Subject recalled phrase : i do not know
Subject recalled phrase: smillingface
Subject recalled phrase: please be back
Subject recalled phrase: I DONT KNOW
Subject recalled phrase:
Subject recalled phrase: 0
Subject recalled phrase: dont know
Subject recalled phrase: I REALLY DONT K
Subject recalled phrase: reboo
Subject recalled phrase: desiree
Subject recalled phrase:
Subject recalled phrase: dont know
Subject recalled phrase : dont know
Subject recalled phrase: berttbr
Subject recalled phrase: DONT KNOW
Subject recalled phrase: #$&$%%&
Subject recalled phrase: k.x--op====x
Subject recalled phrase: DONT KNOW
Subject recalled phrase: GREECKLETTERS
Subject recalled phrase:
Subject recalled phrase : do not know
Subject recalled phrase: buildings of an
Subject recalled phrase: dont know
Subject recalled phrase: dont know
Subject recalled phrase: do not know
Subject recalled phrase: psychology
Subject recalled phrase: HOW ARE YOU
Subject recalled phrase: i don't know
Subject recalled phrase: seeing is belie
Subject recalled phrase:
Subject recalled phrase: think















Subject recalled phrase: what is your
Subject recalled phrase: haroon
Subject recalled phrase: happy
Subject recalled phrase: don'tknow
Subject recalled phrase: white flash
Subject recalled phrase: I DIDN'T SEE AN
Subject recalled phrase: nothing was see
Subject recalled phrase: TRY HARD
Subject recalled phrase: practical
Subject recalled phrase: the dog
Subject recalled phrase:
Subject recalled phrase: the hands of





L~~_ .._ J L_ ~...~_ _J
HOME LANGUAGE: (X) ~~_~ _ .
5. AFRIKAANS [ J 6. OTHER Dl. ZULU 1_· _ _ __~ 2. XHOSA l:=J 3. OTHER AFRICAN LANGUAGE [=~] 4. ENGLISH r=-:-J
INSTRUCTION~: Please rate the following list of words by making a ring on the number on each scale, indicating how you think each word is related to the emotion in question.
word Rela ted to HAPPINESS Related to SADNESS HOW OFTEN USED BY YOU
CD23®56® CD23®56® ®23®56®
not at all moderately highly not at all moderately highly never sometimes often
medal: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
meddle: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1234567
hymn: I 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 2 3 4 5 6 7
him: I 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 1234567 ~
die : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
~dye : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7sweet: I 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1234567
suite: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ~
won: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ~one: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
mourrung: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1234567 ~
morrung: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1234567 0heal: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1234567 dheel: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1234567
bridal: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ~
bridle: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1234567 0presents : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
~presence: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1234567 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
banned: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 1234567 ~
band : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0bored: I 2 3 4 5 6 7 I 2 3 4 5 6 7 1234567
board: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1234567 ~
dear: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1234567 ~
deer : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
~missed: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
mist: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ifined : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1234567
find: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ~
peace: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
prece: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 45 . 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
rose : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
rows: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
pride : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
pried : 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
pain: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
pane : I 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
